Concept
Supplemental Principles of Law and Equity
Rules of construction and application (§ 1-101, et seq.)
Supplemental Principles of Law and Equity
A Code provision rarely answers every question a dispute raises, and § 1-103(b) says where the rest of the answer comes from. Unless displaced by the Code's particular provisions, the principles of law and equity supplement its provisions, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause.1 The rule has two halves. Supplementation keeps the general law running alongside the Code, and displacement marks the points where the Code's own rules take over.
Without supplementation, the Code's silence on a doctrine would read as abolition of it. Most of the listed doctrines decide whether a contract exists, who is bound by it, or whether it can be avoided, and those questions come before any Code rule on performance or remedy. A buyer who signed because of the seller's lies would find no law of fraud to invoke, and a seller whose employee lacked authority to bind the company would find no law of agency to consult. The closing phrase, “other validating or invalidating cause,” extends the same idea to any doctrine that makes an agreement effective or ineffective.
Displacement limits the rule from the other side. Where the Code speaks to a point in a particular provision, that provision controls over the general doctrine, because merchants could not rely on the Code's text if an older doctrine could override a specific rule. The limit reaches only as far as the provision does, so a doctrine displaced on one point keeps operating on matters the Code leaves alone.
The Code's rule on modifying a sales contract shows displacement at work. At common law, technicalities such as the pre-existing duty rule hampered adjustments to contracts. The Code's modification section replaces them with its own terms; its stated policy is to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications without regard to those technicalities. The modified contract must still satisfy the statute of frauds (a sale of goods for $500 or more must be in writing), and the parties may in effect write their own statute of frauds, because a signed agreement that excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot otherwise be modified or rescinded.2
Custom supplies a second example. The Code abandoned the traditional common-law test of nonconsensual custom, which required that a custom be universally practiced, and treats usage as a way of determining the parties' probable intent. A trade usage must still be well settled, but universal practice is no longer the measure.3
Both examples turn on one question: has the Code spoken to the same point? Where a particular Code provision addresses the point, as the modification section does and as the Code's treatment of usage does, the provision controls. Where none does, the general doctrine fills the gap, as the buyer's fraud claim does in the hypothetical.
Simplify, Clarify, Modernize
The first of the Code's three stated purposes is to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions.5 The drafters promulgated the Code in the 1950s to that end, with eight substantive articles and one article of general provisions. It gained widespread adoption in the 1960s, was revised piecemeal afterward, and in the mid-1980s began a wholesale article-by-article revision that was finally completed in 2003.6
Obsolescence drove part of that work. Computerization made prior means of doing business obsolete and produced changes in statutory law affecting the UCC, among them the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, and the controversial Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, enacted in only two states.7
Revision answers obsolescence slowly, because an approved article must go to each state, and a state may make nonuniform amendments as it adopts the article.8 Interpretation works between revisions. The drafters recognized that the practices they wanted to regulate could change over time, so they directed courts to construe the provisions liberally to promote the Code's underlying purposes and policies, which include the modernization of commercial law.9 A court reading a Code provision today therefore need not wait for an amendment before it lets doctrine keep pace with a new practice.
The simplify-and-clarify strand appears in how courts read a commercial agreement. In Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., Royster opened a new plant that produced more phosphate than it needed, and the parties reversed roles: Royster would sell the excess to Columbia. The contract set the price and the amount to be sold and let the price rise if certain events occurred, but it provided for no price declines. When the price of nitrogen fell precipitously, Columbia refused to accept the full amount the contract specified after Royster refused to renegotiate the price.10 The trial judge excluded evidence of trade usage and course of dealing offered to explain the express quantity term. The appellate court reversed, because Columbia had offered to prove that the quantity was a mere projection to be adjusted for market forces.11
The contract was lengthy, the product of long and careful negotiation, and apparently covered every contingency. The court nonetheless held that “the test of admissibility is not whether the contract appears on its face to be complete in every detail, but whether the proffered evidence of course of dealing and trade usage reasonably can be construed as consistent with the express terms of the agreement.” Ambiguity was not needed to admit the evidence. The quantity term could reasonably be read as consistent with a usage treating such terms as projections, because the contract did not say that usage and dealings evidence would be excluded, it was silent on adjusting price or quantity in a declining market, it expressed the minimum tonnage as “Products Supplied” rather than “Products Purchased,” and its default clause stated no penalty for failure to take delivery.12
The contract also had a merger clause stating that there were no oral agreements. The court explained that its ruling “reflects the reality of the marketplace and avoids the overly legalistic interpretations which the Code seeks to abolish,” because the Code assigns dealing and usage evidence “unique and important roles,” and an “overly simplistic and overly legalistic interpretation of a contract should be shunned.”13 Simplify, in this setting, does not mean reading the writing at its plainest. A judge who treats a long, careful contract as closed on its face simplifies the inquiry but never learns what the quantity term meant in that trade, which is the legalism the court rejected.
The Code's modification rule, discussed above, reflects the same impatience with technicality: its policy is to make necessary and desirable modifications effective without regard to the technicalities that hampered them at common law.14 Both strands of the first purpose answer a mismatch between legal text and commercial practice. Revision and liberal construction address a mismatch that grows over time, and context-based reading addresses a mismatch inside a single contract. The usage evidence at the center of Columbia Nitrogen bears equally on the second purpose, which the next section takes up.
Custom, Usage, and Agreement
The second stated purpose is to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.16 The sentence names three routes by which practice enters a transaction and tells a court to keep each one open. The drafters expected practice to keep moving after enactment. Their commentary, quoted in Nanakuli Paving & Rock Sales, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., says the Act is “drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices,” and that the courts may develop its law “in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.”17
Commercial practice starts with merchants in the trade, not with the legislature. An agreement that meant only the words on the page would force a court to ignore the understandings that make the trade work, and every new practice would await an amendment before it counted. Letting custom, usage, and agreement give meaning to terms avoids both problems. Two checks, taken up below, keep that freedom from being abused.
The Code carries these routes into the contract through its definition of agreement. Hawaii's version, which Nanakuli applied, defines an agreement as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance,” and it points to separate Code sections for those three terms. Express terms therefore do not constitute the entire agreement, which must be sought also in evidence of usages, dealings, and performance, and the purpose of usage evidence is to help a court understand the whole agreement.18
Express terms and usage must be read together wherever they can be. The express terms and an applicable course of dealing or usage of trade “shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.”19
Nanakuli applied that structure to a supply relationship. The contract carried an express price term, “Shell's Posted Price at time of delivery.”20 In 1974, Shell's new Houston management denied Nanakuli price protection, relying solely on the 1969 contract's express price term and unaware of Shell's 1969 commitment or of its past pricing practices toward Nanakuli.21 The court held that a trade usage to price protect pavers at times of price increases for work committed on nonescalating contracts could reasonably be construed as consistent with the express posted-price term. It reasoned that the agreement is broader than the express terms and includes usages, which may even add terms, that the commercial background those usages supply is vital to understanding the agreement, and that the Code therefore directs a court to assume the parties included them unless they cannot reasonably be construed as consistent with the express terms.22
The court added that a usage may modify the apparent agreement shown in the written terms so long as it does not totally negate it. Price protection formed an exception to the posted-price term, not a total negation of it, and the evidence was overwhelming that all suppliers in the small Oahu asphaltic paving market routinely practiced price protection, that Shell therefore knew of it, that it was a realistic necessity for doing business there, and that it was an intended part of the agreement.23 The opinion also had to decide how broad a trade bound Shell, either the Hawaiian asphaltic paving trade or only the purchase and sale of asphalt, and whether Shell's two instances of price protection in 1970 and 1971 were waivers of the 1969 contract as a matter of law or a course of performance the jury could find.24
The two scenes differ in the work left for the express term to do. Price protection for committed work left the posted price in charge of every other sale, while a signing-date rule for all purchases would leave it in charge of none.
A party who loses under the express terms will often answer that a practice supports a different reading, and the Code does not accept the assertion on its own. Because the Code abandoned the common-law custom test and treats usage as evidence of the parties' probable intent, universal practice is no longer required, but a trade usage must still be well settled. A court must also demand that the evidence be sufficiently definite and widespread to prevent one party from revising the contract's terms unilaterally after the fact, because the Code's intent is to put usage evidence on an objective basis.25
The check works through exclusion. A judge may exclude evidence that fails to show a practice regularly observed, because it then does not show a course of dealing or usage of trade as the Code defines them. A judge may also exclude as irrelevant a usage that members of the trade confirm but do not support as applying to the facts in litigation, and a past practice that the parties abandoned by using new and different language for their agreement.26
A comparison test governs usage drawn from other contracts. If contracts of similar detail, covering similar time periods, and negotiated with similar care were regarded as estimates by others in the trade, the usage comes in. If the contracts treated as estimates were always form contracts, short-term contracts, or otherwise substantially different, the usage is irrelevant to the dispute and is excluded.27 Read with Columbia Nitrogen, the lesson is that the completeness of a writing never excludes a usage by itself, while a mismatch between the usage and the kind of contract in dispute does.
Uniformity Among States
The third stated purpose is to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.29 The first two purposes ask how a provision fits the commercial world, and this one asks how it fits the law of other states. A seller who ships to a buyer in another state, or a lender who finances inventory held in several, can plan around a single set of rules and can predict the outcome of a dispute without first learning which state's court will hear it.
Uniformity is a goal the Code states and cannot achieve alone, because the Code takes effect only as each state enacts it. Once the two sponsoring organizations approve an article, it is proposed to a state for adoption through that state's normal legislative process, and the state may make nonuniform amendments along the way. The UCC is not law; the law is the relevant article as enacted by a particular state, which is why a lawyer advising a client on a real dispute must consult the Code as enacted in the relevant state.30
Where legislatures follow the sponsors, the purpose is met. Revised Article 1, which contains the general provisions that apply across the other articles, has been adopted by almost every state, so a party doing business in several states meets essentially the same rules in each.31 The first limit on that success is the nonuniform amendment. A majority, but not all, of the states that enacted revised Article 1 included its expanded definition of good faith. The original definition required only honesty in fact, and the revised one adds the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing for parties and transactions subject to a good faith requirement under another Article.32
The second limit arises after enactment, when courts read identical text differently. Difficult issues appear and persist, and they have produced conflicting judicial interpretations that threaten the uniformity of commercial law, which is why most of the UCC has recently been subjected to revision efforts.33 Nothing in the Code compels one state's court to follow another's reading, but the purpose creates a pull toward alignment. Nanakuli shows it. The opinion quotes a court's observation that numerous state courts have interpreted their own versions of the Code in line with the weight of federal authority, admitting freely evidence of additional terms, usages, and prior dealings and harmonizing them in most instances with apparently contradictory express terms, and that the only Hawaiian case on the subject dealt with the parol evidence rule in dicta. The opinion treated that discussion as pertinent to the approach to be taken in the case before it.34 A court facing an open question under its own enacted text looks to how other courts have read the same words, and a reading that fits the weight of that authority keeps its state's law close to its neighbors'.
The same wish for uniformity reaches across borders. A series of meetings in Vienna, attended by 62 nations, led to the adoption in 1980 of the international sales convention known as the CISG, which took effect a year after the tenth instrument of adherence was deposited and so went into effect among 11 nations in 1988.35
Because uniformity depends on enactment, an argument that the purpose should override a state's enacted text fails. The purpose guides how a court reads the text its legislature adopted, and the text itself, including any nonuniform amendment, remains that state's law.