Concept
Limits on Liberal Construction
Rules of construction and application (§ 1-101, et seq.)
Limits on Liberal Construction
Section 1-103(a) requires that the Code be liberally construed and applied to promote three purposes: to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;1 to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties;2 and to make the law uniform among the various jurisdictions.3 Because the directive rests on purposes, it carries its own limits. An argument that begins “the Code must be liberally construed” is unfinished until it names the purpose the proposed reading serves and shows that the reading serves it.
Three questions finish the argument, and each comes from a recurring dispute: whether a buyer’s own production counts as cover, whether a seller may cure after the buyer revokes acceptance, and when evidence of trade practice may reshape a written contract.
Stretching Only When Needed
A buyer whose seller has breached may replace the goods by manufacturing them or by drawing on its own inventory. The commentary calls this self-cover. Section 2-712(1) demands that cover involve a transaction with another party, so counting self-cover as cover takes the section past its words.4
One court applying the Texas Business and Commerce Code took that step by reasoning from purpose. It read the official comment to section 2.712 as describing two aims: putting the aggrieved buyer in the economic position that performance would have given it, and letting the buyer acquire the goods it needs. A buyer should therefore be able to cover by manufacturing substitute goods, the court concluded, if the cover otherwise satisfies and promotes the purposes and policies of the Code.5 The final clause is the first limit. The stretch has no force of its own and holds only as far as it serves the section’s aims.
Critics add a second limit: a stretch that changes nothing is not worth making. A buyer turns to its own plant or inventory when that yields a substitute at a lower price than outside sellers demand. If self-cover pays, its price is likely to equal the market price, and § 2-713(1)’s market formula then gives the same damages as § 2-712(1), so the cover formula need not be invoked at all. Nor does self-cover systematically produce a different measure from the cover or market formulas, because, judged in advance, nothing suggests that the self-cover price will land above those figures rather than below them.6 The demand for a transaction with another party can be read to recognize that equivalence, and the critics conclude that there is no need to stretch the section’s language to allow self-cover.
The stretch matters most when in-house cost and market price part company, because the two formulas then stop agreeing. There the court’s proviso governs: the buyer’s claim must satisfy and promote the aims the court identified, including the aim of placing the buyer where performance would have placed it.7
Silence in the Text
The cure cases show that purposes inform a provision’s words without erasing them. A seller’s right to cure under § 2-508 clearly limits the buyer’s right to reject under § 2-602. Whether § 2-508 also limits the buyer’s right to revoke acceptance under § 2-608 is less clear.9
Until recent years, most courts answered no, relying mostly on a strict reading of the Code’s text. Section 2-508 speaks only of rejection, and the word “revocation” appears in neither its text nor its official comments. Proponents of the strict view argue that the omission was intended and that the act of acceptance draws the line where the right to cure ends.10
Other courts have held that the right to cure after revocation is implied in the Code’s language. They usually work through § 2-608(1)(a), correctly or not, or find a buyer’s duty to allow cure implied in § 2-608(3). Courts that wish to preserve a seller’s right to cure can also skirt the issue, and one Mississippi decision, over four dissents, in effect applied § 2-508 to preclude a finding of breach.11 The second limit therefore asks a question before any stretch begins: is the silence a gap or a deliberate line?
Those facts present the case in which a gap is most plausible. One commentary suspects that the drafters failed to envision the revocation case in which the seller tenders early, the buyer accepts and later revokes, and the seller tenders a conforming delivery before the contract period expires, and it suspects the drafters might have allowed cure had they thought about it.12 That argument is strongest where time remains in the contract, and it is weaker for a court that must supply a right in a provision that, on its face, speaks only of rejection.
Proving the Practice
The second purpose in § 1-103(a) lets commercial practices expand through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.14 That purpose gives trade practice a real voice in a contract, but the practice must be proven before it speaks. The Code abandoned the common-law test of nonconsensual custom and treats usage as a way of determining the parties’ probable intent, which abolished the requirement that custom be universally practiced. Even so, trade usages still must be well settled.15
That standard is workable because it can be checked against something outside the litigation. The existence and scope of a usage can be determined from other members of the trade, so an outside standard exists for judging a party’s claim that the parties meant the usage to control.16 A judge can therefore keep usage evidence from the jury in three situations:
- The evidence fails to show that the practice is regularly observed, so it does not show a usage of trade as the Code defines it.
- Members of the trade confirm the usage but do not support its application to the particular facts, so the evidence is irrelevant.
- The parties used new and different language to convey their agreed intention to abandon the past practice, so practice under the old language is irrelevant to the contract containing the new.17
Criticism of Columbia Nitrogen shows the first two screens at work. That decision has been criticized for admitting a usage that was not proved sufficiently well established and was not clearly applicable to the detailed contract between Royster and Columbia Nitrogen. The critique asks whether contracts of similar detail, covering similar periods, and negotiated with similar care were regarded as estimates by others in the trade. If they were, the usage belonged in evidence. If the contracts treated as estimates were always form contracts, short-term contracts, or otherwise substantially different, the usage was irrelevant and should have been excluded.18
A proven usage must also fit the written terms. A usage may modify the apparent agreement, as seen in the written terms, so long as it does not totally negate it. Applying that limit, one court held that a seller’s posted price at delivery might seem at first glance inconsistent with a trade usage of price protection at times of price increases, but that a closer reading allowed the jury to find the two consistent.19
The three limits share one logic. A purposive argument must connect the reading to a purpose, must be needed to reach the result, and, when it rests on practice, must rest on practice that is proven and fits the contract.