Concept
Other Subsection (d) Exclusions
Subject matter of Article 9 (§ 9-109)
Other Subsection (d) Exclusions
Section 9-109(d) lists the transaction types that Article 9 leaves to other law, and it opens with the words “This article does not apply to.”1 Subsection (c), covered above, dealt with federal preemption, governmental debtors, and transferee beneficiaries. The previous section took up paragraphs (d)(4) through (7), the receivable assignments that “by their nature have nothing to do with commercial financing transactions.”2 This section covers the rest: paragraphs (d)(1) through (3) and (d)(8) through (13).
Those paragraphs reach liens that arise by operation of law, assignments of wages, transfers of insurance interests and claims, assignments of judgments, rights of recoupment and setoff, interests in real property, assignments of tort claims, and assignments of deposit accounts in consumer transactions.3 The exclusions matter because Article 9 is so broad. It applies to any transaction, regardless of its form, that is intended to create a security interest in personal property, and it treats even a “sale” of accounts as the creation of a security interest.4 The Article covers a consumer’s multiyear installment purchase of a home entertainment system and a retailer’s inventory loan from a bank alike.5 The exclusions mark where that breadth stops.
The analysis runs in two steps. First, classify the transaction under the scope provisions covered earlier in this chapter. Then work through the exclusions to see whether any of them applies. An exclusion changes which law governs and does not forbid the creditor from taking an interest in that type of asset, because other law then controls whether and how the interest arises.6
Several paragraphs carry an exception that pulls a slice of the subject back inside the Article.7 The exceptions cluster where an excluded interest meets a conventional security interest in the same asset. Depending on the paragraph, they restore Article 9 for proceeds of other collateral, for priority against a security interest, or for fixtures and certain enforcement rights. A creditor holding an Article 9 interest in the original collateral needs the Article’s rules to follow its value into those assets and to rank against competing claimants. The common exam error is to spot a listed transaction type, announce that Article 9 is out, and miss the exception that puts the tested issue back in. Each subsection below therefore teaches an exclusion together with its exception.
Nonconsensual Liens
Paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) exclude two liens that the law, and not the debtor, creates: “a landlord’s lien, other than an agricultural lien,” and “a lien, other than an agricultural lien, given by statute or other rule of law for services or materials, but Section 9-333 applies with respect to priority of the lien.”9 Both are nonconsensual liens, and that explains their placement. The core entry, § 9-109(a)(1), reaches a transaction that “creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract.”10 A security interest is a consensual lien that the debtor creates by giving the creditor an interest in some or all of its property,11 as Beth does when she grants Farmers’ Bank a security interest in her cattle to secure a loan.12 A lien that a statute or other rule of law imposes involves no such grant, so Article 9 does not apply to a nonconsensual lien on personal property, although it does cover agricultural liens for certain purposes.13 The phrase “other than an agricultural lien” appears in both paragraphs, and that carve-out decides most problems in this area.
Just over half of the states have statutes that impress a lien in the landlord’s favor on the tenant’s chattels located on the leased property, to secure rent. Those statutes are in derogation of the common law, and courts generally construe them strictly. Most secure only rent, though a few states extend the lien to other claims arising from the landlord-tenant relationship.14 Article 9 contributes none of those rules, so a statutory lien on a shop tenant’s inventory for unpaid rent lies outside the Article.
What changes the answer is what the tenant does with the leased land. A landlord’s lien for unpaid rent on land used in a farming operation is covered by Article 9,15 because it is an agricultural lien, a transaction type the Article lists as its own.16 Almost all agricultural liens run in favor of landlords, for rent, or of trade creditors who sell goods such as feed and seed or provide services such as custom cutting and veterinary care.17 A shop landlord and a farm landlord may therefore both hold statutory liens for rent, and the labels “landlord” and “statutory” cannot tell them apart. The definition of an agricultural lien, covered earlier, can. The lien must be an interest in farm products, must secure rent on land leased in connection with the debtor’s farming operation (or goods or services furnished to it), must be created by statute, and must not depend on the creditor’s possession. The carve-out sits in both paragraphs because farm liens come in two forms that the exclusions would otherwise absorb: farm rent, which paragraph (d)(1) would treat as a landlord’s lien, and farm inputs, which paragraph (d)(2) would treat as a lien for services or materials.18 A student who stops at “landlord’s lien” or “statutory lien” and declares Article 9 inapplicable has skipped the question that matters, which is whether the lien is an agricultural lien.
Paragraph (d)(2) covers the liens commonly called artisan’s or service liens. State law outside Article 9 gives a person who repairs goods or supplies materials for them a lien to secure the bill, and the usual example is a repairer who may keep the goods until paid.19 Many statutory and common law liens on personal property require that the lienholder have possession, and the lien is lost if the lienholder gives possession to the debtor or someone else.20 Article 9 leaves the lien to the law that created it. Exclusion settles which law applies and leaves the lien itself intact.21
One question cannot be left to the lien statute alone, and that is where the lien ranks against a security interest in the same goods. Paragraph (d)(2) therefore keeps the Article in play with the words “but Section 9-333 applies with respect to priority of the lien.” The standard illustration is a repairer, A, who fixes B’s tractor. B farms with the tractor, and a bank holds a consensual security interest in it. State law gives A a lien for the repair bill as long as A keeps the tractor. Article 9 does not govern A’s lien except to decide the priority dispute with the bank, and the lien is not an agricultural lien because a tractor is not “farm products.”22 Section 9-333 supplies the answer, and it ranks the lienholder ahead of a perfected security interest only when four conditions are all present.23
The possession condition has a practical edge. If the lienholder gives the goods back, the lien that depended on possession is lost, and there is nothing left for § 9-333 to rank.25 The fourth condition defers to the legislature that created the lien, so a statute that expressly ranks the lien otherwise controls.
The farm supplier’s lien sits at the opposite end of the boundary. It is created by statute for goods furnished to a farming operation and does not depend on possession, so Article 9’s perfection, priority, and enforcement rules apply to it. The supplier perfects when the lien is effective under the creating statute and a proper financing statement has been filed centrally. Priority against a security interest depends on the creating statute, which commonly states its own priority rule. If the statute is silent, Article 9’s normal priority rules apply, so a perfected security interest ranks by time of filing or perfection, whichever comes first, unless the statute provides otherwise.26 A possessory repair lien thus receives a single Article 9 rule, the ranking rule of § 9-333, while an agricultural lien receives the Article’s perfection, priority, and enforcement rules.
Wage Assignments
Section 9-109(d)(3) excludes “an assignment of a claim for wages, salary, or other compensation of an employee.”28 In such an assignment the employee transfers to a creditor the right to be paid by the employer, so that part of the pay goes to the creditor when it comes due. Because the paragraph removes a whole transaction type, a transfer that fits it leaves Article 9 altogether, and other law answers every question about how the creditor obtains and enforces an interest in the pay.
A transfer qualifies only if it meets three parts of the text. It must be an assignment of a claim, meaning a transfer of the right to be paid by the employer, and not a loan secured by some other asset the employee owns. The right must be one to wages, salary, or other compensation. And the person who earned the pay must be an employee, a limit that matters because a worker paid by invoice holds an ordinary commercial right to payment of the kind Article 9 was written to cover.
The reason for the exclusion is social. Wage assignments are regulated by other federal and state statutes and raise important social issues that other law addresses.29 Article 9 is a commercial financing statute, and it stays out of the area those statutes govern.
The exclusion has two consequences for the creditor. First, state or federal law may circumscribe or prohibit contractual assignment of wages or compensation, so whether the assignment is allowed at all is a question for that law.30 Second, even where other law allows the assignment, Article 9 does not prescribe the rules for obtaining an interest in wages, salary, or employee compensation. The standard illustration is an employee who agrees to assign ten percent of a monthly salary to a creditor for one year to pay a debt. Article 9 governs neither whether the employee may do so nor, if the assignment is allowed, the creditor’s rights under it. A creditor in that position cannot invoke Article 9’s attachment, perfection, or priority rules and must look to the law that governs wage assignments. The usual error is to read exclusion as invalidity. Exclusion decides which law applies, and that law may permit, restrict, or forbid the assignment.
The salaried employee and the illustrator each owe a debt, each assign a right to be paid, and each might describe the deal as repayment from future money. The fact that sorts them is the status of the person who earned the pay. A creditor that takes an interest in a client’s obligation to a contractor has taken an interest in personal property by contract, which is the core transaction the Article covers.31 The exclusion also reaches only the claim for pay itself. An employee who borrows against a car and expects to repay from salary has granted a security interest in goods, and Article 9 governs that interest in the ordinary way. The opposite error is the more tempting one: applying Article 9’s filing rules to a wage assignment because pay is a right to payment and rights to payment are covered collateral. Paragraph (d)(3) answers that instinct by removing an employee’s compensation from the Article before any rule about collateral comes into play.
Insurance Claims
Section 9-109(d)(8) excludes “a transfer of an interest in or an assignment of a claim under a policy of insurance.”33 Two exceptions, stated in the same sentence, bring part of the subject back. Article 9 still governs proceeds and priorities in proceeds, because §§ 9-315 and 9-322 apply to them. And Article 9 governs an assignment by or to a health-care provider of a health-care-insurance receivable, together with any later assignment of the right to payment.
A claim under a policy is the policyholder’s right to be paid when the insured event occurs. An interest in the policy can reach further, as with the cash value of a life insurance policy. The paragraph removes a whole transaction type, so a creditor who takes such an interest cannot rely on Article 9’s attachment, perfection, and priority rules except through the two exceptions. Other law decides whether the creditor may take the interest and how it becomes effective, and the exclusion does not forbid the arrangement.34 In the standard illustration, a policyholder, A, owns a life insurance policy with a cash value and assigns the right to payment of that cash value to B. The assignment is not covered by Article 9.35 B may hold a valid interest, but its existence, its strength against A’s other creditors, and its enforcement are questions for law outside Article 9.
The first exception keeps Article 9 in the picture when insurance pays for damage to collateral. If an automobile that secures a loan is destroyed in an accident, the secured party has a security interest in the payment the insurer makes to the policyholder under a collision policy.36 The creditor’s lien was on the car, and when the car is destroyed the insurer’s money takes its place, so Article 9 follows the lien into that payment as proceeds. A rule that ended the lien at the moment the collateral was lost would strip the creditor of protection exactly when it needs it. The exception is narrow, though. It protects a creditor whose Article 9 interest was in the damaged collateral, and it does not turn an assignment of the policy claim itself into an Article 9 transaction. A lender who takes the cash value of a life insurance policy as its own collateral gets nothing from the proceeds rule.
The second exception rests on a different reason. A provider’s right to be paid by a patient’s insurer for care already given works like an account. A health-care-insurance receivable is a right to payment under a health insurance policy for health care furnished, and an assignment by or to the provider of that right is within Article 9.37 A patient who signs over insurance benefits to the treating physician makes an assignment of this kind, and so does a provider who assigns its claims against patients’ insurers to a finance company. The statute also extends the exception to any later assignment of the right to payment, so the Article follows the receivable down the chain of financers.
The policyholder who assigns life insurance cash value and the patient who assigns benefits to a doctor both hold a right under an insurance policy. The two assignments land on opposite sides of the line because the doctor is a health-care provider receiving the right as payment for services rendered.
The outer edge of the exclusion is not fully mapped. Article 9 defines a supporting obligation as a letter-of-credit right or secondary obligation that supports payment of collateral such as an account, and there is a suggestion that some obligations of insurance companies could fit that definition despite the exclusion, a question the statute does not resolve.38
An exam stem that says someone assigned rights under an insurance policy is asking who stands at each end of the assignment and what the right is for. The usual error is to stop at the word insurance and declare Article 9 inapplicable, which overlooks the provider exception and the proceeds rule. The opposite error is to reason that because a lender can reach insurance money paid for its collateral, a lender who takes an assignment of the policy itself is covered as well.
Judgments
Section 9-109(d)(9) excludes “an assignment of a right represented by a judgment, other than a judgment taken on a right to payment that was collateral.”40 A judgment is a court’s order that one party owes another a stated sum, and once entered it replaces the underlying claim with a right the court itself created and will enforce. The paragraph removes a whole transaction type and carves one exception back out. Stated in one sentence, Article 9 does not apply to an assignment of a right under a judgment unless the judgment was on a right to payment that was already subject to a security interest.41
Without the paragraph, an assignment of a judgment to secure a debt would be a transaction that creates a security interest in personal property by contract, and paragraph (a)(1) would pull it into the Article.42 The exclusion sends the question to other law instead, which decides whether an interest in the judgment may arise to secure an obligation and how it is made effective.43
In the standard illustration, A owes B for goods that B supplied, and B sues and obtains a judgment against A for the amount owed. B then assigns the judgment to C to secure a debt that B owes C, and the assignment is not covered by Article 9.44 The unpaid price was never collateral for anyone, so when it became a judgment it became a right that the law of judgments governs, and B’s pledge of it to C has no earlier Article 9 interest standing behind it. C may hold a valid claim, but its validity, its strength against B’s other creditors, and its enforcement are questions for law outside Article 9. C therefore cannot rely on Article 9’s filing system to protect it.
The same debt with a different history comes out the other way. B first grants C a security interest in B’s right to payment from A, and only afterward obtains the judgment and assigns it to C. Because the judgment was taken on a right to payment that was collateral, Article 9 covers the assignment.45 The exception answers a problem of form. C bargained for an interest in B’s right to be paid by A. If suing on that right moved it outside the Article, a debtor could shed the secured party’s interest simply by reducing the claim to judgment.
The hinge in both illustrations is when the right to payment became collateral. The words “was collateral” look back from the day the court entered judgment, and the exception reaches a judgment on a right to payment that was already subject to a security interest.46 A security interest granted for the first time after the judgment exists does not qualify, which is why C’s interest in the first illustration, taken in the judgment itself, falls outside the Article. Had B assigned the unpaid account to C as security before suing, that assignment would have been a security interest in an account created by contract, and paragraph (a)(1) would have covered it without help from the exception.47
An exam stem that mentions a judgment is really asking when a security interest, if any, first reached the claim. The usual error is to stop at the word judgment and declare Article 9 inapplicable, which overlooks the exception for a claim that was already collateral. The opposite error is to see a secured creditor at the end of the chain and apply Article 9 even though the claim was unencumbered until after the court ruled.
Recoupment and Setoff
Section 9-109(d)(10) excludes “a right of recoupment or set-off,” and it keeps two corners of the subject inside the Article. Section 9-340 applies to the effectiveness of rights of recoupment or setoff against deposit accounts, and § 9-404 applies to the defenses or claims of an account debtor.49 Both rights let a party reduce what it owes by what it is owed, so the paragraph is easiest to apply once the difference between them is clear. A setoff lets two parties who are each debtors of the other net their mutual debts, and the debts may come from separate transactions.50 Recoupment lets a payor subtract from a payment due the amount that the person seeking payment, or that person’s predecessor, owes the payor, and the offsetting claims arise out of the same transaction.51
Setoff and recoupment operate between two parties who already owe each other money. The party exercising the right pays itself by netting the debts, takes no interest in any asset of the other party, and does not have to rank itself against third-party creditors. Article 9’s attachment, perfection, and priority rules were built for the opposite situation, in which a creditor holds an interest in the debtor’s property. Exclusion therefore means that other law, such as the common law of setoff, decides when a party may net its debts, and it does not forbid the netting.
The bank example shows the right at its simplest. A has a deposit account at a bank and owes the bank money on a loan. When A defaults, the bank sets off the balance in the account against the loan, and Article 9 does not apply to that setoff.52 The two debts run in opposite directions between the same two parties, since the balance is what the bank owes A and the loan is what A owes the bank. The bank can cancel one against the other without taking an interest in anything.
Adding a second creditor changes the analysis. When A has also granted C a security interest in the same deposit account, the grant to C is covered by Article 9, and the priority of the bank’s setoff against C’s security interest is governed by Article 9 as well.53 That is the first exception, and the exclusion cannot reach it, because two claimants now want one fund: the bank’s netting right and C’s interest in the account as collateral. Under § 9-340 the depositary bank’s right of setoff generally takes priority, unless the secured party has obtained control of the account by becoming the bank’s customer on it.54 That result reverses the old rule, under which a common law pledgee of the account generally prevailed so long as the bank had notice of the pledge.55 Control and the full priority rules for deposit accounts, found in §§ 9-327 and 9-328, belong to later chapters.56 For scope, the point is that this contest is an Article 9 contest.
The second exception protects the person who owes the money. In the standard illustration, A owes B the price of goods that B sold to A, so A’s obligation is an account. B grants C a security interest in that account to secure an obligation B owes C, and that grant is covered by Article 9. B then fails to pay C, and C asks A to pay C directly. A answers that the goods were defective and asserts a right of recoupment against C. Article 9 governs whether A may assert that right against C, through § 9-404.57 A is an account debtor, the Article’s name for a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible.58 A never chose to deal with C, and C acquired only the right B had against A, which was always a right to something less than the full price if the goods were defective. The exception puts that question in the same Article that governs C’s interest.
The two exceptions run in different directions. Under § 9-340 the party netting is a bank, and the collateral is a deposit account that the bank itself holds. Under § 9-404 the party asserting the offset is the obligor on a receivable, and the collateral is the right to be paid by that obligor. In both, a right that ordinarily stays outside the Article collides with a secured party’s interest, and in both the Article supplies the rule for that collision and nothing more.
An answer that stops at the word setoff overlooks both exceptions, and an answer that applies Article 9 to every bank setoff overlooks the exclusion. The sorting question is whether anyone other than the two parties who owe each other holds an interest in the account or the receivable being netted against.
Real Estate Interests
Section 9-109(d)(11) excludes “the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, including a lease or rents thereunder,” except to the extent Article 9 makes provision for four matters.60 Land and personal property run on separate systems. One perfects an interest in land by recording in the real estate records, and one perfects an interest in personal property by complying with Article 9.61 The exclusion keeps a land lender from having to satisfy both systems for one asset. Like the other subsection (d) exclusions, it removes a type of transaction, and other law governs how the interest is created and made effective.
The exclusion is narrower than it looks, because a real estate deal also produces contract rights, and contract rights are personal property. A mortgage secures a promise to pay, and the holder of that promise owns a right to payment apart from the land. The official illustration is the owner of Blackacre, who borrows $10,000 from a neighbor and secures the note by a mortgage on Blackacre. Article 9 does not govern the creation of that mortgage. But when the neighbor pledges the note and mortgage to secure the neighbor’s own debt to X, Article 9 governs the security interest thus created in the note and the mortgage.62 The creditor who takes the note is not trying to get an interest in the real estate, only in the mortgagee’s contract rights, and that attempt is subject to Article 9. To enforce against the land as an assignee of the mortgage, though, the creditor must use real property law.63 The reverse arrangement, in which the landowner gives a lender an interest in the land itself, stays outside the Article.
One court faced a package of this kind, in which a creditor held promissory notes and the deeds of trust that secured them. It reconciled the real estate exclusion with Article 9’s coverage of the notes by holding that Article 9 applies to the promissory notes but not to the deeds of trust.64 The split has a practical edge for a lender, because the step that protects one half of the package does nothing for the other.
Rents sit on the excluded side of that line even though they look like the payment rights Article 9 ordinarily covers. A owns real property and leases it to B, and the rights and obligations under the lease are outside Article 9. If A then grants C an interest in the rental payments to secure a debt A owes C, the right to the rent would be an account but for the exclusion, and the exclusion removes it from the Article.66 The paragraph names “a lease or rents thereunder,” so rent leaves the Article even though it is money owed, the very feature that usually qualifies a right as collateral.67 A right to payment on a mortgage note is therefore within the Article, while a right to rent under a lease of land is outside it. The boundary is not fully mapped. Bankruptcy courts have long disagreed over whether the right to a hotel’s daily room rentals is an account within Article 9 or rent outside it, and neither Article 9 nor the Bankruptcy Code resolves the question.68
The exclusion has four exceptions, and each marks a place where an Article 9 interest and land are tied together closely enough that leaving the matter wholly to real property law would strand a creditor:
- Liens on real property in §§ 9-203 and 9-308. Attachment of a security interest in a right to payment secured by a mortgage or other lien is also attachment of a security interest in that mortgage or lien, and perfecting in the right to payment perfects in the lien too.69
- Fixtures in § 9-334, so that goods attached to land stay within Article 9 for these purposes.70
- Fixture filings in §§ 9-501, 9-502, 9-512, 9-516, and 9-519.71
- Security agreements covering personal and real property in § 9-604, which give a secured party holding lien interests in both kinds of property certain enforcement rights.72
The four exceptions show that the paragraph removes the land and what the land produces, while Article 9 keeps personal property that touches or is tied to the land. Fixture priority and the detailed enforcement rules belong to later chapters. For scope, a transaction that touches land does not automatically leave the Article.
Tort Claims
Section 9-109(d)(12) excludes “an assignment of a claim arising in tort, other than a commercial tort claim,” and it keeps part of the subject inside the Article by providing that “Sections 9-315 and 9-322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds.”75 A tort claim is a right to recover damages from a person who has wrongfully caused harm, and an assignment occurs when the holder pledges that right to a creditor so that the recovery will answer for a debt. Like the other paragraphs of subsection (d), this one removes a whole transaction type, so an assignment that fits it leaves Article 9 and other law decides whether and how the creditor obtains an interest in the claim. Two limits on the exclusion do most of the work: the carve-out for a commercial tort claim, and the exception for proceeds.
The line the statute draws follows the line between claims that work as business assets and claims that do not. The 1999 revision added commercial tort claims to the kinds of property a secured transaction can cover and left excluded the tort claims that are not commercial.76 A business that has been wronged, perhaps by someone who damaged its delivery vehicle, holds a claim with real economic value that a lender can reasonably treat as one more business asset. Bringing that claim inside the Article gives the lender the rules on attachment, perfection, and priority that apply to any other business asset. An individual’s claim for harm suffered outside any business falls outside commercial financing, so the Article leaves it to other law.
The definition of a commercial tort claim has two limbs, and which one applies depends on who holds the claim. Under the first, any claim arising in tort whose claimant is an organization qualifies, and an organization is any entity that is not an individual person.77 Under the second, an individual’s claim qualifies only if it arose in the course of the individual’s profession or business and is not based on damages for the personal injury or death of an individual.78 An organization’s tort claim is therefore commercial whatever its subject, while an individual must show a connection to a business.
The second limb is easiest to see on an individual debtor. An individual is in a car accident on vacation and grants a lender an interest in the negligence claim against the other driver. The claim has no connection to any business, so the transaction is outside Article 9 and other law governs it. A different individual is in a car accident while delivering goods to a customer in the course of a delivery business. That claim arose in the course of the individual’s business, and a pledge of it to a lender is within Article 9 as long as the claim is not for personal injury or death.79 The negligence, the accident, and the loan are the same in both situations, so the fact that moves the answer is whether the accident happened in the course of the individual’s business.
An organization’s claim needs no such showing. When an organization has a negligence claim against a driver and grants a creditor an interest in that claim, the transaction is subject to Article 9, because the claimant’s status as an organization settles the question.80
The personal injury limit in the second limb is the part students most often overlook, because a business setting does not by itself make a claim commercial. Damages for the injury or death of an individual compensate harm to a person, while a delivery van or a contract is a business asset. The Article reaches claims for the second kind of loss and leaves claims for the first to other law. The limit applies only to individuals, since the organization limb carries no personal injury condition.
The two claims in the courier’s scene share an accident and a claimant, and they differ in what they compensate, which is the fact the personal injury limit examines.
Exclusion here has the meaning it has throughout subsection (d). The creditor’s interest in the vacation claim is not void, and other law controls whether the interest exists and how it is made effective.81 An assignment that escapes the exclusion is a consensual grant of an interest in personal property, so paragraph (a)(1) brings it into the Article in the ordinary way.82
The proceeds exception answers a different problem, and it operates whether or not the claim is a commercial tort claim. Article 9 applies to a tort claim that is proceeds of other collateral in which there is a security interest.83 A secured party bargains for a claim on the value of particular collateral, and when a wrongdoer destroys that collateral, the debtor’s claim for damages becomes the substitute for the lost goods. A rule that cut the lender off at that point would end the lien when the collateral is lost, which is when the lender most needs it, and would let the debtor keep a recovery for property that was supposed to answer for the debt. Keeping §§ 9-315 and 9-322 in force lets the lien follow the value into the claim and ranks the lender against others who claim the recovery.84
The exception is as wide as the two sections it names, which cover proceeds and priorities in proceeds, and later chapters develop those rules. An individual who pledges a vacation-accident claim to secure a loan, with no tie to other encumbered collateral, gains nothing from the exception. The claim is not proceeds of anything, and the exclusion applies in full.
Consumer Deposit Accounts
Section 9-109(d)(13) excludes “an assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction, but Sections 9-315 and 9-322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds.”87 Most of the neighboring paragraphs sort transactions by the kind of right that changes hands. This one sorts them by what the loan is for, so the same checking account can sit inside Article 9 in one deal and outside it in the next.
The exclusion is narrow because deposit accounts are covered collateral. Article 9 does not apply to an assignment of an interest in a deposit account in a consumer transaction unless the account is proceeds of other collateral.88 A deposit account that secures a nonconsumer obligation is therefore within the Article, and there the creditor perfects a direct security interest in the account by control.89 Outside the Article, the older device is the common law pledge, in which the depositor delivers the evidence and control of the account to the creditor or otherwise restricts the depositor’s own control of it.90 Priorities in deposit accounts are a topic for later chapters.91 The work of this section is to say what makes a transaction a consumer transaction, because only that kind of deal leaves the Article.
The definition has three conditions, and all of them must be present. An individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, a security interest secures that obligation, and the collateral is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.92 In a loan setting, the “assignment” the paragraph mentions is the debtor’s grant to the creditor of an interest in the account to secure the debt. Because each condition can fail on its own, run the definition as a checklist.
Each condition does its own work. The individual requirement screens out every organization, because an entity cannot incur an obligation for personal or family purposes, and a company’s operating account is commercial no matter who owns the company. The purpose of the obligation looks at why the money was borrowed, while the purpose of the collateral looks at what the account does in the debtor’s life, and requiring both prevents a personal label on one half of the deal from carrying the other half out of the Article. A business account is working capital, the kind of asset a commercial lender looks to, whereas a household account paired with a household loan contains no commercial financing for Article 9 to organize.
An exam stem that offers an individual’s personal checking account as collateral is really asking what the loan is for. In the standard illustrations, an individual keeps a personal checking account, borrows from a lender to operate a business, and grants the lender a security interest in the account. The loan is for business purposes, so the transaction is not a consumer transaction and the grant is within Article 9.93 An organization that borrows to operate its business and grants an interest in its checking account is within Article 9 as well, because it fails the first condition at the outset. The excluded case keeps the individual and the personal account but changes the use of the money. The individual borrows to go on vacation and grants the lender an interest in the personal checking account, every condition is met, and the grant is outside Article 9 and governed by other law.94 Owning the account as an individual therefore settles nothing, which is why a student who equates “individual” with “consumer” reaches the wrong answer on the business loan.
The caterer’s loan and the vacation loan in the standard illustration both fund a family trip, and the single fact that moves the answer is how the account is used. The household’s own account leaves the Article, and the account that is really the business’s operating account stays in it.
Exclusion carries its usual meaning here. The creditor’s interest in the account is not void, because other law controls whether the grant of that interest is effective.95 The lender on a vacation loan may therefore hold a good interest, but it cannot invoke Article 9’s rules on attachment, perfection, and priority to establish it, and it must satisfy whatever the other law requires. A student who reads “excluded” as “unenforceable” has confused a choice of governing law with a ban on the lien.
The second half of the paragraph keeps the exclusion from reaching past the account itself. Sections 9-315 and 9-322 still apply to proceeds and priorities in proceeds, so a secured party whose Article 9 interest is in some other collateral can follow cash proceeds into a consumer’s deposit account. The secured party bargained for a claim on the value of the original collateral. If a sale turned that collateral into cash, and the cash lost its Article 9 protection the moment it entered a household account, a debtor could shed the lien simply by depositing the payment. Perfection in the original collateral can carry over to the proceeds under § 9-315, and § 9-322 ranks competing claims to them.96
The motorcycle lender and the vacation lender both deal with a personal checking account, and they differ in how the lender reaches it. A lender that takes the account itself as collateral for a consumer loan is outside Article 9, while a lender that traces proceeds of other collateral into the account is inside it. Later chapters develop tracing and the priority rules. For scope, this exclusion removes an assignment of the account and leaves proceeds claims where they were.