Concept
Elements of the Exception
Statement under the belief of imminent death
Elements of the Exception
Rule 804(b)(2) admits, “[i]n a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case,” a statement the declarant made “while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent” and “about its cause or circumstances.”1 The lead-in to Rule 804(b) adds a fourth condition, because each exception beneath it applies only “if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.”2 A proponent therefore answers four questions. What did the speaker believe? What did the speaker talk about? In what kind of case is the statement offered? Can the speaker testify? A statement that fails any one of them remains hearsay, however moving the deathbed scene.
Each question guards against a different weakness. The belief requirement carries the exception’s reliability premise, which the Advisory Committee put in terms of “powerful psychological pressures” that operate at the time of death and lead a person to get especially serious matters off her chest.3 The subject-matter limit keeps the statement to events likely to sit in the forefront of memory.4 The proceeding limit marks the cases in which the exception may be used at all. The unavailability requirement supplies the necessity, because live testimony is the first preference and the hearsay serves only when the live witness cannot be had.5
The common-law exception was narrower than the Federal Rule on several of these points. The Rule relaxes some of the older limits and keeps others, so each section below marks the places where it parts from the older formulation.
One caution cuts across all four conditions. Rule 804(b)(2) clears only the dying person’s own words. If the jury will hear those words through a second out-of-court statement, such as a written report of what a paramedic was told, Rule 805 requires an exception for each layer.6
Belief in Imminent Death
The Rule tests the declarant’s state of mind at one moment: the moment of speaking. The declarant must have spoken “while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent,”7 and what the speaker expected then decides the point. A death that followed shows what happened, and it does not show what the speaker thought was happening. The element also bears the exception’s weight: the special reason to trust a dying person’s words is the pressure that comes with the expectation of death, and a speaker who lacks that expectation lacks the pressure.8
The common law demanded a great deal. The declarant had to be in extremis, to know it, and to have abandoned hope of recovery.9 The classic formula asks for “a settled hopeless expectation” that death is near at hand.10 The Federal Rule is less emphatic. It says only that the declarant believed death to be imminent, so evidence that would satisfy the common law plainly satisfies the Rule, and a growing number of courts accept a lesser showing.11 The relaxation has a floor, though. The crux of the exception remains a settled expectation that death is inevitable, and a speaker who says “I might be dying” has not shown it.12
Shepard v. United States shows the formula at work on a close set of facts. Mrs. Shepard, who was ill, spoke to her nurse, and the government offered her words as a dying wife’s charge of murder against her husband.13 The government first offered the conversation, withdrew it when it doubted its competence, and offered it again after the nurse testified that Mrs. Shepard had said she was not going to get well and was going to die.14 The Court still held that the conversation was not a dying declaration. A dying declaration requires a declarant who spoke without hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending death, and the record furnished no proof of that “indispensable condition.”15
Her own words about dying did not settle the matter, because the Court weighed them against the rest of the record. She “may have thought she was going to die and have said so to her nurse, but this was consistent with hope, which could not have been put aside without more to quench it.” A fortnight later, her condition grave, she asked a physician, “You will get me well, won’t you?”16 The plan to test the liquor pointed the same way. “She spoke as one ill, giving voice to the beliefs and perhaps the conjectures of the moment,” and the liquor “was to be tested, to see whether her beliefs were sound.” She did not speak “as one dying, announcing to the survivors a definitive conviction, a legacy of knowledge on which the world might act when she had gone.”17
Three points follow from the case. Fear of death, or even a belief that illness will end in death, is not enough by itself.18 What decides the question is the declarant’s state of mind, and that state of mind “must be exhibited in the evidence, and not left to conjecture.”19 And no ritual of words is required: despair of recovery may be gathered from the circumstances if the facts support the inference, even when the declarant survives longer than anyone expected.20
The judge decides whether the belief existed, so the proponent needs evidence of it.21 The declarant’s own statements will do, and so will circumstances such as the nature of the wounds, statements made in the declarant’s presence, or a physician’s opinion.22 What doctors or others told the declarant about the hopelessness of the condition, and the apparent fatal quality of the wound, can show the belief circumstantially, “but it must be shown.”23 Older cases excluded victims’ statements when the evidence that the victim knew he was about to die was insufficient.24 Cases such as Mattox v. United States and State v. Buggs illustrate the circumstantial route, in which the gravity of the wounds supports the inference of belief.
Because the inquiry fixes on the moment of speaking, the declarant need not die. The Federal Rules require unavailability, which includes death but is broader, so the critical issue is the declarant’s belief in the nearness of death when speaking, and not how swiftly death followed or how soon after the injury the words were spoken.25 A speaker who truly expected to die and then recovered has still made a dying declaration, and the proponent must then establish unavailability by one of the other methods in Rule 804(a).26 Survival therefore leaves the belief element untouched and matters only to the unavailability showing taken up below.
The word imminent also limits how far off the expected death may be. A person who has been given six months to live, or even six weeks or six days, does not believe that death is imminent; the belief the exception requires is that death is at hand now.27
A stem in which the declarant says “I am going to die” invites an easy yes. Mrs. Shepard said as much, and the Court still found no belief, because her words had to be weighed against her condition and her conduct. Conversely, a declarant who never mentions dying can qualify when the wounds and the doctors’ statements show the expectation. A stem that supplies a terminal diagnosis and a deathbed accusation tests whether you notice the time horizon, because the horizon decides whether death was imminent when the words were spoken.
Cause or Circumstances
The Rule admits only what the declarant said “about its cause or circumstances,” and “its” refers back to the death the declarant expected.29 In practice the statement must tell who or what caused the death and under what circumstances.30 A declarant who expects to die, is unavailable, and speaks in a homicide prosecution or a civil case has met every other condition, yet a remark on some other subject remains hearsay with no exception to carry it. The limit serves a memory rationale. A statement confined to the events behind the death is likely to concern facts in the forefront of the speaker’s memory, and the restriction reduces memory problems.31
The phrase reaches further than a first reading suggests. Identifying the assailant fits, and so does describing the accident or catastrophe that overtook the declarant.32 In Connor v. State, a wife run over by her husband’s car said as she was dying, “It was no accident,” and the words qualified because they characterized how the fatal event came about. In United States v. Mobley, a bank president shot during a robbery described the events. In a civil case, a woman fatally injured in a head-on collision reported that her husband had said, just before driving into the left lane, that they would “go to eternity together.”33 The treatise adds that the phrase probably embraces descriptions of prior threats and quarrels, physical pain or sensations, and matters inhaled, injected, or ingested.34
The Federal Rule’s wording is also more liberal than earlier formulations about how far back the circumstances reach. Statements identifying an attacker are clearly admissible, and so are statements describing prior threats by that person or fights and arguments with that person.35 Remoteness and prejudice remain grounds for exclusion, but a judge weighs them under Rule 403.36
A statement that wanders from the death falls outside the limit. A declarant who believes death is near and says, “I am sorry that I killed my brother when I was 12,” has confessed to something with no bearing on the cause or circumstances of the present death.37 Background, personal history, and old grievances fall in the same place. The speaker’s belief and unavailability may be fully established, and the exception still covers only what the speaker says about the death.
The subject-matter question is asked about the declarant’s death, and the lawsuit is a separate matter. A hotel owner suing a father for an unpaid bill, for example, may offer a third party’s dying declaration identifying a member of the father’s immediate family as the assailant in the hotel lobby, because the identification suggests that the family was staying at the hotel.38 Two tests operate separately. The Rule asks whether the statement concerns the believed-imminent death, and relevance asks whether it bears on an issue in the case. Students often test the statement against the subject of the lawsuit, when the Rule tests it against the death the speaker expected.
The first remark is the easier call, because it connects the defendant’s earlier conduct to the fatal encounter. The second is a close call, and a strong answer commits to a side and argues it from the Rule’s words. The proponent can say that enmity supplies the reason for the killing and therefore belongs to its cause, and that the Federal Rule already admits prior threats and quarrels.39 The opponent can answer that the remark names a relationship and says nothing about how this death came about, and that it invites exclusion as remote under Rule 403. What moves the analysis is whether the remark ties earlier conduct or history to the death the declarant expects.
A statement that misses Rule 804(b)(2) on subject matter may have another route. A person speaking in the face of death is often under stress, and the excited-utterance exception, unlike Rule 804(b)(2), requires no showing that the declarant is unavailable.40 A later section takes up that fallback.
Homicide or Civil Case
The proceeding limit is the first check to run on a fact pattern, because it depends only on the case being tried and can end the analysis before anyone asks what the declarant believed. The Rule admits a dying declaration “[i]n a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case.”42 The two halves reach different distances. The civil half carries no further qualifier and covers every civil case, while the criminal half covers one kind of prosecution only.43 A dying person’s words may satisfy every other element and still stay out because the charge is rape, robbery, theft, or a drug crime.44
Both halves depart from older practice. English courts in the 1700s did not confine dying declarations in this way, but later decisions refused to admit them in civil cases, including death actions, and in criminal cases that did not charge homicide as an essential part of the offense. In a rape prosecution, the victim’s declarations were excluded even though she died before trial.45 The restriction probably came from a sense that dying declarations rest on a questionable guarantee of trustworthiness and that a jury is likely to handle them too emotionally.46
The exception as the Supreme Court proposed it carried no limit on the type of case. Congress, led by the House Judiciary Committee, amended it to reach prosecutions for homicide and civil actions or proceedings, so dying declarations are inadmissible in criminal cases other than homicides.47 The amendment grew out of congressional concern about the reliability of this form of hearsay.48 Commentators find the resulting line odd. It embraces the most serious cases (criminal homicide) and the least serious (civil cases) and leaves out the cases in between, such as criminal assault.49 The need for the testimony is frequently just as great in non-homicide cases, because under the Rule the declarant must be unavailable to testify.50 Civil litigation produces unavailable witnesses too: in Neville’s negligence suit over a sexually transmitted disease, Ordway blames a third person, Stoner, who cannot testify at trial.51
The effect of the line shows in the lawsuits that can follow a single assault. Suppose Mae, after a sexual assault, believes she is about to die and describes what happened, and she does not die until later. Her statement shows a settled expectation of death and concerns the cause and circumstances of her death, so it would be admissible in a murder prosecution.52 In a prosecution for rape with intent to kill it would not be, because the exception reaches only one kind of criminal prosecution, homicide.53 If Mae’s husband sues the assailant, the statement should be admissible, because Mae thought she was about to die and the cause of her death seems sufficiently related to the assault.54 Mae’s death does not convert the second case into a homicide prosecution, since the limit looks to the offense charged. Homicide here is not limited to murder, because even the common-law exception reached criminal homicide prosecutions generally.55
A second departure concerns whose death is on trial. At common law the defendant had to be charged with the death of the declarant, so when a marauder shot a man and his wife together and the defendant was tried separately for the husband’s murder, the wife’s dying declaration identifying the defendant was excluded. Wigmore could not imagine “a more senseless rule of exclusion.”56 Rule 804(b)(2) does not by its terms incorporate that requirement.57 The Rule’s conditions concern the type of proceeding, the declarant’s belief, the subject of the statement, and unavailability, and none of them names the person whose killing is charged. Whether limiting criminal use to homicide implies an intent to keep the old requirement is as unclear as the reason for the homicide limit in the first place.58
A third point concerns who may offer the statement. In a homicide prosecution a dying declaration is admissible when offered either by or against the accused.59
At common law those words would have been excluded because Diaz was not charged with Walt’s death. Under the Federal Rule they clear the proceeding limit.60
Step 3 does most of the work, and the common mistake is to see a dead declarant and assume the case is a homicide prosecution. A statement stopped at this gate is not necessarily lost. Two fallbacks remain: the excited-utterance exception, which requires no showing of unavailability, and the residual exception in Rule 807 for trustworthy statements that fit no listed exception.62 Later sections develop both.
Unavailability of the Declarant
Every exception in Rule 804(b) opens with the same condition: the listed statements escape the rule against hearsay only “if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.”64 A statement made in the belief of imminent death therefore stays inadmissible until the proponent shows that the speaker cannot be brought in to testify. Live testimony is the preferred form of proof, and the hearsay serves as a substitute only when the live version is out of reach.65
Rule 804(a) lists the circumstances in which a declarant counts as unavailable, and three parts of that list matter for a dying declaration.66 Death is the common ground, but it is one ground among several, and the list reaches survivors too: a declarant who cannot be present or testify because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness is unavailable.67 A declarant who is merely absent is unavailable only if the proponent could not obtain the declarant’s attendance or testimony by process or other reasonable means, a showing the Rule specifies for this exception.68 And the definition is withdrawn from a proponent who procured the unavailability in order to keep the declarant from attending or testifying.69 The next two sections take up survivors first, and then absence and procurement.
Unavailability of Survivors
A declarant does not have to die for the exception to apply. Rule 804(a) lists several circumstances that make a declarant unavailable, and death is only one of them.70 The reason is the one that supports the exception: live testimony cannot be had. A survivor who is too ill, who is protected by a privilege, or who cannot remember removes the live account as completely as the grave does.
Two separate clocks therefore govern a survivor’s statement. The belief element looks to the moment of speaking, when the declarant either did or did not expect death to be at hand. The unavailability element looks to the moment of trial, when the declarant either can or cannot give live testimony. The words of a speaker who believed death was imminent count as dying declarations even if the speaker recovers, and the proponent then proves unavailability by another method under Rule 804(a).71 The declarant need not actually die.72
Four grounds fit a survivor:
- Death or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness keeps the declarant from being present or testifying.73
- The court rules that a privilege exempts the declarant from testifying about the subject matter.74
- The declarant refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so.75
- The declarant testifies to not remembering the subject matter.76
The last three depend on something that happens in the courtroom: a ruling on privilege, a refusal that persists after an order, or the witness’s own testimony of forgetting. Reluctance without a ruling or an order does not meet the first two, and a remark outside the courtroom that the declarant has forgotten is not testimony of forgetting.
The instinct that costs points runs the other way. A victim who spoke while believing death was near and then recovered seems to have made a statement that must come in. The belief element is met, but the lead-in to Rule 804(b) still conditions every listed exception on unavailability.77 The Rule prefers the live witness, and it allows the hearsay only when the live witness cannot be had.78
The two passengers share the same belief, the same words, and the same lawsuit, and they differ only in their condition on the day of trial. A student who judges belief by what happened afterward, or who judges unavailability by what the declarant expected while speaking, has confused the two clocks. A survivor who simply fails to appear raises a different showing, taken up next.
Absence and Wrongful Procurement
Rule 804(a)(5) makes a declarant unavailable who is absent from the trial or hearing when the proponent “has not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure” what the Rule requires.80 Absence alone proves little, since a declarant may be missing only because no one tried to bring the declarant in. The Rule therefore puts the burden of effort on the proponent and sizes the burden to the exception. For former testimony and forfeiture by wrongdoing, the proponent need only show that the declarant’s attendance could not be procured.81 For a dying declaration, a statement against interest, or a statement of family history, the proponent must show that neither the declarant’s attendance nor the declarant’s testimony could be procured.82 The extra word, testimony, carries the extra duty: a proponent who cannot get the declarant into court must also try to get the declarant’s account in another form, most often a deposition (sworn testimony taken out of court, with the opponent present to cross-examine), before using the hearsay.83
The reason is cross-examination. Rule 804’s first preference is the live witness, and its second-level preference is a deposition. That second preference does not apply to former testimony, because the opponent has already had a chance to cross-examine and the testimony was probably recorded in a transcript.84 A dying declaration offers neither safeguard, which is why the proponent must try for the deposition.
The belief, the words, and the lawsuit are the same in both scenes. The effort moved the answer: the first plaintiff tried one route and quit, while the second exhausted the routes the Rule names for a dying declaration.
The deposition duty attaches only to the absence ground. If the declarant is ill or dead, or the unavailability rests on another listed ground, the proponent need not show any attempt to obtain alternative testimony, even though the dying declaration is one of the three exceptions that otherwise carry the duty.85 A stem that says only that the declarant is abroad has not yet supplied unavailability for a dying declaration, and a stem that says the declarant died needs no deposition showing.
The closing clause of Rule 804(a) withdraws the entire definition from a proponent who procured or wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability in order to prevent the declarant from attending or testifying.86 The bar answers an incentive problem. A party may prefer the hearsay to live testimony, perhaps because the declarant would communicate poorly on the stand or would say something inconsistent with the earlier statement, and so may be tempted to make the declarant unavailable. Denying that party the exception removes the payoff.87 The clause speaks of subdivision (a) as a whole, so it reaches every ground of unavailability and not just absence.88
A patient who takes a job overseas for reasons of her own, with no prompting from the plaintiff, leaves the bar untouched, and the inquiry returns to whether the plaintiff tried process and other reasonable means to obtain attendance and testimony. The two departures look alike at the courthouse door and differ in the proponent’s hand in the departure and in the purpose of keeping the declarant away. A stem that mentions a paid trip, a favor, or a pressure campaign directed at the declarant is signaling the procurement bar.