Concept
Scope of Described Collateral
Including sufficiency of description (§ 9-108)
Scope of Described Collateral
A description of personal or real property is sufficient under § 9-108(a), whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.1 That test asks whether the words point to identifiable property; it does not ask whether they reach the asset a creditor now wants. The second question is one of coverage, and the security agreement answers it: the description in the agreement determines which collateral the agreement covers.2 A description can therefore pass the first test and still leave the creditor with no interest in the asset in dispute.
A security interest is always in specific property, even when the description is broad.3 If the agreement describes the collateral as “all accounts and inventory of the debtor,” the secured party has no interest in the debtor’s equipment, even when the financing statement lists equipment.4 The filing cannot close that gap. A financing statement can neither reduce nor enlarge the security interest the parties actually created, so a surplus description has no effect; the interest is only as extensive as the property described in the security agreement, and the filing perfects the interest in that property and does no more.5
A problem that pairs a sufficient description with an asset the words never name tests coverage, and an argument that the description is too vague answers a question the problem did not ask. A description such as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” fails at the first step because it does not reasonably identify the collateral, so the court never reaches the question of what the words cover.6
Reach in Time
The words of a description fix its reach in time as well as in kind. A debtor rarely owns on the day of signing the property the debtor will own a year later, so the question is whether the grant covers only what the debtor holds at signing or also what the debtor acquires afterward, which is called after-acquired property. Section 9-108 does not answer it. Comment 3 observes that much litigation has arisen over whether a description is sufficient to include after-acquired collateral when the agreement does not say so. It calls the question “one of contract interpretation” that “is not susceptible to a statutory rule,” and for that reason the section contains no reference to descriptions of after-acquired collateral.8
Because the question is one of interpretation, the parties’ own time words carry the weight. Some decisions have implied after-acquired coverage where the collateral is inventory or is described as accounts receivable, but those results come from reading the agreement, not from a rule in the statute.9 A drafter who wants later property covered should say so in words.
An agreement that reaches property “now owned or hereafter acquired” carries the grant past the signing date. In re McAllister, an Agricultural Security Agreement secured an interest in property “now owned or hereafter acquired, including but not limited to machinery and tools.” The court held that an auger, a planter, and a trailer fell within the category of collateral the agreement secured, and it accepted a general description as enough for after-acquired property.10
A description tied to a date stops the grant at that date. In FSL Acquisition Corp. v. Freeland Systems, LLC, the Bill of Sale defined the purchased assets as “certain specified tangible and intangible assets . . . as they exist at the time of Closing” and then described them at length.11 The debtor, Kardia, argued that Freeland’s security interest did not extend to software or customer information that Kardia developed or acquired after the May 2008 closing. The court found that argument the stronger one. It noted that the language at issue plainly reached some post-closing property but, on the current record, did not appear to reach software or customer information that came into existence after the closing.12
The two decisions differ in their time words, not in the adequacy of the descriptions. “Hereafter acquired” looked forward in McAllister, and “as they exist at the time of Closing” fixed a moment and stopped in FSL.
Property Covered Without Description
The description is the usual measure of coverage, but Article 9 names six circumstances in which attachment to one type of collateral carries the security interest to a different specified type. Each is in effect an exception to the rule that a description must reasonably identify what it covers.16 Proceeds illustrate the pattern.
When a secured party has an attached security interest in any type of collateral, the interest automatically attaches to any identifiable proceeds of that collateral (UCC §§ 9-203(f), 9-315(a)(2)).17 The security agreement need not use the word proceeds or money. If A grants B an interest in all of A’s equipment and then sells the equipment for money, B’s interest attaches to the money for as long as it is identifiable as proceeds of the sale.18 Two limits keep the rule from becoming a general expansion of the grant: the proceeds must fall into one of the categories in the definition of proceeds, and they must result, in a factual sense, from the original collateral.19
The rule adds a last step to the coverage analysis. Before concluding that the words do not reach an item, ask whether the item is identifiable proceeds of described collateral.