Concept
Agreement and Contract
General definitions and principles of interpretation (§ 1-201, et seq.)
Agreement and Contract
Ordinary speech treats agreement and contract as synonyms, but § 1-201 gives each word its own job. An agreement is the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in § 1-303.1 A contract is the total legal obligation that results from that agreement, as determined by the Code and supplemented by any other applicable law.2 The first word asks what the parties actually arranged. The second asks what the law makes of the arrangement.
The Code keeps the two apart because each answers a different question. Finding an agreement is a fact inquiry with a wide net: the definition looks past the written words to circumstances such as course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, so a term the parties never wrote down can still belong to the bargain.3 Finding a contract applies legal rules to the bargain once the court has found it, and that second step lets a defense to enforcement operate on a bargain that undeniably exists. Merge the two ideas and every bargain in fact would become an enforceable obligation automatically.
A security agreement shows both layers at work. The security agreement creates the security interest and, in essence, memorializes the parties’ agreement and makes clear what the secured party can repossess on default.4 It is also a contract, so the usual doctrines of the common law govern it except where Article 9 or another statute alters them.5 That exception is the supplementation the contract definition describes: the Code supplies the primary rules, and general contract law fills the gaps.
Chemical Bank v. Rinden Professional Association shows both layers in one decision. Rinden and Intertel had signed a lease-purchase contract calling for $158 a month for 96 months, with an option to buy the equipment for $1 at the end, and the question was whether the defendant had waived his defenses against Chemical Bank. The court’s list of what a valid waiver requires contains both layers. One requirement is the bargain itself: an agreement by the buyer to waive defenses against an assignee. The others are conditions the law attaches to enforcing that bargain: the buyer is not a consumer, and the assignment was made for value, in good faith, and without notice of a claim or defense. The contract also permitted modification only by a “like signed agreement.” The court found every requirement met, so the defendant had validly waived his defenses against the bank.6
Two shorter definitions help you describe an agreement precisely. A term is a portion of an agreement that relates to a particular matter,7 so the waiver clause in Rinden is one term of a larger bargain. A party, as distinguished from a third party, is a person that has engaged in a transaction or made an agreement subject to the Code.8 Parties made the bargain; third parties, such as a later buyer of the collateral, did not.
Because the agreement layer asks for the bargain in fact, the title on a document settles little. Pre-Code labels such as conditional sale, chattel mortgage, and trust receipt still appear, but each is now one form of Article 9 security interest.9 What matters is the language of the instrument. The Fifth Circuit has said that “there must be language in the instrument which leads to the logical conclusion that it was the intention of the parties that a security interest be created,” and Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribus repeats the statement.10
The formal requirements are light. The secured party need not sign the document, no addresses are required, the document need not be witnessed or sealed or state the terms of the loan, and even a misspelling of the debtor’s name is not fatal.11 Drafting and authenticating a document that works as a security agreement is easy.
The same fact-bound approach appears when Article 9 turns to the secured party’s consent. If the secured party consents to a disposition of the collateral free of its security interest, the transferee takes free of it, and that consent may be express or implied. Whether the secured party consented depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.12 An agreement giving the secured party a right to proceeds should not be read as authorizing a disposition free of the security interest.13
The Core Definition
Section 1-201(b)(35) opens with the sentence that does most of the work: a security interest is an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.16 Two requirements sit inside it, one about the property and one about the purpose. The sentence also guards the door to Article 9, which applies to a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract.17 A financing arrangement therefore receives Article 9’s rules only if it fits this sentence.
Take the ordinary case. A borrows money from B and gives B the right to take A’s boat if A does not pay. The boat is collateral, the generic term for any tangible or intangible asset belonging to the debtor in which the debtor grants a security interest.18 A owns the boat and owes the money, so A is the debtor. B holds the interest and is the secured party.
The property requirement is the easier of the two. Collateral can be tangible, like a boat, or intangible, like a right to payment.19 Fixtures, which are goods related to real estate, count as personal property within Article 9, although Article 9 does not apply to a real estate security interest such as a mortgage or deed of trust.20 A loan secured by the borrower’s tractor meets the property requirement. A loan secured only by a mortgage on the borrower’s farmland does not.
The second requirement, that the interest secure payment or performance of an obligation, explains what kind of right the creditor holds. A lender who advances money acquires a claim to be repaid. A security interest adds a lien: a limited interest in specific property that gives the creditor a right to possession if the debtor fails to perform.21 The lien does two jobs. If the debtor defaults, the creditor may take the property and use it to satisfy the debt. If other creditors, buyers from the debtor, or a bankruptcy trustee claim the same property, the lien may give the creditor a priority position.22 A bare promise to pay leaves the lender in line with the borrower’s other creditors, while a lien gives the lender a claim on one asset that may rank ahead of theirs. The definition decides only whether the lien exists. Whether it prevails over a competing claim is a separate question.
A lender who takes no collateral holds only its claim against the borrower. Without an interest in property, no security interest exists, and Article 9 has nothing to govern.23
Holding a security interest and winning with it are different things. In re SemCrude L.P, oil producers claimed a security interest in oil that J. Aron and BP later bought from SemGroup. The court concluded that the producers did not have a perfected security interest, even if Texas or Kansas law applied, so J. Aron and BP took the oil free of any lien as buyers for value under § 9-317(b).24 The case marks the definition’s limit as a tool. Fitting the definition brings a claim into Article 9, but beating a later buyer depends on rules beyond the definition, perfection among them.
The word performance matters because the secured obligation need not be a payment. A financing buyer who advances money to a supplier acquires an interest in the goods to be supplied, and that interest secures the supplier’s duty to deliver them. Article 9 governs the arrangement.25 The obligation there is to deliver goods, and the interest qualifies because the definition asks only whether it backs some obligation.
The breadth is deliberate. Pre-Code law recognized several types of security interest in chattels, the simplest being the pledge, a bailment in which the creditor keeps possession.26 Article 9 dropped the traditional distinctions among security devices, which rested largely on form, and applies to all transactions intended to create security interests in personal property and fixtures under the single term security interest.27 The term reaches the typical grants as well as chattel mortgages, trust receipts, conditional sales, and other concepts.28 Because one test decides coverage, renaming a transaction does not take it outside Article 9. The two requirements also mark the edges: limiting the interest to personal property and fixtures leaves land mortgages to real property law, and requiring that it secure an obligation separates a lien from an outright transfer. A few outright transfers, such as sales of accounts and promissory notes, enter through the definition’s later sentences.29
Substance Over Form
The definition’s later sentences show that labels do not decide whether a transaction creates a security interest. The term includes any interest of a consignor, and of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note, in a transaction subject to Article 9.31 A seller’s retention or reservation of title after shipment or delivery is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.32 Article 9’s scope provision approaches from the other direction, reaching a transaction “regardless of its form” that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract.33 Each clause takes an arrangement the parties may call a sale, a title reservation, or a consignment and tests it by what it does.
The reason shows in what a lien does. A lien can win priority over other creditors, buyers, and a bankruptcy trustee,34 so the Code cannot let the parties choose their own label and, with it, their own priority. The single term security interest therefore replaced the variety of descriptive terms that had grown up at common law and by statute, and the traditional distinctions among security devices, based largely on form, are not retained.35 The old forms may still be used, but each is now simply one form of Article 9 security interest.36
The title-retention sentence applies the same reasoning to sellers. Before the Code, questions such as risk of loss were resolved by locating title. Article 2 abandoned that method: legal consequences flow directly from the contract and the action taken under it, because title is an intangible whose passing no one can prove by evidence, while words and actions can be proved.37 Each Article 2 provision on the rights, obligations, and remedies of sellers, buyers, and third parties therefore applies irrespective of title unless the provision specifically refers to it, as the warranty of title does.38 Article 9 follows the same path. It adopts neither a title theory nor a lien theory, and rights under it do not depend on where title sits.39 A seller that keeps title to delivered goods thus holds, in effect, a security interest for the unpaid price, and its position against the buyer’s other creditors depends on Article 9.
Herrington Livestock Auction Co. v. Verschoor shows the cost of relying on the label. A seller rested its claim to cattle on an agreement about when title would pass, and the Iowa Supreme Court treated the interest it claimed as a security interest. A seller who wants to protect a reserved interest has to proceed under Article 9.
The consignor clause works the same way. A consignment involves goods sent to a merchant to hold for sale on the consignor’s behalf, and Article 9 now covers consignments, with the consignor holding a security interest in the consigned goods.40 An earlier version of the definition left a consignment outside the term unless it was intended as security.41 The qualifier in the current text matters, because Article 9 covers consignments only as it defines them, and that definition excludes some arrangements a layperson would call consignments, such as leaving used clothing or furniture at a resale shop.42 The person who leaves a coat with a resale shop has not become a secured party. A supplier that delivers a stock of new inventory to a retailer for sale on the supplier’s behalf may have.
The clause for buyers of receivables reaches furthest, because the buyer there owns the asset outright. A business that needs cash can borrow against its receivables and grant the lender a security interest in them, since collateral may be any tangible or intangible asset of the debtor.43 It can also sell the receivables at a discount and let the buyer collect. Either route puts cash in the business’s hands now and leaves the customers’ payments for later. The sale of rights to payment, often called factoring, has long been regarded as a financing transaction with most of the economic characteristics of a personal property financing, and Article 9 now covers it more fully than before 1999.44 Because the two routes look alike from outside, a rule that applied Article 9 only to the loan would invite every lender to recast the loan as a purchase, and every dispute would turn on which transaction the parties made. Including the buyer’s interest in the definition puts both routes under the same rules.
Does the same reasoning reach a store that sells its customer list? It does not. The buyer clause is confined to the listed assets: accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, and a promissory note.45 A customer list is information about who the customers are, which differs from a right to be paid, so its buyer is an ordinary buyer and holds no security interest. Receivables entered the definition because a sale of them resembles a loan, and a sale of something with no financing counterpart raises no such difficulty.
Sales-Article Carve-Outs
Two sentences of § 1-201(b)(35) take rights that arise under the sales articles out of the term security interest, and each carries a proviso. The term does not include the special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of those goods to a contract for sale under § 2-401, although a buyer may also acquire a security interest by complying with Article 9. And, except as § 2-505 provides otherwise, the right of a seller or lessor of goods under Article 2 or 2A to retain or acquire possession of the goods is not a security interest, although a seller or lessor may also acquire one by complying with Article 9.47
Both carve-outs mark where the sales articles, not Article 9, govern. Article 2 attaches legal consequences to the contract and to action taken under it, not to the location of title, and its provisions on the rights, obligations, and remedies of sellers, buyers, and third parties apply on that basis.48 A buyer’s interest in goods identified to its contract and an unpaid seller’s right to hold goods back belong to the performance of a sale. Treating either as a lien would turn an ordinary sale into a financing.
The provisos keep the door to Article 9 open. A buyer who complies with Article 9 may also acquire a security interest, and so may a seller or lessor.49 The financing buyer is the clearest example: a buyer who advances money to a supplier and takes an interest in the goods to be supplied holds a security interest that secures the supplier’s duty to deliver.50 The same buyer’s special property under Article 2 remains a separate interest and is not a security interest, so two distinct interests can coexist in the same goods. A seller or lessor that wants a lien must take the Article 9 route. Without it, the seller or lessor holds only its Article 2 or 2A rights.
The opening qualifier of the seller-and-lessor sentence, “except as otherwise provided in Section 2-505,” marks where that carve-out stops.51 The qualifier points to § 2-505, the provision on a seller’s shipment under reservation, and a seller’s retention of title notwithstanding shipment or delivery is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.52 Withholding unshipped goods and shipping under reservation can look alike, since the seller keeps some control over the goods in both. Check for a shipment under reservation before concluding that a seller’s possession-related right sits outside Article 9.
Limits of the Definition
The reach just described invites the opposite mistake: treating every creditor’s claim on a debtor’s assets as a security interest. Read literally, the words “secures payment or performance of an obligation” are broad enough to include any distinctive claim to a debtor’s assets that a creditor might assert on default, and the definition therefore cannot be taken at face value.54 Several claims that look like security interests fall outside the term, and each fails for a different reason: the debtor granted nothing, the property is the wrong kind, the deal lies outside the financing transactions Article 9 was built for, or the asset may not be property at all.
Liens fall into three categories: judicial or execution liens, statutory and common law liens, and consensual liens.55 A security interest belongs in the third category, because the debtor grants it by agreement.56 A creditor holding only a judgment has no lien on any particular asset; the judgment is not a lien.57 Statutory liens arise by law instead of by agreement. Most states give liens in specific property to contractors who improve real property, to those who repair cars or other personal property, to hotels, and to landlords.58 Many statutory and common law liens on personal property also depend on the lienholder’s possession and are lost if the lienholder gives possession to the debtor or someone else.59 Because the debtor granted none of these liens, no security agreement stands behind them.
Falling outside the definition does not make these claims irrelevant, because their holders compete with secured parties for the same assets.60 Article 9 addresses some statutory liens in its priority rules; the source cites § 9-333(a) for the point.61 A bankruptcy trustee can also appear as a hypothetical lien creditor, as Hoggard below shows.
Agricultural liens show the same boundary in statutory form. Article 9 defines an agricultural lien as a term separate from security interest, and its scope reaches agricultural liens, a 1999 addition.62 The separate definitions have consequences. In an Iowa dispute, a bank and CCC argued that the state’s proceeds provision allows only a security interest, not an agricultural lien, to attach to proceeds, and that the Iowa Code defines and treats the two terms separately.63 Whether a provision that speaks only of a security interest also reaches an agricultural lien therefore depends on its text.
A mortgage on land fails the definition for a different reason: the interest is in the wrong kind of property. Article 9 does not apply to a real estate security interest such as a mortgage or deed of trust,64 nor to the creation or transfer of interests in real property generally, except for fixtures and certain enforcement rights.65 Fixtures are where the line is easiest to cross. If the owner of a building sold it after a furnace was installed, the furnace would pass to the buyer under the deed, yet the furnace keeps its personal property character and may be the subject of a separate contract apart from the real estate.66 An interest in the furnace created by contract is therefore an interest in a fixture within Article 9.67
In re Hoggard, the court accepted that when an Article 9 security interest in a fixture conflicts with a competing mortgage lien in the same fixture, the Michigan legislature has directed that Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9334 resolves the conflict. It then said that Revised Article 9’s application to mortgage liens in fixtures extends no further. The statute has no bearing on how such a lien is created or on how it relates to the rights of a bankruptcy trustee as a hypothetical lien creditor.68 A mortgage on land and its fixtures stays a real property lien, and it does not become a security interest merely because it also covers fixtures.
Subordination agreements and negative pledges fail for a third reason: Article 9 was not built to govern them. Section 9-339 provides that nothing in Article 9 prevents a superior creditor from subordinating its interest to another, and the point shows why the definition cannot be read at face value.69 The Article was drafted for institutionalized financing transactions. Beyond them lies a “no-man’s land, in which strange creatures do strange things,” and courts work out solutions case by case.70 A negative pledge, a debtor’s promise not to grant security interests in its personal property until the creditor is paid, is that kind of deal. The creditor holds a promise about the debtor’s future conduct, and it cannot name an asset it may take on default. A lien is always an interest in specific property, and a creditor who cannot say what the lien is in probably has none.71
What should you say when a lender takes a security interest in a liquor license? Begin by asking whether the license is property. The definition requires an interest in personal property or fixtures, and Article 9 does not itself decide whether an asset qualifies as property.72 That question belongs to the statutes, regulations, and court decisions that govern the asset. It arises most often with liquor and broadcasting licenses, because the issuing authority often takes the position that a license grants a privilege to engage in the licensed conduct and is not itself property.73 The answer matters because a security interest gives the lender the right to take the pledged property on default,74 and an asset that the regulator says the licensee does not own and may not transfer gives the creditor nothing to take.
You can sort the failures by the part of the definition each one lacks. A judicial or statutory lien lacks the debtor’s grant. An agricultural lien is a defined term of its own. A land mortgage concerns the wrong kind of property. A subordination agreement or negative pledge gives the creditor no interest in specific property and lies outside the institutionalized financing transactions Article 9 was built for. A license that other law denies is property gives the definition nothing to attach to.
Lease or Security Interest
The most litigated edge of the definition lies between a true lease and a so-called lease that is really a financing. The test appears in the older text of § 1-201(37) and now in § 1-203, to which Article 9 directs readers.76 Under § 1-203(a), the characterization of a particular transaction “is determined by the facts of each case.”77 Older cases cite § 1-201(37), so you will see both numbers.
The classification decides whether Article 9 governs. A lessee who is free to stop paying and return the goods holds an at-will lease, and Article 9 does not apply.78 If the lessee’s obligation runs for the whole term and cannot be terminated, the court must apply the test. When the test finds a security interest, the lessor is a creditor holding a lien, and its rights against the lessee’s other creditors and a bankruptcy trustee become Article 9 questions.79 A lessee who pays for the goods’ entire value and keeps them looks like an owner, and the so-called lessor then holds what a secured lender holds.
The idea beneath the test is the lessor’s reversion, the economic interest that remains with the lessor when the lease ends. A true lease lets the lessee use goods for less than their economic life and requires the lessee to return them while they retain substantial economic life, so the lessor keeps an economically meaningful residual interest.80 That interest has two parts: at signing the parties expect the goods to hold significant value at the end of the term, and the lessor keeps an entrepreneurial stake, the possibility of gain or the risk of loss, in that value.81 The Code does not state the idea as a single rule. Section 1-203 instead lists factors that should or should not support an inference of lease.82 Earlier versions asked whether a lease was “intended as security,”83 and the 1987 revision removed the reference to the parties’ intent and turned attention to the economics of the transaction.84
The bright-line test has two parts, and both must be met. The first is that the lessee’s obligation to pay for the term cannot be terminated by the lessee. The second is that at least one of four residual-value factors is present:
- The original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods.
- The lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods.
- The lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional consideration.
- The lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional consideration.85
The first part screens out the lessee who may stop paying and return the goods; that lessee has made an at-will lease, and Article 9 does not apply.86 The second part asks whether anything of value remains for the lessor once the non-terminable payments are made. A term that spans the goods’ remaining economic life leaves no life to return, and a duty to renew for that life or to become owner leaves none either. An option to renew or buy for little or nothing will almost certainly be exercised, so each factor describes a reversion that exists only on paper.87 When both parts are met, the transaction creates a security interest, and no other fact matters. Courts applying New York law reached the same result for an option to become owner for no or nominal additional consideration: the so-called lease was conclusively a financing, and the inquiry ended.88
Rinden applies the fourth factor. The lessee agreed to pay $158 a month for 96 months and could buy the equipment for $1 at the end. The court held that Article 9 applied because the lease-purchase contract was a secured transaction: a security interest is created where, upon compliance with the lease terms, the lessee has the option to buy the goods for nominal consideration.89 A $1 buyout after 96 payments leaves the lessor nothing of value to take back.
The absence of an option does not settle the question the other way. Consider a lease like the one in Towe Farms, Inc. v. Central Iowa Production Credit Assoc. It contained no option to purchase and no option to become owner for nominal consideration, and the lessee was to replace any cows or later-born heifers that died, were stolen, lost, or unaccounted for. The court still cautioned that the absence of such language is not controlling, because economic realities may show that a “lease” is in fact a security agreement.90
Nominality is the hinge of the fourth factor, so the definition supplies a measure. Additional consideration is nominal if it is less than the lessee’s reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease if the option is not exercised, and it is not nominal if the lease states the option price as the fair market value determined when the option is to be performed.91 The measure is a proxy for a practical question: is the option price so low that the lessee will certainly exercise it and, in all plausible circumstances, leave no meaningful reversion for the lessor?92
The comparison uses the information the parties had when they signed. The definition provides that what is reasonably predictable, and the remaining economic life of the goods, are determined from the facts and circumstances at the time the transaction is entered into.93 As one court put it, “Foresight not hindsight controls,” and an agreement that favors one party at the end does not change the character of the transaction.94 A rule that waited for the goods’ actual value at the end of the term would leave both sides unable to classify the deal on the day they sign it.
The definition also lists features that look like ownership but do not, standing alone, create a security interest. A transaction does not create a security interest merely because it provides that:
- the present value of the lessee’s rent is substantially equal to or greater than the goods’ fair market value when the lease is entered into;
- the lessee assumes the risk of loss or agrees to pay taxes, insurance, fees, or service and maintenance costs;
- the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner;
- the lessee may renew for a fixed rent equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent; or
- the lessee may become the owner for a fixed price equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value when the option is to be performed.95
Present value is the amount as of a date certain of sums payable in the future, discounted at the interest rate the parties specify if that rate is not manifestly unreasonable when the transaction is entered into, and otherwise at a commercially reasonable rate.96 None of the listed features says anything about what returns to the lessor at the end of the term. Rent whose present value approaches the goods’ value allocates payment, and a lessee’s assumption of risk and expense allocates the costs of using the goods. A fixed-price option set at or above the predicted market value leaves the lessor its entrepreneurial stake, because the lessee exercises only if the goods turn out to be worth more.97
A transaction that fails the bright-line test is not thereby a true lease. If the option price is not nominal, a court looks to other factors, and most importantly to the economic substance of the transaction.98 One court framed the inquiry around four matters: the lease’s actual terms; the circumstances and the parties’ actions before and at execution; whether the option price is nominal; and whether a lessor that has bargained away all of the goods’ meaningful value, leaving little or none at the end of the term, can ever hold a true lease.99 The party contending that the agreement is not what it purports to be carries the burden of showing that its rights are those of a purchaser or owner and not those of a lessee, as the parties agreed in one case.100
Step three does the decisive work in most problems, and the usual trap is to spend the analysis on features that make a lease feel like a purchase. A lessee that pays all taxes, insures the goods, and pays rent with a present value near the goods’ price has shown nothing the bright-line test counts. A lessee that cannot terminate and holds a $1 option has met the test, whatever the document is titled.