Concept
Value Given
Enforceability (§ 9-203)
Value Given
A security interest created by agreement attaches only when three conditions are met: the debtor agrees to grant it, value is given, and the debtor has rights in the collateral.1 The conditions are cumulative. A creditor who holds a signed agreement over collateral the debtor owns still has no enforceable interest until value arrives, and the interest attaches when the last condition is met.2 This unit takes the conditions in the order § 9-203(b) lists them: value, then the debtor’s rights, then the agreement itself.
The first condition takes four words to state: “value has been given.”3 Article 9 supplies no definition of its own and applies the general definition in Article 1, § 1-204.4 Under that definition, a person gives value for rights by acquiring them in any of four ways:
- in return for a binding commitment to extend credit, or for the extension of immediately available credit, whether or not drawn upon;
- as security for, or in total or partial satisfaction of, a preexisting claim;
- by accepting delivery under a preexisting contract for purchase; or
- in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.5
Those four routes are broad enough that litigation over value is uncommon.6 What litigation there is tends to concern past indebtedness and the sufficiency of future advances.7 The ordinary commercial transactions clear the line without argument. A lender that loans money, or merely commits to loan it, gives value. So does a seller that sells, or agrees to sell, goods on installment terms and reserves a security interest to secure the price.8
The second route surprises students, because contract law generally refuses to enforce a promise supported only by past consideration. Article 9 departs from that rule: taking security for an antecedent debt is value in its own right.9 A buyer who purchased goods on open account and cannot pay may grant the seller a security interest in those goods, and value is given even though the interest secures only the old balance. The result is the same when the collateral is goods the seller never sold.10 A debtor who owes $1,000 on one unsecured loan and $10,000 on another, and who grants security for the larger loan in return for discharge of the smaller, has received value on two grounds: the interest secures a preexisting loan, and the agreement was given in satisfaction of a debt.11
The fourth route reaches any exchange that would count as consideration in a simple contract. In Compass Bank v. Kone, Compass Bank and Noelle Kone each claimed excess sale proceeds that had been deposited in an interpleader action, each relying on its own security interest.12 Compass Bank argued that Blake Street had given no consideration, because it was already obligated to pay the long-term liabilities, including the Guyer note. The court rejected that argument. Under the parties’ Undertaking, Blake Street agreed to assume sole responsibility for repaying those obligations and to give up its contractual right to impose liability on James Kone as a co-borrower on the note, and no one disputed it.13 A preexisting duty does not defeat consideration when the exchange adds something to it: here, sole responsibility and the surrender of a claim against a co-borrower.
The value requirement guards against sham grants. Secured creditors can always beat unsecured creditors and usually a trustee in bankruptcy, so a debtor who could grant security interests for nothing could become judgment-proof by granting them to friends and family who never lent a dollar. The collateral would then be unavailable to legitimate creditors.14 The safeguard does not burden real lenders, because a loan, a commitment to lend, an installment sale, and security for an old debt each pass.15 Only the grant that rests on nothing fails.
When Value Arrives, and From Whom
The secured party must give value before the interest can attach, so the date value arrives sets the earliest date of attachment. A debtor can sign a security agreement long before anyone has committed to lend. Suppose a debtor who owns its equipment signs an agreement granting a bank an interest in it, and the bank makes no commitment to lend; a week later the bank agrees to make the loan. No value existed at signing, so the interest did not attach and was not enforceable until the bank agreed to lend.16
A purchase-money financing shows the same rule in two versions. In the first, a debtor who wants widgets asks a lender to finance the price and signs an agreement giving the lender an interest in the widgets for any loan the lender might make. The lender has promised nothing. The seller delivers, the debtor forwards the bill, and the lender pays it. Value is given when the lender pays, because no earlier commitment to extend credit existed.17 In the second version, the agreement says the lender will make the loan if the debtor buys the widgets. The lender is bound from the moment of signing, so value is given then.18 Attachment also requires the debtor’s rights in the widgets, the next condition, but value no longer holds the date back.
The commitment need not be unconditional. A lender that promises to lend if a review of the debtor’s financial statement shows that the debtor can repay has made a promise that would be good consideration in contract law, and a security interest granted before the loan is made already rests on value. The condition does not destroy the promise’s effectiveness as consideration or value.19 What a lender cannot do is stay free to lend or to refuse and still claim value at signing. Like the bank in the equipment example, that lender has given nothing until it commits or lends.
Performance can supply what a promise did not. In re ProvideRx of Grapevine, LLC, a term sheet was non-binding when signed: it described a loan the purchaser was willing to make and a senior security interest the guarantor would provide. The loan transaction later occurred under a convertible note that expressly incorporated the term sheet, and the court found that value had been given via the loans.20
Nothing in the definition requires value to flow from the secured party to the debtor. Value must be given, but the secured party need not advance it, and it need not be advanced to the debtor; the debtor and the obligor can be two different people.21 A lender that assumes a debtor’s open-account debt to a seller, in return for a security interest in the goods, gives value by taking on that debt.22
Rights in the Collateral
The second condition looks from the lender to the debtor: the interest is enforceable only if the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party.24 A lender with a signed agreement and a funded loan still has nothing if the debtor had nothing to give.
The condition rests on a baseline of property law: a security interest attaches only to whatever rights the debtor has. The Comment calls this a “baseline” rule and notes exceptions that let a debtor transfer, and a security interest attach to, greater rights than the debtor holds. Section 9-203(b)(2) accommodates those exceptions by adding the phrase “or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party,” and the exceptions themselves appear in the priority rules of §§ 9-317 through 9-339.25
Rights can be far less than ownership, and Article 9 does not make its rules turn on where title sits.26 A lessee who grants a lender a security interest in all of its goods gives the lender an interest in the lessee’s rights under the lease and nothing beyond them, because the interest reaches only the rights the debtor holds.27 The hard cases lie between a lessee’s clear rights and a custodian’s bare possession. Where, precisely, a debtor’s relationship with the collateral moves from mere possession to rights sufficient for a security interest is not clear.28 A consignee shows one answer: unless the consignor perfects a security interest in the consigned goods, the consignee holds rights and title “identical to those the consignor had or had power to transfer.”29
Because the interest attaches to the debtor’s rights, it takes them as the debtor holds them, burdens included. In Systran Financial Services Corp. v. Giant Cement Holding, Inc., an assignee was bound by an arbitration term in the agreement between the account debtor and the assignor. The court observed that if the assignee did not want to arbitrate disputes over collections from account debtors, “it could have contracted with [the assignor] to prevent it from entering into any agreement that contained arbitration clauses.”30
The second half of the condition, the power to transfer, covers a debtor who can give a secured party more than the debtor holds. A bounced check shows it at work. X sells goods to D and takes a currently dated check, which is dishonored for insufficient funds. Meanwhile D pledges the goods to a secured party. D has voidable title and therefore the power to transfer good title to a good-faith purchaser for value, and a secured party is a purchaser, so X cannot recover the goods from the secured party.31
The condition fails when no rule gives the debtor extra power. In First National Bank of the North v. Automotive Finance Corp., a dealer accepted trade-in vehicles from a bank’s borrowers. The dealer never received a right to title. At most it received a right to possess, because possession was all the borrowers could transfer without the bank’s consent, and the dealer gained no greater rights than the borrowers had.32 The dealer was the “debtor” only in name as to those vehicles, with nothing for its own grant to attach to. A second example reaches the same result. Financer repossesses an automobile and delivers it to Dealer for repairs, and Dealer has granted Second Financer a security interest in all of its inventory. Dealer has no rights in that particular car, so Second Financer has no security interest in it.33 What separates these results from the bounced check is whether a rule outside § 9-203 gave the debtor power to pass more than it held. The bad-check buyer’s voidable title carried that power; the dealer simply stood in the borrowers’ shoes.
The rights condition also sets a date, because an interest needs something to attach to. A debtor who grants a security interest in “all of its present and after-acquired inventory and present and after-acquired equipment” has an interest that attaches immediately to the inventory and equipment it owns. A truck or a batch of inventory acquired next year falls within the description, but the interest does not attach to it until the debtor acquires an interest in it.34 An after-acquired property clause works that way: it reaches later-acquired items within the collateral description once the debtor has rights in them.35 The interest “floats” to replacement collateral, but as to any specific item it cannot attach and become enforceable until the debtor has rights in that item.36
Possession without more falls short. Livestock disputes such as Baldwin v. Castro County Feeders I, Ltd. test the line, because feedlots and growers hold animals that belong to someone else.
The party asserting the security interest generally bears the burden of proving the debtor’s rights, although in some states the debtor’s possession of the collateral creates a presumption of ownership that shifts the burden to the debtor.37
The Security Agreement
The third condition asks what the debtor agreed to. Article 9 defines a security agreement as “an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.”39 Article 1 supplies the key word: an agreement is the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or implied from other circumstances.40 Read together, the definitions make the security agreement the bargain by which a debtor grants a secured party an interest in personal property to secure payment or performance of an obligation, or sells accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes to a buyer who is called a “secured party.”41 A creditor’s wish for collateral does not create that bargain.
Possession does not replace the agreement either. Even where the secured party holds the collateral, an agreement is necessary, though it need not be in writing. A judgment creditor who seizes a debtor’s property by attachment, garnishment, or execution therefore holds a judicial lien created by law outside Article 9, not a security interest.42
The debtor must intend to grant the creditor a security interest in personal property, and the intent must be that the creditor may sell the collateral if the debtor defaults.43 Mortgage law long treated an absolute deed as a mortgage when the parties meant it that way, and Article 9 carries that rule over to personal property.44 The label on the document does not decide the question. An instrument headed “conditional sale contract,” “chattel mortgage,” “trust receipt,” or, in current practice, “retail installment sales agreement” is a security agreement if it contains the necessary requirements; substance controls.45 A Colorado court put the point this way: when the requirements for a security interest are present, the title or form of the agreement is not critical, and the parties’ intention controls.46 Most of what fills a typical security agreement, such as the debtor’s representations about prior liens, covenants to insure the collateral, and the details of the loan, is unnecessary to create the interest. Those provisions only allocate rights and duties between the parties.47
Two standard examples show how far substance reaches. A store sells a piano to a buyer on credit under a document stating that “title shall remain in Store until all of the payments are made.” Title passes to the buyer despite the words, so the store holds a security interest; the store is the secured party and the buyer is the debtor. A retailer that accepts diamonds on consignment from their owner, to sell for the owner’s account and pay over the proceeds, has entered a secured transaction as well. Although no one expressly intended security, the consignor is deemed to hold a security interest in the goods.48
No formula of words is required. The Texas version of Article 9 does not require an express granting clause, so a term sheet saying the debtor “shall grant” a security interest is not defeated because it never says “is hereby granted.”49 In ProvideRx, a term sheet that was non-binding when signed, followed by loans under a note that expressly incorporated it, supplied the authenticated agreement that described the collateral: the intellectual property assets owned by the guarantor or its affiliates.50 The flexibility has a floor. A writing with no language indicating that a security interest in described collateral is granted is not a security agreement, even though Article 9 prescribes no particular words.51 How little can suffice is clear from the debtor who writes on the back of an envelope, “I hereby grant bank a security interest in my cattle, John Jones.” If the bank makes a loan and the debtor owns the cattle, the parties have created a valid security interest despite the informality.52
The security agreement, not the financing statement, defines and limits the collateral subject to the creditor’s security interest. A financing statement does a lesser job: it puts third parties on notice that the creditor may have a lien on the property described and that further inquiry into the extent of the security interest is prudent.53
Because the security agreement is a contract, ordinary contract defenses apply to it. If B’s undue influence led A to sign, a court may hold the agreement unenforceable even when every Article 9 condition is otherwise satisfied.54 Fraud, mutual mistake, and duress likewise support rescission, and unconscionability and consumer credit protection statutes can supply defenses too. The trustee in bankruptcy succeeds to the debtor’s powers of rescission and to those defenses, and may assert them against the secured creditor.55
The bargain must be the debtor’s, and Article 9 defines debtor more widely than the person who borrows. A person is a debtor in any of three capacities:
- a person having an interest, other than a security interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not the person is an obligor;
- a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes; or
- a consignee.56
The first capacity separates the debtor from the obligor, the person who owes payment, and it matters when the owner of the collateral is not the borrower. The debtor must agree to grant the interest.57
The second and third capacities exist because Article 9 reaches transactions that do not look like loans. A seller of accounts counts as a debtor, and the buyer counts as a secured party, even though the transaction is a sale.58 In Rexford Funding, LLC v. JVS Powersports USA, Inc., for example, the two firms entered into a factoring agreement by which Rexford received an advance of some $3 million.59 A consignee is a debtor for a similar reason, as the diamond consignment above shows.
Finding a bargain does not finish the third condition, because § 9-203(b)(3) also requires that the agreement be evidenced in one of several ways. The ordinary way is a security agreement the debtor has signed that provides a description of the collateral and, if the interest covers timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned.60 The alternatives dispense with the signed record but not with the bargain. Under § 9-203(b)(3)(A), an authenticated agreement must provide a description of the collateral. Possession under (3)(B) and delivery to the secured party under (3)(C) make a description unnecessary, and control under (3)(D) does so to a lesser extent for deposit accounts and investment property, because the secured party must still identify what it controls.61 Possession means that the secured party or its agent has dominion over the collateral and the debtor is excluded from access to it, and debtor access generally destroys an attempt to attach through possession. Control of a deposit account does not require excluding the debtor.62 In practice, nine times out of ten the enforceable interest arises from a signed writing that describes the collateral, and the remainder involve only possession, an electronic record, or control.63
Disputes over the description rarely come from the debtor. When a description is allegedly ambiguous, the challenge more often comes from a third party, such as a trustee in bankruptcy or another creditor, and it is disingenuous for that party to say the debtor and creditor should have been clearer in their private agreement simply because the writing looks ambiguous.64 The description statute permits any other method of identification so long as “the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.” A court may need testimony to decide whether a description meets that standard: if a debtor granted a security interest in all of its inventory located at its plant at 625 S. State St., the court would need testimony about what was located at that plant at the relevant time.65 The rules on the record, the signature, and the description come next.