Concept
Applying the Test
Waiver by inadvertent disclosure and clawback
Applying the Test
Rule 502(b) shields a federal disclosure from waiver only when three conditions are all met: the disclosure was inadvertent, the holder took reasonable steps to prevent it, and the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including, where applicable, following Rule 26(b)(5)(B).1 Each condition looks at a different moment, so the way to apply the rule to untidy facts is to take the conditions in the order the events happened and ask, at each one, what the producer must show and where the facts leave room for argument. One scenario, run through that sequence, shows the method. The sources support the method more than any single result, so the discussion marks the points at which a court has a real decision to make.
The Scenario
BBS produced emails to Milton in a federal case, and it screened them in two stages. Software isolated every email addressed to or received from attorneys at Frank/Carlton and removed 840 of them. Marlow, who worked with BBS's counsel, Brock, then reviewed the remaining 62,360 emails, largely by sampling, and removed 38 more as privileged or work product. The withheld emails went on a privilege log, and the 62,322 emails that remained went to Milton on May 14.2
The trouble surfaced five weeks later. On June 20, Milton's counsel told Brock that 62 of the produced emails appeared to be attorney-client privileged. Brock replied the same day that the disclosure was inadvertent and that she would be back in touch shortly. She and Marlow then spent three weeks on eight depositions and on a summary judgment motion brought by another defendant. On July 18, Brock called Milton's counsel and learned that the 62 emails were attachments to other emails, which is why nothing in the headers connected them to Frank/Carlton attorneys. On July 22, she wrote to assert the privilege and demand return. Milton refused, arguing that BBS had waived the privilege by failing to conduct a proper review before production and by delaying its demand. On August 1, Brock moved for a ruling that the 62 emails are privileged and must be returned.3
The production came in federal litigation, so Rule 502(b) supplies the waiver standard. The rule protects against waiver by inadvertent disclosure only on a showing that the holder took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, so BBS must make that showing.4 The analysis also assumes that the 62 emails are privileged. Rule 502(b) asks whether a disclosure forfeited a protection; it does not create one.
First Condition: Was the Disclosure Inadvertent?
Nothing in the facts suggests that BBS meant to produce the 62 emails.5 BBS built its screen to remove communications with lawyers, and these emails passed through it because they were attachments whose lawyer connection never appeared in the headers. A holder that designs a process to catch protected material and misses some has made a mistake. The result would differ if a lawyer had read the attachments and chosen to include them, because a choice is not a mistake and the first condition would fail. Milton's stated grounds for waiver attack the quality of the review and the speed of the demand, which are the subjects of the second and third conditions. The first condition should draw little dispute.
Second Condition: Reasonable Steps to Prevent Disclosure
BBS can point to the scale of the job. The treatise notes that computer screening is likely the only feasible way to handle massive document exchanges, and it adds that reasonable use of analytical software and effective search terms may itself show reasonable steps.6 Proportion helps as well. Sixty-two misses in a production of 62,322 emails is about one-tenth of one percent, and a small proportion of misses in a large set makes a finding of reasonable review more likely than many misses in a limited set.7
The case against BBS centers on the design of the screen. In Rhoads Industries, the court criticized a producer for limiting its email search to address lines and not the bodies of the emails, and for relying on keyword searches without other quality assurance measures.8 BBS's filter resembles the first of those targets: it caught messages to and from lawyers and missed attachments whose lawyer connection did not appear in the headers. Marlow checked the rest largely by sampling. A court would want concrete answers. Why did BBS rely on addresses alone? Did anyone consider attachments? How was the sample chosen, and how large was it? Did anyone test the filter's results? The answers decide whether the process was a sound design with one unlucky gap or an unexamined shortcut.
Two other considerations cut neither way on this record. The treatise lists time pressure, since an accelerated deadline can let privileged documents slip past even a careful review, and records management before litigation, since a well-organized system suggests a reasonable effort. The scenario is silent on both.9 The parties in Race Tires agreed that certain search terms would raise a presumption of reasonable search, but nothing indicates that Milton and BBS made such an agreement.10
A producer with a strong record looks different from BBS.
BBS's record differs at three points: a single layer of address filtering, an undocumented sample, and a month before the demand. A court would set those differences against BBS's real strengths, the volume of the production and the small proportion of misses.
Third Condition: Prompt Rectification
The third condition begins with the question of when delay is measured from. BBS learned of the mistake only when Milton's counsel wrote. A producing party need not conduct a post-production review to find protected material it sent by mistake, but it must follow up on any obvious indications that something was produced inadvertently.11 The scenario shows no such indication before June 20, so the clock starts with Milton's notice and not with the May 14 production. Measuring from production would demand the very audit that the advisory note excuses.
Promptness is BBS's weakest point.12 Thirty-two days passed between Milton's notice and BBS's July 22 letter. Courts have set markers at both ends of that range. In Sheet Metal Workers, a producer that discovered an inadvertent production late on a Friday notified opposing counsel the following Monday, and that satisfied the promptness requirement. In Ceeglia, a two-month delay in requesting return of an inadvertently disclosed email was not reasonable.13 A month falls between those results, so the court must weigh BBS's explanation.
That explanation has two parts. First, a notice under Rule 26(b)(5)(B) states the claim and its basis, and Brock did not learn the basis until July 18.14 Once she knew, she sent the letter within four days. Second, she and Marlow were occupied with eight depositions and a summary judgment motion. Milton will answer that Brock promised on June 20 to be back in touch, then took four weeks to make a call she could have made at once, and that a general assertion of privilege did not need to wait for the details. Whether another lawyer could have handled the clawback during the depositions is a fact the scenario leaves open, and a court would want to hear it. The treatise does not say how this comes out. It says the court must examine the promptness and reasonableness of BBS's conduct after it discovered the error.15
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) and the Recipient in the Timeline
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) enters the timeline twice, and the two entrances should be kept apart. Brock's July 22 letter is the clawback notice and the rectifying step that Rule 502(b)(3) names.16 The step must still be prompt, so a letter that follows the procedure but arrives late does not satisfy the third condition on its own.
Milton's side of the timeline has two layers. Its counsel's June 20 message met the ethical duty under ABA Model Rule 4.4(b) to notify the sender of an apparent mistake, but that rule does not address waiver and leaves the question to the judge.17 The civil rule's duties begin only when the producing party notifies the recipient of the claim and its basis.18 After the July 22 letter, Milton had to promptly return, sequester, or destroy the emails and any copies, could not use or disclose them until the claim was resolved, and had to take reasonable steps to retrieve any it had already disclosed. It could present the emails to the court under seal for a ruling.19 A stipulated-order provision tracks this rule: once a producing party gives notice that inadvertently produced material is subject to a privilege claim, the receiving parties' obligations are those of Rule 26(b)(5)(B).20 Milton's disagreement about waiver gave it a lawful way to contest the claim. It did not entitle Milton to keep working with the emails, and the scenario does not say whether Milton did. Brock's August 1 motion puts two questions to the court: whether the emails are privileged, and, if they are, whether Rule 502(b) preserved the privilege.
What a Loss Would Cost
Rule 502 caps what a mistaken production can cost. Before it, a mistaken disclosure could waive the privilege and, in some circumstances, produce subject matter waiver, which meant a further production of every privileged communication on the same subject.21 Under Rule 502(a), a mistaken disclosure in a federal proceeding can never justify subject matter waiver, so a finding of waiver here would reach only the 62 emails actually disclosed.22
If the Parties Had an Agreement
The last step can displace everything above it. Suppose that before discovery Milton and BBS had agreed that a disclosure in the litigation would not waive any privilege or work product protection in this or any other action, and that Rule 502(b) would not apply.23 Between those two parties, the agreement supplies its own terms in place of the three conditions. Milton could no longer argue that BBS's review was careless or its demand late, and the dispute would shrink to whether the emails are privileged and whether the agreement reaches them. Under Rule 502(e), however, an agreement binds only the parties unless it is incorporated into a court order, so a stranger to the agreement could still argue waiver.24
A Rule 502(d) order protects further. The court may order that disclosure connected with the pending litigation is not a waiver, and the disclosure is then not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding either.25 Parties may incorporate their agreement in the stipulated protective order they submit to the court.26 With such an order in place and covering the emails, BBS's screening design and its thirty-two days would no longer matter.