Concept
Scope of Admissible Statements
Forfeiture by wrongdoing
Scope of Admissible Statements
Rule 804(b)(6) says almost nothing about the statements it admits. It reaches “[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.”1 Every condition in that sentence describes either what the party did (causing, acquiescing, intending) or what happened to the declarant (unavailability). None describes what the declarant said, when, to whom, or about what. The only other condition comes from the list that houses the rule, whose exceptions apply “if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.”2 That condition also concerns the declarant, not the words.
The text is spare because the exception rests on responsibility, not reliability. It follows the policy that a party should not profit by excluding hearsay that is needed only because the party made it impossible to produce the declarant.3 A rule built on reliability draws its lines around the statement. This rule draws them around the party: who acted, with what purpose, and with what effect on the declarant. The scope of admissible statements therefore tracks the scope of the wrongdoing, and the content of any single statement matters little.
Two questions of scope follow. The first is how far the exception reaches across subject matter and across proceedings. The second is whether the court tests a statement for trustworthiness before admitting it.
Any Subject, Any Proceeding
Rule 804(b)(6) ties the exception to the party’s purpose toward the declarant. It says nothing about which trial is under way or what the statement concerns. The phrase “as a witness” marks what the party must have meant to prevent, which is the declarant’s testimony. The text does not say where the declarant would have testified or what the statement must be about.4 United States v. Gray tested whether that silence imposes a limit. The defendant argued that Rule 804(b)(6) should not apply because she did not intend to procure Robert Gray’s unavailability as a witness at this trial.5
The court began with the text, because the Federal Rules are a legislative enactment and are construed with the traditional tools of statutory construction.6 It found two things the text does not contain: a requirement that the declarant would otherwise be a witness at any particular trial, and a limit confining admissible statements to events distinct from those at issue in the trial where they are offered. The court therefore held that the Rule applies “whenever the defendant’s wrongdoing was intended to, and did, render the declarant unavailable as a witness against the defendant, without regard to the nature of the charges at the trial in which the declarant’s statements are offered.” It cited a treatise to the same effect: there is no limit on the subject matter of statements admissible under this exception, so statements implicating the defendant in a plot to kill the declarant can fit it.7
The statements admitted in Gray show how wide the holding runs. They included Robert Gray’s criminal complaint alleging that the defendant tried to stab him with a knife and attack him with a club. They also included his statements to Darnell Gray and a police detective that the defendant and Goode had assaulted him in October 1990.8 The district court’s findings supplied the intent. Robert Gray was killed before the November 15 and 16 court date and after the defendant knew he was a witness, which justified the inference that the killing was motivated by a wish to keep him from being available at court proceedings. The court of appeals held those findings sufficient and found no abuse of discretion in admitting the statements.9
The breadth follows from what the party answers for. Federal courts have construed the exception’s elements broadly to serve its purpose, applying it even where the declarant was only a potential witness and no proceeding was pending.10 A defendant who wrongfully and intentionally renders a declarant unavailable as a witness in any proceeding forfeits the right to exclude the declarant’s statements on hearsay grounds at that proceeding and at any subsequent one.11 Silencing does not last for one courtroom: a declarant who has been killed is as unavailable at the next proceeding as at the first. A rule confined to the trial the party had in mind would also reward successful silencing, because a party who removed the witness could nearly always answer that the witness would not have testified at this trial.
The lack of a subject-matter limit follows the same design and has a sharper consequence. A witness’s statements about the very events on trial are the ones a party has the most reason to suppress, so an exception that excluded them would fail where it is needed most. Because the forfeiting party loses the right to object to any of the victim’s hearsay statements, content plays no part in deciding whether the exception admits them.12
Breadth along those two lines is easy to mistake for breadth along two others: the identity of the declarant and the party’s purpose. The tempting error is to reason that once a party has silenced one witness, hearsay objections to everything near that witness fall away.
The text draws that line, because the party must have caused “the declarant’s unavailability,” and the declarant is the person whose statement is offered.13 Breadth of subject matter also does not dissolve the purpose requirement. Showing that the party made the declarant unavailable through wrongful acts, even by killing the witness, does not meet the exception’s requirements. The exception does not automatically admit a murder victim’s hearsay against the accused murderer.14 A defendant who kills a declarant because he did not like him, or because the declarant burned him in a drug deal, keeps the hearsay objection.15 The defendant in Gray lost the objection because the court found that the killing was motivated by a wish to keep Robert Gray from court proceedings.16
No Reliability Requirement
Rule 804(b)(6) asks whether the party silenced the declarant. It does not ask whether the declarant spoke truly. Every condition in its text describes what the party did or what happened to the declarant, and none turns on the likely truth of the statement.20 That sets the exception apart: Rule 804(b)(6) is unique among the hearsay exceptions in admitting evidence without a guarantee of trustworthiness.21 Compare the statement-against-interest exception. When a statement exposing the declarant to criminal liability is offered in a criminal case, it comes in only if corroborating circumstances clearly indicate its trustworthiness after considering the totality of circumstances under which it was made and any evidence that supports or undermines it.22 Rule 804(b)(6) demands nothing comparable.
The reason lies in what a trustworthiness requirement is for. The hearsay rule worries about untested statements because the opponent could not cross-examine the declarant. Most exceptions answer that worry with a circumstance that makes testing less necessary. Forfeiture answers it from another direction. When the opponent’s own wrongdoing is the reason the declarant cannot be questioned, the complaint belongs to the person who created the problem. The theory is that the opponent’s purposeful wrongful action forfeits any objection, so nothing about the statement needs to be shown to replace it.23
An exam question on this point usually supplies a statement that looks bad, such as a suspect shifting blame to someone else, and asks whether the hearsay objection should succeed. Students who import a reliability inquiry into the rule miss the first scene below, and students who treat forfeiture as automatic miss the second.
Only the defendant’s conduct toward the declarant changed the answer. In the first scene the threat supplies the forfeiture, and the weak quality of the statement is no obstacle because the rule never asks about it. In the second scene nothing forfeits the objection, however much the statement resembles the first.
Because the exception is justified by the party’s conduct and by no quality of the statement, it cannot be stretched to reach anyone else. A statement admitted under it comes in only against a party whose conduct the rule was meant to deter, a party responsible for the witness’s absence.24 A second defendant tried alongside Dale who never threatened, paid, or agreed to silence Prieto keeps her hearsay objection, and the statement stays out against her unless some other exception applies.
The price of dispensing with reliability is that a doubtful statement can reach the factfinder. Some courts have responded by holding that trial courts should exclude clearly unreliable hearsay even in forfeiture cases, because it lacks sufficient probative value under the Rule 403 balancing process.25 The Second Circuit took this view in United States v. Dhinsa, recognizing that courts can exclude “facially unreliable” hearsay under Rule 403 even when the hearsay objection has been forfeited.26 Rule 403 addresses probative value, an objection distinct from the hearsay objection the party has lost. The backstop works only at the extreme. A proponent still needs no showing of reliability to satisfy Rule 804(b)(6), but a statement that deserves no belief on its face may be kept from the jury anyway.
State courts add a further layer of variation. Whether a defendant has forfeited the Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness is a question of constitutional law on which states must follow Giles v. California, taken up in the next section. Whether forfeiting that right also forfeits objections under the state’s own hearsay rules is a question of state law.27 Most state courts that have considered it conclude that forfeiting confrontation also forfeits hearsay objections; People v. Stechly in Illinois and State v. Meeks in Kansas are examples.28 Colorado’s Vasquez v. People took a different view, reasoning that the more prudent course is to require that the hearsay rules be satisfied separately.29 In a jurisdiction that decouples the two, the proponent must find an exception that stands independently of forfeiture.