Concept
Notice Requirement
Residual hearsay exception and notice
Notice Requirement
Rule 807(b) adds a third condition to the residual exception: the proponent must give notice. The statement comes in “only if the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement,” and the notice must include the statement’s substance and the declarant’s name “so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.”1 The notice must be in writing before the trial or hearing, or in any form during the trial or hearing if the court, for good cause, excuses a lack of earlier notice.2 The text answers three questions: what the notice must say, how and when it must arrive, and when a late notice still counts.
The stated purpose is a fair opportunity to meet the statement. An opponent who faces hearsay in place of live testimony meets it by investigating in advance: who the declarant is, what the statement says, whether it can be contradicted, and whether better proof was within the proponent’s reach. Without notice, that work begins when the statement is offered, too late to help.
Notice is a condition of admissibility in its own right. A statement that is trustworthy and more probative than anything else the proponent can reasonably obtain still stays out if the proponent never gave notice and the court finds no good cause for the omission. Students who treat notice as housekeeping lose the point in just the problems where the stem has already settled reliability and need. The subsections below take up the notice’s content first, then its form and timing, then the good-cause excuse.
Content of the Notice
The notice must contain “its substance and the declarant’s name,” and it must contain them “so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.”3 The listed items set the floor, and the fair-opportunity purpose explains why each one is there. Together they require three things:
- An announcement that the proponent intends to offer the statement, so the opponent knows which statement to prepare against.
- The statement’s substance, so the opponent can look for contradicting evidence and for better proof of the same point.
- The declarant’s name, so the opponent can investigate the declarant’s motive, vantage point, and availability.
The last two items depend on each other. A summary without a name leaves the opponent no one to investigate, and a name without a summary leaves nothing to answer. A notice missing either one fails the text, however early or carefully it was served. A general warning that some hearsay may be offered fails for the same reason, because the rule speaks of the intent to offer the statement, an identified statement the proponent actually plans to use.
The 2019 amendment deleted the declarant’s address from the notice, as nonsensical for unavailable declarants and unnecessary where the address is known or easily obtained.4 Some unavailable declarants have no address to give, and an opponent who already knows where the declarant lives learns nothing from being told. Where the address is critical and the adversary cannot get it, the Advisory Committee expects the court to grant relief on an individual request, so the burden does not fall on every notice.5
Outlines written before 2019 often list the address as a required item. A notice that names the declarant and summarizes the statement is now complete on content even if it says nothing about where the declarant lives, and an opponent with a genuine need for the address asks the court for it.
One illustration in the secondary literature shows the requirement at work. In a problem built on a set of notes and an article, Rule 807 might supply the route to admission, but the proponent would have to give notice of the intention to introduce the notes and article, in addition to establishing trustworthiness.6 Under the current text, that notice would also state the writings’ substance and name the declarant.
Stems on this requirement usually test one of three variations. A notice that announces an offer but omits the substance or the declarant’s name fails, because the opponent cannot prepare. A notice that gives both but omits the address passes on content. A notice that is complete on content but late or spoken raises the form-and-timing question, which comes next.
Writing and Timing
The last sentence of Rule 807(b) sets a default and an exception. By default, the notice “must be provided in writing before the trial or hearing.” The exception allows notice “in any form during the trial or hearing if the court, for good cause, excuses a lack of earlier notice.”9 This subsection covers the default, and the next takes up the exception. A proponent who gives timely written notice never needs the exception.
A writing includes electronic form under Rule 101(b)(6), so an email satisfies the requirement as readily as a letter.10 The 2019 amendment added the writing requirement to reduce disputes over whether notice was given.11 Oral notice breeds two disputes, whether anything was said and what was said, and each lawyer remembers the conversation through the lawyer’s own interest. A writing settles both. It proves that notice was given, and it fixes the substance and the declarant’s name that the proponent actually disclosed.
The timing requirement protects the opponent’s time. Notice before the trial or hearing lets the opponent do the investigating described above while it can still affect the outcome. The word “hearing” extends the same duty to any proceeding where the statement will be offered. The rule sets no fixed number of days, but the notice must still be reasonable and must leave a fair opportunity to meet the statement, so a writing delivered minutes before the proceeding invites the objection that it came too late to be reasonable.
Before 2019, practice was less uniform. Courts occasionally demanded strict compliance, but they generally dispensed with notice when the need for the hearsay arose shortly before or during trial and a continuance or other remedy could avoid injustice.12 The amended rule keeps the preference for early notice and writes the relaxation into its text, recognizing that notice may sometimes come only at trial.13 A proponent therefore cannot count on a court’s overlooking silence. The proponent must give timely written notice or earn the excuse.
The instinct that loses points here is to treat the opponent’s actual knowledge as notice.
Opposing counsel may have heard every word, and the objection still succeeds, because the rule asks for a writing and the conversation left none. Actual knowledge shows that the opponent was not surprised, which is not the question the writing requirement asks. The writing prevents the later quarrel over whether the conversation happened and what it covered. And because the proponent held the statement for months, nothing late-arising excuses the lapse, as the next subsection explains.
Form and timing are both satisfied here. The opponent holds a record of exactly what was disclosed and has two weeks to look into the declarant, the circumstances of the statement, and the availability of better evidence. That settles only the notice condition. The statement must still clear the trustworthiness and comparative-probative-value conditions before it comes in.
Stems on this point usually supply a spoken notice or a late one. A spoken notice given before trial fails the writing requirement however early it came. A late notice, spoken or written, fails the timing requirement unless the court finds good cause. If the stem shows that the need arose only during trial, move to good cause rather than excluding the statement at once.
Good-Cause Excuse
The default is written notice before the trial or hearing, and the last clause of Rule 807(b) supplies the only escape: notice may be given “in any form during the trial or hearing if the court, for good cause, excuses a lack of earlier notice.”15 The clause relaxes two requirements. Timing relaxes because notice may arrive once the proceeding is under way. Form relaxes because notice during trial need not be a writing, which suits a lawyer who must alert the court and the opponent within minutes of learning that a declarant is gone. Content does not relax: the opponent must still receive the statement’s substance and the declarant’s name in time to meet it. And the clause excuses only a lack of earlier notice, so a proponent who never gives notice falls outside it.
A rigid pretrial deadline would sometimes exclude needed evidence for reasons the proponent did not cause. When the need for a statement first arises in the middle of trial, no diligence could have produced earlier notice. Courts reached this result even before the 2019 amendment. They occasionally demanded strict compliance, but they generally dispensed with notice when the need arose shortly before or during trial and a continuance or other remedy could avoid injustice.16 The amended rule formalizes that practice as a good-cause exception.17
The Advisory Committee gave two examples of good cause: the proponent first learns that the hearsay statement exists after trial has begun, or a witness unexpectedly becomes unavailable.18 In each, the lateness traces to an event the proponent neither controlled nor foresaw. The inquiry therefore asks why notice was not given earlier, and the satisfying answer is that the need arose late. The second example also connects to the comparison with other evidence: the sudden loss of live testimony can create the need for the hearsay and the lateness of the notice at the same moment.
Finding good cause does not end the judge’s work. Where notice was not given in the normal course before trial, the court can excuse the failure, and it is expected to consider protective measures, such as a continuance, to avoid prejudice.19 Late notice costs the opponent time to investigate the declarant, to search for contradicting evidence, and to look for better proof, and a recess or continuance gives that time back. The excuse changes when notice may arrive, but the opponent’s fair opportunity to meet the statement remains something the judge must secure. Good cause also answers only the notice condition. The statement must still clear the trustworthiness and comparative-probative-value conditions.
When a stem says the proponent first mentioned the statement on the morning it was offered, ask why the notice came so late. Two scenes with the same missing writing show how the answer decides the result.
The hinge is the cause of the lateness. Treating reliable, needed hearsay as admissible whatever the delay turns good cause into a formality, and the rule does not make notice optional. Excluding every statement that lacks written pretrial notice overlooks the clause Rule 807(b) itself contains. The hallway conversation in the previous subsection fails for the reason the first scene fails: the proponent held the statement for months, and no later event explains the silence.
The third step does the real work. The proponent’s own account of the delay is what the court evaluates, and the rule treats the excuse as an exception to a requirement that otherwise stands.