Concept
Statutory Limits on Attachment
After-acquired property
Statutory Limits on Attachment
A lender can draft “now owned or hereafter acquired” flawlessly and still find that the statute withholds part of what the words promise. Section 9-204(a) gives the general permission: “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a security agreement may create or provide for a security interest in after-acquired collateral.”1 Subsection (b) then takes part of it back. Subject to the carve-out in subsection (b.1), “a security interest does not attach under a term constituting an after-acquired property clause to” two kinds of collateral: consumer goods acquired outside a ten-day window, and commercial tort claims.2
The clause works through the ordinary rules of attachment, which require that the debtor agree to grant the interest, that value be given, and that the debtor have rights in the collateral.3 A clause lets the agreement and the value precede the debtor’s ownership, so the interest reaches each later item as the debtor acquires rights in it.4 A typical clause provides that the secured party’s interest “extends to all collateral of the kind which is the subject of this agreement which the debtor may acquire at any time during the continuation of this agreement in connection with the operation of the business of the debtor.”5
The previous section asked whether an agreement that never mentions the future still covers later items. The limits here apply even to a clause written in the plainest words, and the two exceptions rest on different reasons. A household that signs a form clause could encumber everything it will ever buy. A tort claim that has not yet arisen is something neither party can identify at signing. In each case a promise made far in advance would be unfair or unworkable, which is why the exceptions sit inside a statute that otherwise favors floating liens.
The first subsection below takes up the ten-day rule for consumer goods, and the second the bar on commercial tort claims. The third explains the carve-out in subsection (b.1), which leaves the lender’s interest in proceeds untouched.6 These limits aim at the clause alone. They leave other routes to attachment open (a secured party may, for example, take delivery of a certificated security pursuant to the debtor’s agreement),7 and they say nothing about perfection. A secured party who files completes a financing statement that asks for the debtor’s exact full legal name,8 and a later section takes up what filing accomplishes.9
Consumer Goods and the Ten-Day Rule
Section 9-204(b)(1) protects goods that a household rather than a business uses. An after-acquired clause does not attach a security interest to “consumer goods, other than an accession when given as additional security, unless the debtor acquires rights in them within 10 days after the secured party gives value.”10 For household goods, then, a clause reaches only what the debtor acquires within ten days after value is given.11 The limit names consumer goods and nothing else, so an express clause covering a merchant’s inventory or a business’s equipment keeps the full force that subsection (a) gives it.12
The evident purpose is to keep a consumer from encumbering present and future assets by signing a form. A floating lien makes sense for a business whose stock turns over and whose lender finances the cycle. A household’s later purchases belong to no such cycle, and the consumer who signs has little ability to foresee how far the clause reaches. The ten-day window preserves what a lender can fairly expect, because goods acquired at about the time credit is extended are plausibly part of the same transaction.
Applying the window requires two dates. The first is the date the secured party gives value. Value includes a binding commitment to extend credit, so that date may precede the day funds are actually advanced.13 The second is the date the debtor acquires rights in the particular item, which is also the date attachment would otherwise occur, since attachment requires the debtor to have rights in the collateral.14 The interest reaches the item only if the second date falls within ten days after the first. The standard illustration shows both outcomes. A grants B a security interest in all of A’s “consumer goods now owned or hereafter acquired,” and B gives value. If A acquires a new consumer good the next day, B’s interest attaches; if A acquires it eleven days after value, the interest does not.15 That transaction is a nonconsumer one in which the description is effective, so the ten-day period alone decides the result.
The statute exempts one kind of consumer good from the window: an accession “when given as additional security.”16 An accession is a good installed in or fastened to other goods, such as a new engine put into a car. If the lender holds an interest in the car and the debtor gives the engine as additional security, the ten-day limit does not stand in the way, however long after value the engine arrives. The exception makes sense because an engine becomes part of goods that already secure the debt, so covering it adds an improvement to existing collateral and opens no claim on the household’s unrelated purchases. The exception also stays within its words, which reach an accession given as additional security and nothing wider.
The ten-day limit restricts what the clause can do, and it does not decide whether the agreement describes the collateral adequately. That is a separate question. Section 9-108(e) makes some descriptions inadequate when the transaction is a consumer transaction and the collateral is a consumer good. In one worked problem, a bank had taken an interest in a buyer’s “goods,” and the buyer then acquired an SUV. The ten-day limit did not apply, because the bank gave value within ten days of the buyer’s acquiring rights in the SUV. Yet the description was inadequate if the transaction was a consumer transaction and the SUV a consumer good, and without an adequate description the bank had no attached interest in the vehicle.17 A lender can therefore pass the ten-day test and still fail the description test, so a consumer-goods problem asks both questions in order.
Commercial Tort Claims
Section 9-204(b)(2) names the second kind of collateral that an after-acquired clause cannot reach: “a commercial tort claim.”19 The consumer-goods rule softens the bar with a ten-day window. This rule offers no window, and it applies in consumer and nonconsumer transactions alike.20 Subsection (a) opens with the words “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b),” so for commercial tort claims the general permission gives way.21
At bottom the limit is a rule about timing. It reaches a commercial tort claim that arises after the debtor authenticates the security agreement.22 A claim that already exists at that moment falls outside the limit, and the lender must deal with it by the means described below. The first task is deciding which tort claims count as commercial. A tort claim is a commercial tort claim if it meets either of two tests:
- The claimant is an organization.
- The claimant is an individual, the claim arose in the course of the individual’s business or profession, and the claim is not based on damages for personal injury or death.
The first test looks only at who holds the claim, and where an organization’s claim came from does not matter. The second test is narrower, because an individual’s claim must come from the claimant’s work and must seek something other than compensation for bodily harm or death. A courier who runs a delivery business and is hit by a negligent driver shows where the line falls. The courier’s claim for damage to the van and for lost deliveries arose in the course of the business and is not a personal injury claim, so it is a commercial tort claim. The courier’s claim for his own bodily injuries is not, because the definition excludes personal injury. A vacationer injured in an accident that another driver’s negligence caused holds a claim that fails the individual test twice over: it arose outside any business of hers, and it seeks damages for personal injury. Subsection (b)(2) has nothing to say about that claim. Whether Article 9 governs a transfer of it is a scope question answered by the exclusions in § 9-109(c) and (d), and an excluded transaction is not thereby forbidden, since other law may allow an interest in the asset.23
Once a claim qualifies, the deciding question is when it arose relative to the moment the debtor authenticated the security agreement. A claim that arises later is not captured by the clause.24 The sensible reason starts with what a tort claim is before it arises, which is nothing: no injury has occurred, no defendant exists, and no one can estimate a value. A clause pledging whatever claims may someday arise would transfer an interest in something neither party can identify at signing. A clause signed years earlier could also sweep in a claim from an accident no one foresaw, an asset the loan never financed. By withholding attachment under the clause, the Code makes the parties deal with the claim after it exists, when they can see what it is.
A claim that already exists on the day of authentication stands differently, because the debtor can grant it directly with no after-acquired clause. Agreement, value, and the debtor’s rights in the claim are then all in place.25 What the lender needs is a description that identifies the claim. Section 9-108(e) makes some descriptions inadequate even when attachment is otherwise possible,26 and for a commercial tort claim the bare label is one of them. An agreement covering “all commercial tort claims of the debtor” fails. An agreement covering the debtor’s claims arising out of the explosion of a named manufacturing facility, an event that has already happened, identifies a particular claim and succeeds. The contrast with a category such as inventory explains the rule. Inventory names a pool of goods that both parties can picture, whereas the label “commercial tort claim” points to no pool, since the debtor may hold none, one, or several, and the label does not say which the lender means. A description tied to an event supplies the missing identity, but only after the event has occurred, because only then does a claim exist to be identified. The printing company’s lender could therefore capture the rival’s claim by having the company authenticate an agreement that describes it by the wrong the rival committed.
Each step guards against a different weakness. A clause cannot capture a claim that did not yet exist, and a bare label cannot identify one that did.
The Proceeds Carve-Out
Subsection (b.1) takes back part of what subsection (b) takes away. It provides that subsection (b) “does not prevent a security interest from attaching” in three situations:30
- to consumer goods as proceeds under § 9-315(a) or commingled goods under § 9-336(c);31
- to a commercial tort claim as proceeds under § 9-315(a); or32
- under an after-acquired property clause, to property that is proceeds of consumer goods or a commercial tort claim.33
Subsection (b) itself begins “Subject to subsection (b.1),” so the limits stay in force against what the clause adds and give way against what the lender’s existing collateral becomes.34
A restriction on the clause does not reach these situations because an interest in proceeds does not come from the clause. When a secured party holds an attached security interest in any collateral, the interest automatically attaches to any identifiable proceeds, and the security agreement need not say anything about proceeds.35 Proceeds include what the debtor receives on selling, leasing, or licensing the collateral, whatever is collected or distributed on account of it, rights arising out of it, claims arising out of its loss, defects, infringement, or other impairment of value, and insurance payable on those claims.36 Because the interest arises automatically, a limit on what the clause can attach has nothing to operate on. Subsection (b.1) says so expressly, so that no one reads the consumer-goods and tort-claim limits as stripping the lender of what its collateral became.
Neither limit’s reason applies to proceeds. The consumer-goods limit keeps a household from encumbering everything it will ever buy, but a household that trades a secured item for another acquires no new category of assets; it holds the same value in a different form. The tort-claim limit exists because an unarisen claim cannot be identified at signing, whereas a claim that is proceeds comes out of collateral the lender already holds, so both sides can see what it is. And if the limits applied to proceeds, a debtor could shed a lien by selling or swapping the collateral, and the lender’s interest would last only until the next disposition.
A standard illustration is a trade. A debtor buys a computer and gives a security interest in it, for example to the seller or a financial institution. When the debtor trades it for a different computer, the secured party has a security interest in the computer obtained in the trade.37
What separates the two purchases is their source: the computer came out of a disposition of collateral the lender already held, and the tablet came out of wages. A student who sees a consumer good acquired long after value and reaches at once for the ten-day rule skips the first question, which is whether the item is the product of a disposition of existing collateral. The ten-day rule governs items that arrive under the clause, and an item that arrives as proceeds never meets it.
Commingled goods follow the same logic, which is why the reference to § 9-336(c) in item (1) sits beside proceeds. Goods are commingled when they are united in such a way that their individual identity is subsumed within the product or mass that results, and a security interest attached to the goods beforehand attaches to that product or mass.38 Commingling changes the form of the collateral as a sale does, because the original item disappears into the mass while its value remains. A lender who lost its interest at that point would be defeated by the debtor’s act of mixing, and the carve-out prevents that for consumer goods that would otherwise face the ten-day limit.
Item (2) applies the same reasoning to commercial tort claims. A claim arising out of the loss of collateral, or out of damage that impairs its value, is itself proceeds, so the lender’s interest in the damaged collateral continues in the claim without any help from the clause.39 Suppose a warehouse fire destroys a manufacturer’s inventory, and the manufacturer acquires a tort claim against a supplier whose negligence started the fire. The claim arises out of the loss of collateral, so the lender’s interest in the destroyed inventory continues in the claim, and insurance payable on the loss is proceeds on the same footing.40 The printing company’s claim against its rival in the preceding subsection had no connection to the lender’s collateral, so it gains nothing from the carve-out and stays outside the clause.
Item (3) covers the lender whose agreement contains an after-acquired clause and whose later-acquired property is itself proceeds of consumer goods or of a commercial tort claim. The limits in subsection (b) do not stop the clause from reaching that property.41 Proceeds are the lender’s existing collateral in a new form, so the clause adds no fresh category of assets to the lien. The carve-out is correspondingly narrow: an item that is neither proceeds nor commingled goods stays subject to the ten-day rule or the tort-claim bar like any other later acquisition.