Concept
Nonconsensual Liens
Excluded transactions (§ 9-109)
Nonconsensual Liens
Article 9 applies to transactions that create a security interest in personal property.1 A creditor may also hold a lien that the law supplies without any grant from the debtor. The first two entries in the list of exclusions in Section 9-109(d) remove two families of such liens from the article: the landlord's lien and the lien for services or materials. Both entries carry the same exception, "other than an agricultural lien," and that exception pulls one kind of statutory lien back into Article 9.
An exclusion does not mean the lien is disallowed. Its only effect is that other law, and not Article 9, controls creation of an interest in that type of asset to secure a debt.2 For a statutory lien, the other law is the statute or common-law rule that gave the lien. That law therefore also answers whether the lien exists, what property it reaches, and how its holder enforces it.
Three questions sort every lien in this unit. How did the lien arise: by the debtor's agreement, or by statute or common law? If by law, does it meet the definition of an agricultural lien, which Article 9 governs? And if the lien is excluded, does the exclusion hand priority back to Article 9? The landlord's lien and the lien for services or materials differ on the third question, and the agricultural lien turns on the second.
Landlord's Liens
Section 9-109(d)(1) excludes "a landlord's lien, other than an agricultural lien."3 The law attaches a landlord's lien to the leasing relationship to secure rent, and the tenant never grants it. Because the lien is a creature of that other law, the statute or common-law rule decides whether the landlord has a lien at all, which of the tenant's goods it reaches, and how the landlord enforces it. States answer those questions differently, and Article 9 offers no rule on any of them.
The text of (d)(1) stops at the exception. The next exclusion preserves Section 9-333 for priority, but (d)(1) contains no clause that pulls any part of Article 9 back in for the excluded lien.4
The exclusion follows the source of the lien and not the identity of the creditor. A landlord who bargains for a security interest in the tenant's goods holds a consensual interest in personal property, and Article 9 governs it like any other.5
Not every landlord's lien falls within the exclusion, because (d)(1) excepts the agricultural lien. Suppose a landlord leases 100 acres to a farmer who grows corn, and state law secures the rent with a lien on the crops. A lien for rent on land that the debtor leases as part of a farming operation can qualify as an agricultural lien,6 and when it does, the exception removes it from the exclusion, so Article 9 governs it.7 That lien competes with any lender financing the same crop, and Article 9 supplies the rules for protecting and ranking claims to the same collateral.
The word "landlord" therefore settles nothing alone, and neither does whether the lease is residential or commercial. Two facts do: how the interest arose, and whether the lien meets the definition of an agricultural lien, which the last part of this unit sets out.
Liens for Services or Materials
Section 9-109(d)(2) excludes "a lien, other than an agricultural lien, given by statute or other rule of law for services or materials, but Section 9-333 applies with respect to priority of the lien."9 These liens are often called artisan's liens.10 A repairer who may keep the goods until the bill is paid shows the type.11
The first half of the rule works like the landlord's exclusion. A statute or common-law rule created the lien, so that law decides who may claim it, which goods it reaches, and how the claimant enforces it. In the repair-shop example, the repairer holds the lien only as long as it keeps possession of the goods.12 Article 9 stays out of those questions.
The second half exists because a repairer's lien often attaches to goods that a lender has already financed. Section 9-333 supplies the rules that rank a lien for services or materials against an Article 9 security interest.13 The exclusion is therefore partial. Other law governs the lien itself, and Article 9 governs the contest between the lienholder and a secured party.
The tractor example shows both halves at once. A repair business fixes a farmer's tractor, and the tractor already carries a bank's consensual security interest from the financing of its purchase. Under state law other than Article 9, the repairer has a lien on the tractor for the repair charges as long as it keeps possession. Article 9 does not govern that lien except to decide the priority dispute between the repairer's lien and the bank's security interest.14 The farmer's use of the tractor in a farming operation does not make the lien agricultural, because a tractor is not farm products.15 A student who answers that Article 9 says nothing about the repairer's lien has read only half of (d)(2).
The same kind of lien on different collateral lands on the other side of the line.
The label "lien for services or materials" therefore does not sort the tractor from the herd. The clause "other than an agricultural lien" does, and the definition behind it comes next. Until then, keep the repairer's possessory lien on equipment in the excluded category, with priority retained, and keep a lien on farm products in the category Article 9 governs.
The Agricultural Lien Exception
Section 9-109(a)(2) lists "an agricultural lien" among the transactions that Article 9 governs, and that entry is why both exclusions above end by excepting it.17 Without the exception, a farm lessor's lien for rent would fall under the landlord's lien exclusion, and a supplier's lien for seed would fall under the exclusion for materials. Subsection (d) would then undo what subsection (a)(2) deliberately includes.
Article 9 reaches this one kind of statutory lien because its holders compete with lenders for the same collateral, the crops and livestock that a bank may also finance. The lien itself still arises under a statute other than Article 9,18 so that statute decides whether the lien exists and how far it extends. Article 9 supplies the rules for perfecting the lien by filing and for ranking it against competing interests.19
Each part has its own reason. Requiring a statute keeps Article 9 from absorbing every common-law claim a creditor might assert against a farmer's crop, and requiring farm products ties the category to the assets that banks and farm suppliers actually contest. A lien that works only while the holder keeps the goods needs no filing to put others on notice, but a silent lien does, which is why the no-possession requirement matters.
Step one removes the claimant whose lien rests on common law alone. A creditor who asserts a lien on a farmer's crop under a common-law doctrine, with no state statute behind it, holds no agricultural lien. That creditor cannot rely on Article 9 to perfect the lien and must look to the other law that supplies it.21 Step four ties the lien to its collateral, and a single farm can hold collateral on both sides of the line. A dairy farmer's cows and the milk they give are farm products, because milk is an unmanufactured product of livestock, so a statutory lien for the feed those cows ate can qualify. When the farmer turns the milk into cheese, the product leaves its unmanufactured state. The cheese is more naturally the farmer's inventory, and a lien reaching only the cheese falls outside the definition.22
That seed supplier shows what a qualifying lien receives. Suppose the supplier sold seed on credit without taking an Article 9 security interest, and a bank later lent to the farmer and took a security interest in the crops. The supplier's state statute decides whether its lien exists and how far it extends. Article 9 decides how the supplier perfects the lien and how it ranks against the bank. Once a lien qualifies, the article casts the lienholder as the secured party, the farmer as the debtor, and the farm product as the collateral, although the lien is not itself a security interest because the debtor never granted it.23 The lienholder perfects by filing a financing statement covering the farm products in the jurisdiction where they are located.24
Because the definition decides the answer and the name of the lien does not, an apartment landlord's lien and a repairer's possessory lien on a tractor stay outside Article 9, while a lessor's lien on crops raised on leased farmland comes inside. Even for the lien that qualifies, the lien statute remains the place to look for whether the lien exists and how far it reaches, and Article 9 supplies the rules on perfection and priority.