Concept
Residual Exception Overview
Residual hearsay exception and notice
Residual Hearsay Exception
Residual Exception Overview
Rule 807 admits hearsay that no other exception reaches. Under Rule 807(a), a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if it is not admissible under a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804, so long as the conditions that follow are met.1 The rule is the residual exception, popularly called the “catch-all,” and a proponent may invoke it whether the declarant is available or unavailable.2
The drafters wrote it because they distrusted a closed list. The specific exceptions draw on the traditional common-law categories,3 and the Advisory Committee that proposed the Federal Rules thought it “presumptuous to assume that all possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay rule have been catalogued and to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a closed system.”4 Its answer was a residual exception for statements “having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,” which would reach “new and presently unanticipated situations” without “an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion.”5 The rule lets a judge create an ad hoc exception for a particular statement when special necessity and special trustworthiness are shown.6
Three showings keep that flexibility within bounds. The statement must be supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness, judged on the totality of the circumstances in which it was made and on any evidence that corroborates it.7 It must be more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.8 And the proponent must give an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer it, including its substance and the declarant’s name, so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.9 The first showing tests reliability, the second tests need, and the third protects the opponent from surprise.
This unit places Rule 807 in the order of hearsay analysis and traces its history, including the 2019 amendment. The sections that follow take up the working parts of the rule in turn: trustworthiness, statements that nearly satisfy another exception, comparative probative value, and notice. The chapter ends with use against criminal defendants.
Role After Specific Exceptions
Rule 807(a) applies “even if the statement is not admissible under a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804.”10 Those words put the residual exception last in the analysis. The Federal Rules keep the common-law structure: a general rule excluding hearsay, with exceptions collected under two rules, one for situations where the declarant’s availability is immaterial and one where unavailability is a condition of admission.11 Some statements never reach those exceptions, because the rules define them as not hearsay. A party’s own statement offered against that party is one, and certain former statements of a witness are another.12
The order follows from the rule’s design. Rule 807’s opening condition makes failure under Rules 803 and 804 a precondition, and Congress meant the residual exception to be rare. A proponent who begins with Rule 807 asks for a judge’s case-by-case judgment before the categories the rules already supply have been tested.
Availability of the declarant plays a different part here than in Rule 804. Rule 804 asks two questions: is the declarant unavailable, and does the statement fit a listed exception. Rule 807 makes unavailability no condition at all.14 It asks instead whether the statement carries sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and whether it is more probative than other evidence the proponent can reasonably obtain, and a declarant who can simply testify bears on that second question, as the later section on availability explains. Two errors follow from blurring the point. A student who sees an available declarant and concludes that no exception can apply has stopped before Rule 807. A student who sees an unavailable declarant and concludes that the statement comes in has skipped Rule 807’s own conditions.
The same discretion that makes Rule 807 useful makes it dangerous, and Congress said so. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the residual exceptions should be used “very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.”15 Courts have used them heavily anyway, and in the reported federal cases the most frequent user has been the prosecution in criminal cases.16 The “catch-all” label misleads on the same point. Its coiner admits it is a misnomer, because the rule as finally drafted was not meant to catch “all” or even “most”; Congress meant to leave inadmissible the vast majority of statements made “in the hall,” “over the back fence,” “at the water cooler,” or “over lunch.”17
The residual exception does its legitimate work on facts that supply what the lunchtime remark lacked.
An exam stem that presents an out-of-court statement calls for the five steps in order. Applying Rule 807 to a statement that an earlier step already admits wastes the analysis. Rule 807 becomes the right answer when the facts show the earlier steps failing and also supply what the rule demands: circumstances and corroboration bearing on trustworthiness, and no better proof reasonably available. Without those facts, an answer built on Rule 807 offers a conclusion the record does not support.
Origins and 2019 Amendment
Rule 807 was added effective December 1, 1997, and amended effective December 1, 2011, and December 1, 2019.19 The dates matter because opinions and outlines written before 2019 quote language the current rule does not contain.
The residual exception began as a proposal. The Advisory Committee proposed a catch-all for both available and unavailable declarants.20 The draft the Supreme Court approved in November 1972 deleted the earlier language, turned the illustrations into true exceptions, and ended each rule with a final residual exception.21 Congress then reshaped the proposal. The House Judiciary Committee deleted the provisions entirely, believing they injected too much uncertainty into the law and urging that new exceptions come through amendment of the rules. The Senate Committee responded by suggesting further restrictions, and the provisions were enacted as modified.22 The enacted provisions, Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), carried restrictions that Congress meant to limit the reach of the catch-all, and a later amendment removed some of them.23
In 1997 those two provisions became Rule 807.24 The 1997 text set four conditions in subdivision (a): equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, offering the statement as evidence of a material fact, greater probative value than other evidence reasonably obtainable, and service of the purposes of the rules and the interests of justice. Subdivision (b) added notice.25 Only three of those five parts imposed substantial requirements. The 2019 amendment kept those three, which deal with trustworthiness, “necessity,” and notice, modified two of them, and deleted the other two.26 A student reading older material needs these translations:
- The trustworthiness condition moved from “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” to “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness,” assessed after considering the totality of the circumstances in which the statement was made and any corroborating evidence.27
- The requirement that the statement be “offered as evidence of a material fact” is gone.28
- The requirement that admission “will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice” is gone.29
- The opening condition moved from a statement “not specifically covered by” an exception in Rule 803 or 804 to one “not admissible under” such an exception.30
- The notice provision now calls for the statement’s “substance” and the declarant’s name, where it once called for its “particulars” and the declarant’s name and address, and it requires writing before the trial or hearing, with an excuse for good cause.31
The first change answers a comparison problem. “Equivalent” invited a comparison with the guarantees behind the existing exceptions, but for some arguably trustworthy hearsay no useful comparison can be found in the existing rules.32 A comparison can also set the bar absurdly low. The ancient-documents exception, limited in 2019 to documents prepared before January 1, 1998, requires no showing of reliability,33 so a statement required to be equivalent to it “would mean that it is not reliable at all.”34 Under the amended standard, courts go directly to an assessment of the guarantees supporting the statement at issue.35
The two deletions rest on a different reason. The Advisory Committee’s Note to the 2019 amendment explains that the “material fact” and “purposes of these rules and the interests of justice” requirements “proved to be superfluous in that they are already found in other rules,” citing Rules 401 and 102.36 Because those rules already apply, repeating the requirements in Rule 807 added nothing.
The amendment’s more consequential change is probably its command to weigh corroboration. Earlier editions of this treatise noted that corroboration had an “uncertain status,” though most courts, but not all, considered it in judging trustworthiness. The amendment ends that uncertainty in the federal courts: evidence corroborating the statement, where it exists, must now be considered.37
The change in the opening words also matters. A statement that falls short of a listed exception’s elements is, by definition, not admissible under that exception, so it meets Rule 807’s opening condition. What the shortfall means for the other conditions is the near-miss problem taken up below.
When an older opinion or outline asks whether a statement had “equivalent circumstantial guarantees,” was “specifically covered” elsewhere, concerned a “material fact,” or served “the interests of justice,” translate the question into the current rule before applying it. The current rule has two substantive conditions, sufficient trustworthiness and greater probative value than other reasonably obtainable evidence, plus the notice requirement.