Concept
The Reasonable Identification Test
Including sufficiency of description (§ 9-108)
Sufficiency of Collateral Description
The Reasonable Identification Test
A lender takes a security interest in a truck and miscopies the serial number. The security agreement describes a "2018 Mack Anthem Truck with serial number AB7777," but the truck's number is AB7888. The description may still hold. If the debtor owns only one Mack Anthem, it is objectively determinable that the parties meant that truck, so the description is adequate despite the error.1 The reason is the standard in § 9-108(a): subject to exceptions in subsections (c), (d), and (e), "a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described."2
The sentence has three working parts. The statute does not require specificity, so a general description can pass. Its measure is reasonable identification, which asks whether the words let a reader work out which property is meant. And the test gives way to three subsections of exceptions, which later sections take up one at a time.
To see how much a description must say, start with why the Code demands one. A security interest attaches by agreement only when the debtor agrees to grant it, value is given, and the debtor has rights in the collateral.3 Section 9-203 adds that the debtor must sign a security agreement that contains a description of the collateral.4 The purpose of that writing is evidentiary.5 The comments say the formal requirements exist to minimize "the possibility of future dispute as to the terms of a security agreement and as to what property stands as collateral for the obligation secured," and they compare the signed writing to a statute of frauds.6 The mechanism shows up at default. Without a required description, a creditor could claim after nonpayment that the debtor had pledged whichever assets turned out to be valuable, and the debtor would have no document to test the claim against. A required description gives everyone a text to read and confines the dispute to what the text says.
Because the purpose is evidentiary, the Code asks only whether the description does its job. It does not ask whether the description is exact. Comment 2 rejects "any requirement that a description is insufficient unless it is exact and detailed (the so-called serial number test)."7 A writing does its work whenever an outsider reading it can tell what was meant. A demand for exactness would add only a way to defeat a real deal over a slip of the pen.
The measure is objective (see Baldwin v. Castro County Feeders I, Ltd.). The signed writing must contain at least a general description that an objective observer would find to include the collateral in question. If it does not, the writing requirement is unmet, and a court should not admit parol evidence to define further what type of collateral the agreement actually covers.8 Proof still has a role, but a narrow one. Suppose the debtor owned two Mack Anthem trucks. The same words would no longer settle which truck the parties meant, and a court might need testimony or other proof to decide.9 Proof may connect the words to the property. It may not alter unambiguous words, because that would undermine the dispute-minimizing purpose of the writing.10 A drafter should therefore ask whether someone other than the drafter can read the description and say what the collateral is. If that reader cannot, the security interest probably is invalid, and the creditor is relegated to the status of an unsecured creditor.11
A description can fail in two directions. It may be too narrow and exclude property the parties meant to cover, or too broad and take in property no one can say they meant.12 The narrow failure appeared in a case where the agreement covered personal property situated in South San Francisco and the creditor claimed property in Fresno and Hayward. The court held that such a description does not "reasonably identify" property located in those cities. Section 9-110, the predecessor of § 9-108, permitted reference to personal property of a "general kind or class," but the court would not convert a clear designation of property in one place into a description of all the debtor's personal property wherever situated.13 A creditor in that position lives with the description it chose.14 The broad failure is codified in § 9-108(c): describing collateral as "all the debtor's assets" or "all the debtor's personal property," or in words of similar import, does not reasonably identify the collateral.15 Words that cover everything identify nothing, so they cannot do the evidentiary job. The supergeneric rule gets its own section below.
The same § 9-108 standards govern descriptions in financing statements, through § 9-504.16 The two documents still do different work. The security agreement defines and limits the collateral. The financing statement puts third parties on notice that the creditor may have a lien and that further inquiry into its extent is prudent.17 A later section returns to how that difference matters.