Concept
Party Choice of Law
General Rules (§ 1-301, et seq.)
Party Choice of Law
Section 1-301(a) lets the parties to a multistate transaction choose the governing law and attaches one condition to that freedom: the transaction must bear a reasonable relation to the places whose law is in play. The text reads: “when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties.”1 It opens with “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section,” so the freedom has a ceiling set elsewhere in § 1-301, and a later part of this chapter takes up the provisions that set it.2
The freedom itself is generous. The Code takes a very liberal stance toward party autonomy,3 and part of its original vision was to bring commercial law into accord with the customs and practices of the commercial community.4 The relationship requirement keeps that freedom tied to the transaction. The parties may pick among the places the deal actually touches, and they may not pick just any jurisdiction they happen to like.
Three questions organize the rest of this part. What does a reasonable relation demand? How should a court read a text that, on its face, asks for a relation to the forum and to another state together? And what happened when the drafters tried in 2001 to drop the requirement? The last question carries an exam trap, because the rejected 2001 text and the enacted text share a section number.
Reasonable Relation Requirement
The condition is the whole test, and a clause that fails it never reaches the grant. The first step with any choice-of-law clause is therefore to ask what the transaction touches. The official comments direct the inquiry. The test is similar to the one the Supreme Court laid down in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., and ordinarily the chosen state must be one in which “a significant enough portion of the making or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs.”5 A state that hosts a meaningful share of the agreement's formation, or of the promised acts such as payment or delivery, has a real tie to the deal.
Seeman shows both how real the connection must be and how little the parties' motive counts once it exists. A Pennsylvania lender and a New York borrower made a loan that was arguably entered into in New York but, under a contract stipulation, was to be performed in Pennsylvania. The Court, essentially treating the stipulation as a choice-of-law clause, upheld the loan against a charge of usury.6 It quoted approvingly a passage reasoning that if the parties' “real, bona fide intention was to fix the situs of the contract at a certain place which has a natural and vital connection with the transaction,” the fact that they were motivated by a wish for a higher interest rate than another place allows does not prevent application of the law allowing the higher rate.7 Two ideas therefore sit inside “reasonable relation”: a natural and vital connection between the chosen place and the transaction, and a bona fide choice of that place.
A simpler decided case follows the same pattern. In Western Auto Supply v. Craig, a note executed in Alabama to a payee whose principal place of business was in Missouri provided that Missouri law governed, and the court determined that the agreement was effective.8 The transaction touched Alabama, where the note was signed, and Missouri, where the payee did business, and the clause chose one of the two.
Both clauses reflect the same motive, a preference for friendlier rules. What differs is the connection. A student who tests clauses by asking why the parties chose a particular law will go wrong, because the inquiry turns on whether a significant part of the making or performance links the chosen place to the deal, and a genuine link is not spoiled by a preference for that place's rules.
The Second Restatement shows how much work the single phrase carries. Section 187 offers two alternative tests, a substantial relationship or some other reasonable basis for the choice, and the UCC's one reasonable-relation test plays the same role as those two.9 One treatise describes the approach of former § 1-105, whose substance the enacted subsection restores, as a bit more restrictive of party autonomy than § 187, even though the general tendency over recent decades has been toward greater autonomy.10
One more feature of the text deserves attention. Unlike the common law and the Second Restatement, § 1-301(a) does not expressly separate a choice of law for interpreting and construing the contract from a choice of law for deciding its validity. Read literally, the same reasonable-relation requirement applies to both purposes.11 Check for the relationship whichever kind of question the clause is invoked to answer.
The Both-States Wording
The statute ties the parties' power to two relationships at once. The transaction must bear “a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation,” and only then may the parties agree that the law “either of this state or of such other state or nation” governs.14 “This state” means the forum, the state whose court is hearing the case. A rule about choosing between two bodies of law would ordinarily ask only whether the chosen law has a real connection to the deal. This one also demands a connection to the forum, and that extra demand is the odd drafting.
It matters only when the forum has no connection to the transaction. A literal reading would then bar the parties from choosing the law of a state that has a real tie to the deal, because the text requires the forum relation as a condition for choosing either state.15 Such a reading would make little sense, if only because it would contradict the Code's otherwise very liberal stance toward party autonomy.16
No court should reach that result, and the forum's lack of connection answers a different question from the one subsection (a) asks. Whether a court has power over the parties, and whether it is a suitable place to try the dispute, belong to jurisdiction and forum non conveniens analysis. Those doctrines can handle a forum with no business hearing the case, but they give no reason to preclude the parties from choosing the law of a connected state.17
Courts have not struggled with the wording, and the explanation is that they either ignore it or do not notice it.18 They work as if the statute asked only for a reasonable relation to the state whose law was chosen. The Z court in the facts above, asking that question, finds that the contract was made in X, a significant enough portion of its making, and honors the clause. When the forum is itself one of the connected states, the ordinary arrangement, the literal text and the working rule give the same answer.
On an exam, treat this as a drafting oddity and do not add it as an element to prove. A student who sees a clause choosing the law of a connected state and writes that it fails because the forum is unrelated has applied the text more strictly than any court does. A sentence noting that the literal wording would bar the choice, followed by the reasons courts do not read it that way, shows command of the point. The analysis then proceeds as before, by asking whether the chosen state has a natural and vital connection to the transaction.
The Failed 2001 Revision
The enacted subsection (a) keeps the reasonable-relation condition, but the condition was nearly lost. From the Code's first promulgation in 1952, § 1-105 fixed the Code's territorial reach and allowed party autonomy for contracts within its scope, and it was amended seven times between 1952 and 2001, in relatively minor ways.21 In 2001 it was revised in a major way and renumbered § 1-301.22
The 2001 text differed in structure and in substance. It separated consumer contracts from business-to-business contracts, and international contracts from intra-U.S. interstate ones, and it imposed different limits on party autonomy for each category.23 For ordinary commercial parties, the central change was that the chosen state no longer had to bear any reasonable relationship to the parties or to the dispute. A court would decline to enforce the clause only if applying it would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state whose law would otherwise apply.24 A consumer agreement, by contrast, was effective only if the transaction had a reasonable relationship to the chosen state.25
One treatise calls this about as far as a body of law has gone in letting parties essentially “make their own law,” and it notes that the proposal fit the Code's original vision of aligning commercial law with the customs of the commercial community.26 The same treatise points out the cost. Parties to a strictly local transaction could evade local law on the validity of certain contracts, so long as that law was not deemed to embody a fundamental policy of the state.27
The states declined to follow. The revised section proved unpopular with state legislatures, and by 2008 only the U.S. Virgin Islands had adopted it.28 Even other jurisdictions that adopted revised Article 1 either refused the proposed section or replaced its language with that of old § 1-105.29 In 2008 the proposal was withdrawn and replaced with a new § 1-301 that essentially restored the text of § 1-105 with only minor changes, so the drafters gave up on the 2001 language and went back to the old wording.30 The enacted subsection (a) therefore asks the question § 1-105 asked: does the transaction bear a reasonable relation to the places whose law the parties chose?
That history leaves a trap in the numbering. The states that rejected the proposal still label their choice-of-law provision § 1-301, although its content is equivalent to old § 1-105.31 One section number therefore names two different texts, and a source that discusses the rejected one under the bare number can mislead a careless reader. The enacted provision places party choice in subsection (a).32 The proposal, as one source describes it, placed the parties' agreement in subsection (c), where it was generally effective whether or not the transaction bore a relation to the chosen state.33
The clause and the parties' motive are identical in the two outcomes. Only the text consulted differs: the first result follows from a proposal that dropped the relationship condition, and the second from an enacted subsection that keeps it.34 What law governs once the clause fails under subsection (a) is a question for the default rule, which a later section takes up.
The practical consequence is direct. A clause choosing the law of a state with no connection to the transaction is tested under the reasonable-relation condition, and a fundamental-policy exception does not enter the analysis, because that exception belongs to the proposal and not to the enacted subsection.