Concept
Consensual Security Interests
Subject matter of Article 9 (§ 9-109)
Consensual Security Interests
Most secured lending falls under a single clause of § 9-109(a), which applies Article 9 to "a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract."1 The clause describes the ordinary credit deal: a lender advances money, or a seller delivers goods on credit, and the debtor agrees that particular assets will answer if the debt goes unpaid. The secured obligation in almost every such deal is a money debt arising from a loan or a sale of goods.2
The clause has three working parts. A security interest is a right in the debtor's property that, on default, entitles the secured party to take possession of the property, sell it, and apply the proceeds to the debt.3 The property must be personal property or fixtures. And the interest must come into being by contract. Article 9 reaches past this core, since it also governs the sale of certain intangibles, which raise the same problems as granting a security interest in them,4 and it covers some interests that arise by operation of law, which later sections take up.5 The consensual security interest remains the primary coverage, so the two subsections below take its elements in order: first the collateral and the obligation, then the debtor's contract.
Personal Property and Fixtures
The first question under the clause is what the interest burdens. Article 9 takes personal property and fixtures, and its definition of security interest tracks the same two categories: an interest in personal property or fixtures that secures payment or performance of an obligation.6 Real property is another matter. Article 9 does not apply to the creation or transfer of interests in real property, including a lease and the rents under it, except for fixtures and certain enforcement rights when a secured party holds lien interests in both real and personal property.7 A mortgage or deed of trust is the standard example of a real estate security interest that stays outside.8
The line sorts ordinary cases easily. A borrower who grants a bank a security interest in her inventory to secure a loan has encumbered personal property, and the transaction falls within the clause.9 The same borrower who gives a second bank a mortgage on her land has created a real estate security interest, and Article 9 does not govern it.10
Fixtures, which are goods related to real estate, sit on the line, and Article 9 takes them in.11 A furnace shows why. Suppose a buyer contracts to purchase a furnace for an office building and grants the seller a security interest in it to secure the price. Once the furnace is installed, real estate law would pass it to a buyer of the building under the deed. Personal property law, however, treats installation as leaving the furnace's status as personal property intact, so the furnace can still be the subject of a separate contract apart from any contract about the real estate. That retained personal-property character is what makes the furnace a fixture, and it is why the seller's interest falls within the clause.12
Corporate shares are personal property too, and Haft v. Haft shows a court starting where the clause points. A Delaware court began with the scope provision, which applied Article 9 to "any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property." It observed that Article 9 generally governs the creation, perfection, and enforcement of security interests in property, and that security interests in share certificates, or certificateless shares, are not excluded from it.13
Before any of this applies, the asset must be "property." Article 9 does not decide that question. The statutes, regulations, and court decisions governing the asset do.14 The problem arises most often with licenses, because an issuing authority will often say that a liquor or broadcasting license is a privilege to engage in the licensed conduct and is not itself property.15 A bar owner who purports to give a bank a security interest in a liquor license shows the risk: if the state treats the license as a privilege and not as property, the bank may have no personal property for its interest to attach to. The sensible order of analysis is to settle under other law that the asset is property, and only then to ask how Article 9 treats an interest in it.
The other half of the definition is the obligation being secured. A creditor with a consensual lien holds two claims: an in personam claim against the borrower on the promise to pay, and an in rem claim against the collateral. A borrower who grants a bank a security interest in her inventory owes the bank the in personam obligation to repay, and the inventory carries the in rem obligation to answer for the debt.16 The obligation can take almost any form. Most are money debts from a loan or a credit sale,17 but the secured obligation may just as well arise out of a tort or a divorce settlement.18
The lien does two jobs for the creditor. If the debtor defaults, the creditor may take possession of the collateral and use it to satisfy the debt. And if other creditors, buyers from the debtor, or a bankruptcy trustee claim the same property, the lien may give the creditor a priority position.19 How well that priority holds up against a particular buyer or competing creditor is the work of the priority sections, such as §§ 9-317 and 9-320 on buyers of goods.20
Article 9 also names the participants. The debtor is the person with a property interest, other than a lien interest, in the collateral, and the creditor holding the interest is the secured party.21 The debtor so defined need not be the person who owes the debt, because a third person may put up collateral for someone else's loan.22
Creation by Contract
The second element is the phrase "by contract." Article 9's primary coverage is the consensual lien, in which the debtor gives the creditor an interest in some or all of the debtor's property.24 Put differently, a person with a property interest in the asset consents to making the asset answer, as an in rem obligation, for the debt owed to the creditor.25 A court applying the clause therefore asks whether the debtor agreed to encumber particular property for a particular obligation. Article 9's other main category, interests that arise by operation of law, needs no such agreement.26
Consent matters because of what the lien does. It gives the secured party the right to possession of the collateral if the debtor defaults, and for that reason the debtor must be the one to create it.27 The consent also reaches only the property the debtor actually offered. A retailer that gives a security interest in its truck has not encumbered its other motor vehicles, although a security interest can be granted in a wide variety of property.28
Because the interest rests on an agreement, ordinary contract law decides whether the agreement is valid. Alongside the attachment requirements, all of the principles of contract law apply in deciding whether the debtor validly created the interest, so a signature procured by undue influence puts the interest in doubt.29 The attachment requirements themselves are three, subject to some limited exceptions: the debtor must agree to grant the interest, value must be given, and the debtor must have the right, as a matter of property law, to grant a security interest in the collateral. UCC § 9-203(b).30 Consent is necessary but not enough.
The words "regardless of its form" keep a label from controlling the result. Mortgage law has long treated an absolute deed as a mortgage when the parties intended that, and Article 9 carries the idea over to personal property security interests.31 The next major section develops that substance-over-form principle.
A right the law hands a creditor without any agreement by the debtor is a different thing. When a contractor defaults, a surety that completes the project and collects the unpaid contract balance from the owner is exercising its common-law right of subrogation. No secured transaction exists, because the surety's right to the payment arose under subrogation, and the surety may keep the payment even though it never perfected a security interest under Article 9.33 The same holds for a nonconsensual lien on personal property, such as a statutory lien, which Article 9 does not apply to.34 A creditor with no agreement at all must use legal process instead. Garnishment, for example, is a proceeding in which a court orders the third party holding the debtor's property to turn it over to the judgment creditor.35
Some interests that arise without a security agreement are covered, but only because the list of covered transactions names them. It lists an agricultural lien36 and a security interest arising under § 4-210 or § 5-118,37 and later sections take up each entry. Outside the named entries, a creditor's possession, or a right the law confers, is no substitute for the debtor's contract.