Concept
Insurance, Judgments, and Setoff
Excluded transactions (§ 9-109)
Insurance, Judgments, and Setoff
Section 9-109(d)(8) through (10) removes three more interests from Article 9: transfers of and assignments of claims under insurance policies, assignments of judgments, and rights of recoupment or setoff.1 Removal does not make these interests untransferable. It means that other law, not Article 9, decides whether an interest in the property may arise to secure payment or performance of an obligation.2
Each exclusion carries a carve-back that returns part of its subject to Article 9. The insurance exclusion yields where the right under the policy is proceeds of other collateral, and for certain assignments of health-care-insurance rights.3 The judgment exclusion yields where the judgment was taken on a right to payment already subject to a security interest.4 The setoff exclusion yields in two places: Section 9-340 governs the effectiveness of setoff and recoupment against deposit accounts,5 and Section 9-404 governs the defenses and claims of an account debtor.6
Most of these carve-backs protect an interest already inside Article 9. A secured party’s car is destroyed, and insurance money replaces it. A secured party’s receivable is reduced to a judgment. A secured party’s deposit account is the target of a bank’s setoff, or its account meets the account debtor’s defense. In each case, an exclusion that swallowed the new form would make the secured party’s rights depend on the shape its value happened to take.
The analysis therefore runs in two layers. The first asks whether the transaction matches the exclusion as written. The second asks whether a carve-back pulls the transaction back in, because the interest is proceeds or traces to a right to payment that was already collateral. A transaction that clears the first layer and fails the second is governed by other law.
Insurance Policy Rights
Section 9-109(d)(8) removes “a transfer of an interest in or an assignment of a claim under a policy of insurance,” and then takes back two pieces: an assignment by or to a health-care provider of a health-care-insurance receivable, together with any later assignment of the right to payment, and the proceeds rules of Sections 9-315 and 9-322.7 The removal is broad and the returns are narrow, so the rule is best learned as one general exclusion and two specific exceptions.
A policyholder who assigns the cash value of a life insurance policy to a creditor shows the exclusion at its plainest. That assignment is outside Article 9.8 Whether the creditor obtains an interest in the policy, and how, is a question for other law, and the assignment is not void merely because Article 9 does not reach it.9
The first exception covers the point at which an insurance claim becomes a business receivable. A health-care-insurance receivable arises when a person assigns rights under a health insurance policy to a health-care provider for services rendered, or when a provider assigns its own rights under such a policy to another.10 The statute also keeps within Article 9 “any subsequent assignment of the right to payment,” so a clinic that later pledges an insurer’s payment to a bank deals within the article as well.11 A provider that treats patients before insurers pay holds a right to payment much like any other account, which is why that right returns to Article 9 while an ordinary policyholder’s benefits do not.
The statutory text requires a health-care provider on one side of the assignment, so the subject matter of the policy cannot carry the exception alone.12 A health policy pledged to a non-provider stays excluded. The same payment right, once it sits with a provider as compensation for care already delivered, returns to the article.
Insurance money can also reach a lender through its collateral rather than through the policy. Suppose a lender holds a security interest in a car and an accident destroys it. The insurer’s payment under a collision policy is proceeds of the car, and Sections 9-315 and 9-322 continue to govern the lender’s interest in the payment and its priority in it.13 Without this exception, the lender’s protection would end when the collateral was lost, because the car would be gone and the money paid for it would pass to the borrower and the borrower’s other creditors.
The cash-value assignment and the collision payment both involve insurance money, but the lender took different things. In the life-policy case the policy claim is itself the thing assigned, so the exclusion applies. In the collision case the car is the collateral and the money is its proceeds, so Article 9 applies. An answer that spots the word “insurance” and declares Article 9 inapplicable has skipped the question of what the creditor actually took.
Assignments of Judgments
Section 9-109(d)(9) removes “an assignment of a right represented by a judgment, other than a judgment taken on a right to payment that was collateral.”16 A judgment is a court’s order that one party pay another, and the right it represents is the creditor’s entitlement to collect with the help of the court’s enforcement procedures. When the creditor transfers that entitlement to secure a loan, the exclusion sends the transfer to other law, and the carve-back brings it back only if the judgment was taken on a right to payment that was already collateral. As with the other exclusions, other law decides whether an interest in the judgment may arise to secure an obligation.17
The carve-back follows the collateral. A lender with a security interest in a seller’s right to be paid by a customer holds an Article 9 asset from the moment the interest attaches. If the seller sues and wins, the same debt is now represented by a court order. An exclusion that reached that judgment would take the same dollars owed by the same customer out of Article 9 merely because the dispute ended up in court. The exception prevents that result, because reducing the right to judgment does not change the secured party’s position.
On the surface the two assignments look alike. In each a judgment against A passes from B to C, and in the first it secures B’s debt to C, the kind of transaction Article 9 usually governs. The purpose of the assignment therefore cannot sort the two. What sorts them is the status of the underlying right before judgment, and the authority’s phrasing makes the timing explicit by asking whether the judgment was on a right to payment “already” subject to a security interest.18 In the second variation C’s interest came first, so the judgment is the same collateral in a new form. Two shortcuts produce wrong answers. A student who sees the word “judgment” and declares Article 9 inapplicable has skipped the carve-back, and a student who sees a security assignment and declares Article 9 applicable has skipped the exclusion. The fact to locate is whether the right to payment was subject to a security interest before it became a judgment.
Recoupment and Setoff
Section 9-109(d)(10) excludes “a right of recoupment or set-off,” and the word “but” that follows introduces two exceptions that return narrow pieces of the subject to Article 9.20 The right itself remains a matter for other law. Article 9 steps in only where the right collides with a financer’s collateral.
A right of recoupment or setoff is an offset: what A owes B is netted against what B owes A.21 The two rights differ in the source of the offsetting claims. In recoupment the claims arise out of the same transaction, and in setoff they may arise out of different transactions.22 Setoff is a common law right to net out mutual debts, and it arises when two parties are debtors to each other on separate credit transactions and one of them defaults.23
A bank’s setoff against a depositor shows the exclusion at its plainest. The bank holds a deposit account for its customer A, A defaults on a loan from the bank, and the bank applies the balance to the debt. Article 9 does not govern that setoff.24 The bank needs no grant from A to do this. A security interest exists because a debtor agrees to give a creditor rights in particular property, and Article 9’s security agreement, attachment, and filing rules are built to record that agreement. A right of setoff or recoupment arises because two parties owe each other money, and other law decides whether the right exists and how it may be used.
These rights nonetheless change what a financer’s collateral is worth. A bank’s setoff can consume a deposit balance that a lender is counting on, and an account debtor’s defense can shrink what an assignee collects on an account. The two exceptions send those collisions to Article 9 and leave the underlying rights where they were.
The first exception provides that Section 9-340 applies with respect to the effectiveness of rights of recoupment or set-off against deposit accounts.25 The bank scene changes once a lender also claims the account. If A has granted C a security interest in the deposit account, that grant is within Article 9. When A defaults and the bank sets off the balance, the effectiveness of the setoff against C’s interest is governed by Article 9 as well.26 The bank and C are claiming the same balance, and a setoff that prevails leaves nothing for C. Without a competing secured party, the bank’s setoff is simply the two-party offset described above and stays outside Article 9.
The second exception provides that Section 9-404 applies with respect to defenses or claims of an account debtor.27 An account debtor is the person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible, and the exception lets that obligor raise claims and defenses against a secured party who holds the right to payment as collateral.28 In the standard illustration, A owes B the price of goods, so the obligation is an account, and B grants C a security interest in it to secure a debt B owes C. B fails to pay C, C asks A to pay, and A asserts a right of recoupment based on a defect in the goods. Article 9 governs whether A may assert that right against C.29 A took no part in the financing, and the defect claim arose out of the transaction that produced the account. Whether C collects the full price or the price less the defect is a question about the collateral C holds, so Article 9 answers it. Whether the goods were in fact defective remains a question for other law.
The two exceptions differ in who asserts the right and against whom. In the first, the holder of the setoff is a bank competing with a secured party for the same deposit balance. In the second, the holder is an obligor on the collateral itself, resisting a secured party who is trying to collect. A fact pattern that merely mentions a setoff or a buyer’s defense neither leaves nor enters Article 9 on that ground alone. What matters is whether a secured party or assignee stands on the other side of the dispute.