Concept
Scope of Covered Facts
Statement of personal or family history
Scope of Covered Facts
Rule 804(b)(4) admits statements on a defined list of subjects, and a statement that is otherwise fully qualified fails if it falls off the list. Subdivision (A) names what a declarant may report about the declarant's own life: birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, and “similar facts of personal or family history.”1 Subdivision (B) applies the same list to another person's history and adds one item, death.2
The earlier sections asked who the declarant is: whether the declarant is unavailable, and how the declarant is tied to the person described. This section asks what the declarant said. The two inquiries are independent, and a declarant who is unavailable and closely related to the person described can still say something the exception does not reach.
The list consists of concrete status facts: who was born to whom, who married whom, who was adopted, and who died. Those are the matters at the core of one of the oldest exceptions to the hearsay rule.3 Other evidence of family matters is hard to obtain, which is why unavailability opens the door, and discussions among relatives and close associates about family members are likely to be accurate.4 Opinions about a relative's character and explanations of a relative's conduct fit that reasoning poorly.
Three points follow. The first is what the list names and how far “similar facts” stretches. The second is why death appears in (B) alone. The third is why a person's reasons for a family event fall outside the exception even when the event itself is covered.
Facts the Rule Names
The list in subdivision (A) sorts into three groups. Birth, ancestry, and adoption describe origin. Legitimacy, marriage, and divorce describe legal status. Relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage describes who is tied to whom.5 Every item is a milestone or a condition with a definite answer: a person was born on a particular date in a particular place, a marriage occurred or did not, two people are siblings or are not. The date and place belong to the fact itself, because the traditional exception admitted statements about “the date and place of birth and death of members of the family and facts about marriage, descent, and relationship.”6
A deceased woman's account of her own marriage and her own children shows the exception at its center. She speaks mostly about herself, so the statement fits subdivision (A). A relative's account of someone else's marriage reaches the same subject through (B) once the relationship condition is met.7
The closing phrase of the list, “similar facts of personal or family history,” reaches facts of the same kind as those named. The federal rule continues the narrow view of what family history includes,8 and two features of the exception support reading the phrase that way. The first is the reliability rationale. The probability that family discussion about family members is accurate fits milestones comfortably and fits an opinion about a relative's temperament poorly, because a relative's closeness to the family says nothing about whether the opinion is sound. The second is the text of (A), which excuses a lack of personal knowledge only for “that fact,” meaning a listed fact.9 Stretching “similar” to cover opinions and general accounts of family life would carry that excuse to topics on which firsthand observation is the normal expectation.
Petra's unavailability and her tie to Orrin were the same for both clauses, so only their content separates them. The relationship condition tests the speaker, and the list of facts tests the subject. A common error is to treat everything a qualified relative said as covered, but closeness to a person never converts an evaluation of that person into a fact of family history.
Death Under Subdivision (B)
Death appears on the list only in subdivision (B), which admits an unavailable declarant's statement about “another person” concerning the listed facts “as well as death.”11 The list in (A) omits it.12 The omission makes sense, because a declarant cannot report his or her own completed death, and adding death to (A) would accomplish nothing. Death becomes a natural subject once someone else is the person described. Relatives and close associates learn of a death through the same family conversation that spreads news of births and marriages, and the exception rests on the probability that such discussions are accurate.13 The traditional exception already covered the date and place of death of family members, so (B) states expressly what the older rule treated as family history.14
Adding death changes the subject list and nothing else. The declarant must still be unavailable, and must still have been related to the person who died by blood, adoption, or marriage, or so intimately associated with that person's family that the declarant's information is likely to be accurate.15 The tie that counts runs from the declarant to the person who died, not to a party in the lawsuit. Because the federal rule keeps the narrow view of family history,16 the safer reading is that the exception carries the fact of death, with its date and place, and does not extend to an account of how or why the death occurred.
News of a death usually travels from person to person, so a court should also look for layers. Rule 805 admits hearsay within hearsay “if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.”17 Subdivision (B) can supply the exception for the declarant's own statement. If the declarant was repeating what a third person said, the court must ask the same Rule 805 question about that inner statement.
Marguerite's statement qualifies through the second route in (B), and blood is only the first route to the same end. The condition asks whether the declarant's information is likely to be accurate, and a household member of long standing can meet it where a casual acquaintance cannot. Two slips recur on exams. One is to assume that unavailability and a listed subject suffice without a relative or close associate of the family. The other is to look for death in subdivision (A), where a declarant's report of his or her own history cannot include it.
Motive Is Not History
The word marriage on the list invites an overreading. A statement about a marriage from a qualified, unavailable declarant can look admissible in every respect, even when part of it explains why the marriage happened. In United States v. Carvalho, the reviewing court held that Rule 804(b)(4) reaches the fact of a marriage but not a person's reasons for entering it.19
The government prosecuted Martha and Fernando Carvalho for knowing use of false alien registration receipt cards and tried to prove that the defendants, who had married after meeting in this country, were “sophisticated regarding the immigration laws.” It offered affidavits from a former spouse of each defendant. One affiant said he had married Martha “for love” but planned “to terminate my marriage to this woman as soon as possible” and “to withdraw the application for permanent residence.” The other said she had married Fernando “because I felt sorry for him and out of anger because of what had happened to me” and because she “wanted to help him get his residence.” The court held that these statements did not fit Rule 804(b)(4).20
The court took two steps. It conceded that, for some purposes, a statement about one's reasons for entering a marriage might well be a statement “concerning” the marriage. It then held that evidence of motive or purpose, “highly debatable or controversial matters,” falls outside the scope of Rule 804(b)(4). The second step read marriage in company with the rest of the list. Birth, adoption, divorce, legitimacy, and ancestry rarely raise questions about a person's frame of mind, since the live issue is far more likely to be a date of birth, the existence of an adoption, or the details of ancestry. A reason for marrying belongs to a different category from anything on the list.21
One way to see why the line falls there is the exception's own premise, that discussions among relatives about family members are likely to be accurate when no one has a motive to fabricate.22 That premise fits milestones better than motives. A birth date or a marriage can be checked against what other family members have heard, while a reason for marrying lives in the mind of the person who acted, may blend several purposes, and may look different to the same person after the marriage has failed. Reading “marriage” to include motive would also loosen the narrow view of family history that the federal rule keeps, and the exception would become a vehicle for explanations of why family members did what they did.23
An exam stem built on this limit usually supplies everything the earlier sections required, an unavailable declarant tied to the person described, and then adds a reason for a family event. The error to avoid is reading “marriage” as covering everything said about the marriage. The question to ask is which part of the statement the exception can carry.
Lena's statement divides cleanly into two parts. The date and place of the marriage are listed facts of her own life, and the exception carries them. Her explanation reports a purpose, a different kind of thing, and the exception does not carry it however well she knew her own mind.
Motive appears in this exception in two senses, and they must be kept apart. The earlier discussion of the dropped requirements concerned a declarant's motive to misrepresent. The federal rule no longer makes its absence a condition of admissibility, so a declarant's stake in the outcome goes to weight or, in an extreme case, to exclusion under Rule 403.24 Carvalho concerns motive as the subject of the statement. A statement of a listed fact from an interested declarant comes in and is weighed, while a statement of a reason for a family event stays out however disinterested the declarant. The first question concerns the speaker and goes to weight. The second concerns the content and limits admissibility.