Concept
Pre-Code Roots of the Rule
Title to collateral immaterial (§ 9-202)
Pre-Code Roots of the Rule
Section 9-202 closes out a contest that lenders and legislatures fought for generations. Except for consignments and sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes, Article 9’s provisions on rights and obligations apply whether title to the collateral is in the secured party or the debtor.1 The Article does not itself decide who holds title, and it adopts neither a “title theory” nor a “lien theory” of security interests.2 The rule makes sense once you see what title was used for.
Before the Code, the methods of securing a debt were distinct devices, each with its own rules.3 One pattern repeats across them. A creditor found a form that seemed to protect its claim without alerting anyone else, and the law answered by requiring notice. Whatever pre-Code lenders and lawyers did to avoid the filing requirement, it was re-imposed for the benefit of those who needed to know the debtor’s true financial condition and the status of its assets, encumbered or not.4
Three devices, taken up in the subsections below, show the pattern most clearly. A pledge relied on the creditor’s possession of the collateral. A chattel mortgage let the debtor keep the goods and gave notice through a public filing. A conditional sale left the goods with the buyer and reserved title in the seller, in an effort to get around that filing.
Two more devices followed the same course. The trust receipt financed goods that turn over, like cereal on a grocery shelf: the lender kept title to the inventory while the debtor held it “in trust” and stayed in possession. When the practice became popular, a statute required a notice filing, and the result was the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, drafted by Karl Llewellyn in 1932.5 Assignments of accounts raised a different worry. A debtor sometimes assigned the same account more than once, and no one could say who was entitled to collect it. Some states responded with a statute requiring a notice filing for assignments of accounts, so that future creditors would be on notice. Article 9 now governs the assignment or outright sale of accounts, and it requires the secured party to file a financing statement to protect itself against later creditors.6 Section 9-202 treats sales of accounts separately, and they appear among the carve-outs below.
Title was the lever. The conditional sale rested on retained title entirely: because title had not passed, the seller was protected from the buyer’s other creditors and from anyone who might buy the goods from the buyer.7 The trust receipt used it too, letting the lender hold title while the debtor kept the goods.8
Article 9 answers by abolishing the distinctions between the methods of securing a debt. Chattel mortgages, conditional sales contracts, trust receipt transactions, and sales and assignments of accounts are now simply secured transactions, and a deal that the paperwork calls a chattel mortgage or a conditional sale is a security interest governed by Article 9.9 Distinctions based on form no longer control. Where distinctions matter, they follow the type of collateral, such as equipment, inventory, farm products, consumer goods, and accounts receivable. A single filing system replaces the separate files for each device, which makes the information more accessible and reduces the cost of procuring credit information and maintaining the files.10
A few formal lines survive, and a student who says that form is irrelevant everywhere has overstated the rule. The drafters’ comment excepts the distinction “between pledge and non-possessory interests.”11 Article 9 attaches significance to form where the secured party has possession of the collateral (a pledge), where the secured party has “control” of it, and where a transaction produces a purchase-money security interest.12 Possession remains one of the two main ways a secured party obtains superior rights in collateral over other parties.13 Title appears nowhere on the list. Filing or possession by the secured party is required no matter what, so a creditor’s protection no longer depends on who holds title.14
Pledges and Chattel Mortgages
Pledges and chattel mortgages attacked the same problem from opposite directions: a debtor who holds goods looks like their unencumbered owner, and other creditors lend on that appearance.
Early English law answered the problem bluntly. A debtor who gave a lender an interest in goods and then kept possession of them acted fraudulently toward other creditors, who would assume the goods were free to satisfy their claims, and the arrangement was void as to them.16 The lender’s safe course was to take possession itself, and possession doubled as a signal that someone held a claim. Possession remains one of the two main ways a secured party can obtain superior rights in collateral over other parties, though it is impractical for working assets that the debtor needs to use in its business.17 The modern pledge keeps the delivery requirement. An agreement to pledge is not enough; possession must be delivered to the pledgee or secured party, or in some instances to a third person acting for the secured party. There is no pledge where the debtor remains in possession, even if the debtor purports to act as the secured party’s agent.18
Lenders who wanted the debtor to keep using the goods needed another way to announce their claim. In the early nineteenth century, creditors’ lawyers borrowed from real property mortgage law to create the chattel mortgage, a consensual lien on personal property. By the 1820s many states had enacted Chattel Mortgage Acts requiring the mortgage to be filed in a central office. The filing gave “constructive notice” of the lien, which means the law treated later creditors as informed whether or not any of them searched the file.19 A public record thus did the work that possession had done, and the debtor could go on using the goods.
Two limits kept these statutes from forming one coherent system. States varied in how they conceptualized the chattel mortgage, and the pre-Code chattel mortgage laws of some states adopted a “title theory.”20 And in most states the lien could not be given on property the debtor acquired after the lien was established; generally, a chattel mortgage could not obtain a lien on property the debtor obtained in the future.21 That limit fits poorly with goods that turn over, such as the inventory the trust receipt was built to finance.
The pledge and the chattel mortgage teach one idea and expose one weakness. The idea is that a lender’s claim to goods in a debtor’s hands has to be announced, by possession or by filing. The weakness is that the old regime had no single view of title, so a rule that turned on whether a chattel mortgage moved title could give different answers in different states for the same loan. Section 9-202 removes that variation by making Article 9’s rights and obligations apply whether title is in the secured party or the debtor.22 The Article keeps the old idea of notice by requiring filing or possession by the secured party no matter who holds title.23
Conditional Sales
The conditional sale was the pre-Code device that leaned hardest on title. It was an installment sale of goods in which the seller kept title until the buyer paid the entire price.25 The seller was in substance the creditor and the buyer the debtor, yet the contract read like a sale with no loan and no lien. The drafting had a purpose. The Chattel Mortgage Acts required a public filing, and secured parties looked for a way around them.26
The device offered protection without a filing. Because title had not passed, the seller-creditor was protected from the buyer’s other creditors who might try to obtain a lien on the goods and from anyone who might purchase the goods from the buyer.27 A mortgage would have given the seller similar protection only after a public filing, and retained title seemed to give it without one.
The silence was the defect. A buyer who has taken delivery and put the goods to work looks like their owner, so a supplier deciding whether to extend credit sees no sign of the seller’s claim. That is the same appearance problem the pledge rules addressed. Courts divided over the device. Some found the structure legitimate, while others invalidated conditional sales because they created secret liens that gave no notice of an interest in the property.28 The first group accepted the form of the contract, under which title really had stayed with the seller. The second looked at its effect on outsiders, who were misled whatever the contract said about title. Legislatures sided with notice. A number of states adopted conditional sales statutes, and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, adopted by a minority of states, required a notice filing as its predecessors had.29 A device built to avoid filing ended with a filing requirement.
Article 9 ends the old disagreement by placing no significance on who holds title. It requires filing or possession by the secured party no matter what, so a conditional sale falls within its filing requirements.30 A sale of goods in which the seller expressly retains title until the buyer pays the price is a secured transaction within Article 9, and the seller has a security interest in the goods for the price. Pre-Code law often considered such a transaction a conditional sale.31 The conditional sales contract, like the chattel mortgage and the trust receipt, is now simply a secured transaction, whatever the paperwork calls it.32 Title mattered before the Code because the device used it to avoid filing, and the seller now stands under the same notice rule as every other lender.
A fact pattern in which goods are delivered under a contract reserving title until payment invites a tempting answer: the seller owns the goods and therefore beats the buyer’s creditors. That answer rests on pre-Code reasoning. Article 9 asks instead whether the seller, as a secured party, gave notice by filing or possession. The next section turns to how labels that reserve title are treated.