Concept
Subsection (c) Exclusions
Subject matter of Article 9 (§ 9-109)
Subsection (c) Exclusions
Section 9-109(a) gives Article 9 its territory, and subsection (c) takes part of it back. The subsection begins “This article does not apply to the extent that,” and each paragraph finishes the sentence by naming a situation in which other law controls.1 The phrase “to the extent” carries the weight. It makes each exclusion a matter of issues rather than of whole transactions: Article 9 withdraws from the questions the other law answers and keeps governing the rest.
Partial withdrawal is the sensible design because other law seldom governs a secured transaction from start to finish. A federal statute may say where an interest in some kind of property must be recorded and leave open how the interest is created, how it ranks against competing claims, and how it is foreclosed.2 If the whole transaction left Article 9 whenever other law touched it, those open questions would have no rules at all. Partial displacement closes the gap.
The analysis runs in two steps. First classify the transaction under the scope provisions in subsection (a), and then work it through the exclusions to see whether other law controls any part of it.3 An exclusion does not forbid a creditor from taking an interest in the asset to secure a debt. Its only effect is that other law supplies the rules for creating the interest, and under subsection (c) it does so only as far as that law reaches.4 The question under every paragraph is therefore how much ground the other law covers. The mere existence of some other law on the subject settles nothing.
Three situations follow, and each has a different source. One rests on the supremacy of federal law over a state enactment, another on special statutes that govern grants by governments, and the third on a letter-of-credit rule that ranks transferee beneficiaries. Federal preemption comes first because it shows most plainly how another body of law can displace Article 9 in part and leave it in force for the rest.
Federal Preemption
Section 9-109(c)(1) removes a transaction from Article 9 to the extent that “a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this article.”6 Article 9 is state law, enacted separately by each state, so wherever paramount federal law speaks, the state enactment cannot control. The exclusion records that limit and tells anyone applying Article 9 to look for federal law first.7
A federal statute, regulation, or treaty does not remove a transaction from Article 9 merely by existing. The exclusion asks whether the constitutional principles governing federal preemption of state law displace Article 9, and the analysis can come out three ways. The federal law may not preempt Article 9 at all, it may preempt Article 9 in part, or it may occupy the field and displace the Article entirely.8 The doctrine belongs to constitutional law, and for scope purposes the point is that the answer is never automatic. Article 9 gives way only as far as the preemption analysis reaches.
Partial displacement is the common result because federal statutes about secured credit usually cover one slice of the subject. Even when a federal act clearly covers filing, as the federal law on aircraft does, it typically leaves open creation of the interest, priorities, and foreclosure.9 Courts have often filled those gaps by analogy to Article 9, which is the use the drafters of the former § 9-104(a) invited.10
The Ship Mortgage Act shows how the analysis works. The federal statute provides for mortgages in ships and for their foreclosure, so a debtor who grants an interest in a ship to secure a debt presents a transaction that both bodies of law could claim. How far the Act displaces Article 9 depends on analyzing the Act under preemption doctrine. To the extent the Act preempts, federal law governs, and the portions of Article 9 that are not preempted govern the rest.11 An answer that says “the Ship Mortgage Act applies, so Article 9 is out” skips the step that decides how much of Article 9 survives.
The aircraft registration system marks the narrow end of the range. Section 9-109(c)(1) is the broad provision, since a federal law that preempts Article 9 can displace all of it. Section 9-311(a)(1) is narrower: it preempts only Article 9's filing system and leaves the remaining rules in force as governing law. The federal aviation act for registering interests in aircraft is the standard example.12 The stakes are real because perfection places a secured creditor well above an unperfected one in the priority ranking.13 A lender that looks only to Article 9's filing system for aircraft collateral has therefore looked in the wrong place.
The ship and the aircraft teach the same lesson at different scales. In the ship example the extent of displacement is an open question for preemption analysis, and in the aircraft example the displacement is limited to filing. In neither does the federal statute's existence remove the whole transaction from Article 9. Because certain collateral raises the question routinely, a lender must research federal law as well as state law when ship mortgages, aircraft titles, patents and copyrights, railroad equipment, or some interstate commercial vehicles are involved.14 The exclusion also has its usual effect here. It changes which law supplies the rules and does not bar a lender from taking an interest in the asset.15
Governmental Debtors
Section 9-109(c)(2) and (c)(3) deal with a debtor that is itself a government, and both defer to a more specific statute. Under paragraph (c)(2), Article 9 does not apply to the extent that “another statute of this State expressly governs the creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of a security interest created by this State or a governmental unit of this State.”17 Paragraph (c)(3) is the mirror image for other lawmakers. It applies to a statute of another State, a foreign country, or a governmental unit of either, other than a statute generally applicable to security interests, that expressly governs those same four matters for a security interest the other government created.18 The two paragraphs divide the field by the source of the special statute: one covers statutes of the enacting State, and the other covers statutes of every other jurisdiction.
The exclusions make sense only against the default they interrupt. A government that grants a security interest in its personal property by contract has created the transaction described in paragraph (a)(1), and nothing in subsection (a) exempts it because of who the debtor is.19 The 1999 revision in fact listed transfers by states and governmental units of states among the transactions it brought within Article 9.20 A state, a state governmental unit, or a foreign government is therefore a debtor like any other until subsection (c) says otherwise. The analysis then proceeds in the usual order, classifying under subsection (a) first and testing the exclusions second.21
The rationale is specificity. A statute written for a government's own pledges speaks to that debtor directly, while Article 9 is a general commercial statute drafted for debtors of every kind. Three limits keep the special statute's victory from growing past that justification.
The first limit is that the other statute must expressly govern. The four matters it must address, creation, perfection, priority, and enforcement, are the stages of a security interest's life. A statute that is silent on those stages leaves the creditor without an answer, and Article 9 is the law positioned to supply one.
The second limit is that deference runs issue by issue. Article 9 yields only to the extent the special statute governs, so a statute that covers creation and enforcement leaves perfection and priority with Article 9 unless it speaks to them as well.22 The other state law governs the aspects it covers, and Article 9 applies to any aspect it does not cover.
The third limit appears only in paragraph (c)(3), and it explains why the two paragraphs are not perfectly symmetrical. Article 9 defers to a statute of another State or a foreign country only if the statute contains rules applicable specifically to security interests created by that jurisdiction's own government.23 A statute generally applicable to security interests, such as another State's own enactment of Article 9, does not qualify. If it did, every grant by a governmental unit of another State would fall out of the Article, and the exclusion would consume the rule it modifies. Paragraph (c)(2) needs no such carve-out because it already looks to a statute other than Article 9.24
Consider a state utility commission that grants a security interest in its accounts to finance an expansion of its services. The commission is an ordinary Article 9 debtor. If no statute of the State expressly governs its grants, Article 9 governs the whole transaction. If one does, that statute controls the matters it covers and Article 9 governs the rest.27
The out-of-state version of the problem turns on the kind of statute rather than on how much ground it covers.
An answer that stops at “the debtor is a government, so Article 9 does not apply” skips every step in that checklist. Government status excludes nothing by itself, a special statute excludes only the matters it expressly governs, and a generally applicable statute from another jurisdiction excludes nothing at all. Where a special statute does apply, the exclusion decides which law supplies the rules for the covered issues and does not forbid the government from granting the interest.28
Transferee Beneficiaries
Section 9-109(c)(4) is the third exclusion in subsection (c). It removes a transaction from Article 9 to the extent that “the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person under a letter of credit are independent and superior under Section 5-114.”30 Section 5-114 deals with assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit.31 Like the other paragraphs of subsection (c), the exclusion works issue by issue. Article 9 gives way on the one question Article 5 already answers, which is how a transferee beneficiary's right ranks against the right of an assignee, and it keeps governing the rest.32
The paragraph is easy to misread because a beneficiary can pass two different things to another person, and Article 9 treats them differently. The only person who may rightfully demand payment from the issuing bank is the beneficiary of the letter of credit. If the credit's terms allow it, the beneficiary may transfer its right to draw to another person (§ 5-112), and that person becomes a transferee beneficiary.33
A beneficiary may instead keep its own position and promise a creditor the money the credit will produce. That arrangement is an assignment of proceeds, a different thing from a transfer of the right to draw. A security interest in a letter-of-credit right is within Article 9's coverage, and for the interest to attach, the assignee must have control of the letter-of-credit right. Control is present if the issuer or nominated person has consented to an assignment of proceeds.34 An assignee of proceeds therefore stands behind the beneficiary and looks to what the beneficiary receives, while a transferee beneficiary holds the right to demand payment from the issuer.
The sorting turns on what A handed over. C received the position that lets it demand payment, and D received a claim on money A may or may not collect. Two statutes answering the same priority contest could produce different answers, so Article 9 steps aside for the letter-of-credit statute on the ranking alone. Everything else about D's security interest stays under Article 9.
Students commonly make one of two errors on this exclusion. The first is to treat every dealing with a letter of credit as outside Article 9 because Article 5 governs the bank's obligation. Only a transferee beneficiary's right to draw, and its ranking above an assignee of proceeds, fall outside the Article, and a lender that takes the proceeds holds an Article 9 interest. The second is to assume that because Article 9 governs D's security interest, D wins the contest. The ranking is decided under § 5-114, and the transferee beneficiary comes first.