Concept
Why Place of Filing Matters
Perfection of security interests in multiple state transactions (§ 9-301)
Law Governing Multistate Perfection
Why Place of Filing Matters
A filing in the wrong place is no filing at all. Most perfection is accomplished by filing a financing statement, the public evidence of the security interest. The point of the public record is that third parties inclined to buy the property can check it to see whether they are buying a debt along with the property. That works only if searchers know which state's records to check.1 Section 9-301 of the Uniform Commercial Code supplies the answer, in the form of a choice-of-law rule: while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, that jurisdiction's local law governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in the collateral.2 In general, the financing statement must be filed in the state where the debtor is "located," and an individual debtor is located in her state of residence.3
The bank in this hypothetical did not misjudge the loan. It misjudged which state's law decides where to file.
That question survives the uniform adoption of Article 9 because uniformity solves only part of the problem. Every state has adopted Article 9 since the 1999 revision, including the 2010 Amendments. Each state therefore has nearly identical law on taking and perfecting a security interest, on the creditor's rights on default, and on priority, and there is usually no need for a choice-of-law rule to decide whether Illinois or Ohio priority rules govern. Place of filing is the exception. When Ohio law controls, the secured party files in Columbus; when Illinois law controls, it files in Springfield. Most perfection is accomplished by filing, and a filing in the wrong place is no filing at all, so choice of law on place of filing is as important as choice of law on other Article 9 questions is unimportant.4 For that reason Sections 9-301 through 9-307, although technically full choice-of-law provisions on perfection and priority, have as their principal function answering a single question: where to file?5
The general choice-of-law provisions of Article 1 do little work here. Former Section 1-105 and revised Section 1-301 have but limited application to secured transactions, because most secured-transaction questions do not settle rights between debtor and secured party. They litigate claims to the collateral between the secured party and third persons. Choice-of-law problems that involve third persons frequently turn on perfection in multistate transactions, or on what law governs the effect of perfection or nonperfection.6
The current design is easiest to appreciate against the scheme it replaced. Former Section 9-103 rested on the premise that filing for goods normally belonged where the goods were located, while filing for intangibles belonged where the debtor was located. The drafters classified some goods as "mobile" and treated them like intangibles, so a filing for mobile goods went to the debtor's location rather than the goods'. A separate rule covered purchase money security interests in goods bought in one state and shipped to the debtor in another. And the debtor's location meant its chief place of business, usually the place of its chief executive office.7
That last definition caused trouble of its own. A modern company may do business in many states, with its chief executive in one city part of the week and another city the rest of it, and with the remaining executives in a third place. The "chief place of business" was then not always clear. Of all the problems in pre-1999 Article 9, the drafters found those presented by the multistate rules in former Section 9-103 the easiest to see and, they hoped, the easiest to resolve.8
Keying filing to the location of goods also tied the correct filing office to a fact that could change without anyone but the debtor knowing. Moving goods and other moveable collateral from state to state generally requires no public notice and will be known only to the debtor in most circumstances.9 The situs approach most often followed in the United States recognized the first creditor's interest, perfected where the property then sat, in the second state as well. That result generally followed if the creditor had not consented to or been involved in the removal and, on discovering it, acted within a reasonable time to perfect in the second state. The rule placed the risk of dealing with a person not known to be a debtor on the public and the credit system of the second state, and even a cautious searcher acting in the best of faith could be caught in the web of the prior interest.10
Section 9-301 replaces that structure with one organizing idea: the law of the debtor's location governs perfection. Section 9-301(2) excludes possessory security interests, and Section 9-301(3) excludes fixture filings and security interests in timber to be cut. But the general rule applies to 99% of all filing, which is to say that one perfects by filing at the debtor's location. The consequences follow directly. The old distinction between tangible and intangible collateral is gone, the distinction between mobile and non-mobile goods is unnecessary, and rules about continued perfection after goods move from state to state are no longer needed.11 For the manufacturer in the hypothetical, that means the governing law turns on neither where the bank sits nor where the equipment sits. The question is where the manufacturer is "located," which the next section takes up.