Concept
Supergeneric Descriptions
Including sufficiency of description (§ 9-108)
Supergeneric Descriptions
A security agreement that grants an interest in “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” describes nothing, and the same is true of any phrase of similar import. Section 9-108(c) says so directly: such words do not reasonably identify the collateral.1 These descriptions are called supergeneric because they reach everything the debtor owns and set no item apart from any other. The subsection is where the generous reasonable-identification standard stops. The general rule that a description is sufficient “whether or not it is specific” opens by yielding to subsection (c).2 The words “of similar import” close the synonym loophole. A drafter who writes “all of the debtor’s property” or “everything the debtor owns” has changed the vocabulary and kept the sweep, and the sweep is what the subsection condemns.
The rule makes sense once you ask what a security agreement is for. Its description defines and limits the collateral subject to the creditor’s security interest, while a financing statement does a different job and puts third parties on notice.3 A phrase that covers everything limits nothing. Every asset the debtor owns satisfies it, so the words cannot tell a reader whether a particular asset is inside the grant or outside it, and they may sweep in property the parties never meant to pledge.4 Making the parties name the classes of property in play forces the writing to say what the deal covers.
Courts treat the subsection as a narrow exception to an otherwise tolerant standard. One court put the point this way: only a super-generic such as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” is insufficient under the reasonable-identification standard of § 9-108.5 Minnesota’s enactment carries the heading “Supergeneric description not sufficient,” and a court applying it described the provision as an outer limit on how generally collateral may be described in a security agreement.6 Both decisions draw the line at the same place. A description such as “all livestock” or “all of the debtor’s inventory” stays on the passing side, because it sorts the debtor’s property into classes, as the earlier sections on category and type showed.
The subsection governs how the grant is worded and says nothing about how much a debtor may pledge. A debtor may still give a security interest in all of its assets. What the Code forbids is using that phrase, or a similar one, to describe the collateral in the security agreement.7 Students often read the rule as a ceiling on the pledge when it restricts only the vocabulary of the description. The workaround follows from that distinction, because a lender that wants a blanket lien can obtain one in words the Code accepts.
The workaround is to name each type of collateral the deal covers. A security agreement that grants an interest in the debtor’s inventory, accounts, general intangibles, equipment, and the other defined types reaches nearly everything the debtor owns and still satisfies the statute.8 Each type name carries an Article 9 definition, so each one sorts the debtor’s property into covered and uncovered in a way the blanket phrase cannot. The economic result is close to the blanket phrase, but the writing now states which classes of property the parties agreed to pledge. The price of that precision is completeness, because a type the drafter leaves out falls outside the grant.9 The special rules of subsection (e) also demand more than a bare type name for a commercial tort claim and, in a consumer transaction, for consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, and a commodity account. The section on special collateral rules takes up that subject.10
The words that fail in the security agreement succeed in a financing statement. Section 9-504 accepts any description that is adequate under § 9-108 and goes one step further, permitting an indication that the financing statement covers all assets or all personal property.11 The difference follows from function. A financing statement does not define the grant. It tells searchers that the creditor may have a lien on the property indicated and that further inquiry into the extent of the interest is prudent, and a blanket indication gives that warning.12 The relationship runs in one direction only. Whatever is adequate for the security agreement is adequate for the financing statement, but a description can pass in the financing statement and fail in the security agreement.13 A lender that files an all-assets financing statement and relies on it to supply the missing description has described its collateral in neither document that matters for the grant, and the later section comparing the security agreement with the financing statement takes up that gap.