Concept
Rights in the Collateral
Enforceability (§ 9-203)
Rights in the Collateral
A debtor cannot grant what the debtor does not have. The second condition in § 9-203(b) writes that limit into the statute: the debtor must have rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party.1 A security interest is an interest in the debtor's personal property, granted to secure payment or performance of an obligation,2 so the debtor must have the right, as a matter of property law, to grant it.3 Without the condition, anyone could encumber a stranger's goods by signing a form, and the owner would lose property without agreeing to anything.
Rights in the collateral is one of three basic requirements for attaching a security interest by agreement, subject to some limited exceptions: the debtor must agree to grant the interest, value must be given, and the debtor must have the right to grant it.4 The third condition concerns the agreement itself. Under § 9-203(b)(3)(A), the debtor must have signed a security agreement that describes the collateral.5 This unit takes up the first two parts of that requirement, a record and the debtor's signature, and the next unit takes up the description. One idea links the conditions: the debtor is defined by an interest in the collateral, so the person whose rights matter under the second condition is also the person whose signature matters under the third. Later sections cover the substitutes for a signed record and the attachment of related property, among it supporting obligations, meaning letter-of-credit rights and secondary obligations, most commonly guarantees, that back payment or performance of collateral such as an account or an instrument.6
A Record
The signed-agreement route presupposes an agreement that exists in a form someone can sign and read.7 Article 9 calls that form a record: information inscribed on a tangible medium, or stored in an electronic or other medium, that is retrievable in perceivable form.8 The definition makes two demands. The information must be fixed somewhere, on paper or on a drive, and a person must be able to bring it back into a form the person can see or hear.
A writing is always a record, and almost all of today's security agreements meet the requirement by being in writing.9 The term reaches further. Information stored on a computer's hard drive or on a disk is a record,10 and so is a security agreement saved as a file on a cloud storage platform or kept as an attachment to an email chain; once the parties adopt it with the present intention of identifying themselves and accepting it, that file is an enforceable security agreement.11 A saved audio file satisfies the definition on the same logic, since stored audio can be played back in perceivable form.12 The medium therefore does not matter. The question is whether the information was preserved and can be retrieved.
Article 9 says record instead of writing to accommodate security agreements prepared and stored in electronic form.13 The requirement still does the work a writing used to do. Together with the debtor's signature, it is basically a statute of frauds provision,14 which exists so that an agreement can be proved from something sturdier than recollection. A record need not be permanent or indestructible, but information retained only through human memory does not qualify.15 A competing creditor who was not at the negotiation can examine a preserved file; it cannot examine a conversation.
A record is not the only way to evidence the agreement. Alongside an authenticated record with an adequate collateral description, the security agreement can be evidenced by the secured party's possession of specified types of collateral, or by its control of specified types.16 If the collateral is not a certificated security and the secured party holds it under the debtor's security agreement, the interest attaches even though no record exists.17 Possession and control get their own treatment later in the chapter.
The Debtor's Signature
The signature ties the record to a person. Under § 9-203(b)(3)(A), the debtor must have signed a security agreement that describes the collateral.19 The sources use two words for the act, signed and authenticated, and both turn on one thing: a symbol executed or adopted, or an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with the record, with present intent to adopt or accept it.20 Authenticated broadens signed so that it reaches records of every kind and not just writings.21 A question or an opinion that uses either word therefore calls for the same analysis.
The signature, like the record, serves the statute of frauds function of the requirement.22 It shows that the person whose property is encumbered agreed to the encumbrance, which is why the signature that counts is the debtor's. Article 9 defines the debtor by its relation to the collateral: a person having an interest in the collateral, other than a security interest or other lien, whether or not that person is an obligor.23 A seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes is also a debtor in that sale, and the agreement that creates the interest is the security agreement.24 In an ordinary loan the borrower owns the collateral and the two roles coincide, which hides the point that the signature must come from the person whose property is encumbered. Owing the debt is irrelevant to the definition; an interest in the collateral decides it.
A handwritten signature is the familiar case, but the definition of signed reaches any symbol executed or adopted with the present intention to adopt or accept a writing. Courts have read it liberally: a typed name may satisfy it, so may a photocopy of a signed signature, as well as many other symbols.25 No formal or complete signature is required, and a signature need not be under seal.26 Electronic records follow the same logic. Suppose a debtor emails a lender a grant of a security interest in described equipment, and the email program adds the debtor's name at the bottom. The debtor composed and sent the message, so the intent to adopt it is plain, and the name is the symbol associated with the record.
Present intent runs through every one of these forms. Authentication requires intent both to identify the person signing and to adopt or accept the record.27 A symbol that someone else places on the record without the debtor's adoption carries no such intent, so a forgery, or a name typed by a lender's clerk without the debtor's knowledge or approval, is not the debtor's signature. The same logic explains the tolerance about form: the evidence of assent lies in the intent behind the mark, not in its appearance.
The signature requirement runs in one direction. The condition asks only whether the debtor has signed, so nothing in § 9-203(b)(3)(A) requires the secured party to sign.28 Small errors in the record do not matter either: misspellings, even of the debtor's name, are not fatal, and it is very easy to draft and authenticate a document that has the effect of a security agreement.29 What cannot stand in for the debtor's signed grant is a financing statement. It needs only the names of the debtor and the secured party and an indication of the collateral, it need not be signed, and it says nothing about the debtor's intent to grant a security interest, so it cannot by itself substitute for a security agreement.30
The signature must also come from the right person for each asset. Suppose A signs a record granting B a security interest in all of A's goods, but one item, a generator, belongs to C, who never agreed to anything. As to the generator, C is the debtor, because C holds the interest in it.31 C signed nothing, so B holds no security agreement signed by the debtor for that item, and the all-goods description reaches C's property on paper while the signature does not.32 A also fails the second condition for the generator, since on these facts A has neither rights in it nor power to transfer any.33 As to A's own goods, A is the debtor, and A's signature supplies the condition. The requirement is tested asset by asset, against the person who is the debtor as to each one.
A corporation or other entity signs only through people, so agency law answers the question when an agent signs for the debtor: common-law agency concepts remain applicable where an agent signs or otherwise authenticates a security agreement on behalf of a principal.34 For a business debtor, the security agreement must contain the debtor's correct name, and the individual who signs for the entity must indicate the capacity in which the individual signs, although most courts will not invalidate an agreement if the debtor is sufficiently identified.35
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Helland shows where an agent question gets fought. To satisfy the signature requirement for certain notes, the creditor, IHCC, contended on appeal that the trial court had erred in excluding minutes of a special meeting of the debtor Leaders' directors, which authorized certain of the creditor's employees to execute notes payable to the creditor, together with a signatory authorization that gave the creditor authority to sign notes on Leaders' behalf and bore the signatures of its president and secretary.36 The offer went to authority. The creditor's employees were signing for the debtor, so the creditor had to show that the debtor, through its officers, had empowered them to do it.
Once the signer is identified and the signature understood, the signed record has one more job, which the next unit takes up: it must describe the collateral.