Concept
Related Rules and Doctrines
Judgment of a previous conviction
Related Rules and Doctrines
Rule 803(22) does one job: it lets a party offer a final judgment of conviction to prove a fact essential to that judgment, once conditions (A) through (D) are met.1 Its text marks the edge of that job. Subparagraph (C) ties admissibility to a fact essential to the judgment, and subparagraph (D) speaks of a prosecutor offering a judgment “for a purpose other than impeachment.”2 That phrase concedes that a conviction can serve other purposes, and it leaves them to other rules.3
Three neighbors of Rule 803(22) share its vocabulary of convictions, pleas, and judgments, and each answers a different question. Rule 609 asks whether a conviction may attack a witness's truthfulness. The law of pleas asks how the defendant's own words in court come in, as distinct from the judgment the court entered on them. Rule 803(23) asks when a judgment that is not a conviction may prove anything at all. Rule 404(b) sits outside this unit, but it offers one more use of past crimes: proof of an element of the charged crime, such as motive, identity, or intent.4
Keep the neighbors apart, because each carries conditions of its own and none transfers. A student who tests a conviction offered only to attack a witness against the felony-grade, essential-fact, and party conditions of Rule 803(22) applies a test built for a different use. The wrong test can exclude evidence that another rule would admit, or admit evidence that this rule would bar. The sections below follow the order that subparagraph (D) suggests: impeachment first, then the line between a plea and the judgment it produces, then the line between a criminal conviction and a civil judgment.
Impeachment Under Rule 609
Subparagraph (D) limits a prosecutor who offers a conviction “for a purpose other than impeachment,” and the phrase assumes a second use that Rule 803(22) does not govern.5 Impeachment is that second use, and Rule 609 controls it, because the rule applies to attacking “a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction.”6 The two rules ask different things of the same document. Under Rule 803(22), the conviction is evidence that something happened: it establishes a fact essential to the judgment, such as that the defendant caused the victim's injury.7 Under Rule 609, the conviction is evidence about the witness on the stand, and whatever the earlier crime was, the proponent uses it to cast doubt on that witness's truthfulness. The purpose of the offer therefore decides which rule applies and which conditions the proponent must meet.
The path from conviction to doubt about credibility runs through three inferences. A person convicted of a crime is taken to show disrespect for legal standards, a person with that disrespect is taken to be more willing than others to lie, and a willingness to lie makes it more likely that the witness is lying under oath now.8 Every link concerns character, so the chain is a propensity argument, a form of reasoning the law generally distrusts. Defenders of impeachment answer that a witness's veracity is a highly important issue, that convictions are likely to be accurate and quick and clear to prove, and that it would seem anomalous for a person convicted of serious crimes to appear before a jury and benefit from its assumption of a clean record.9 The chain remains open to doubt, since no empirical evidence shows that convicted persons lie more often than others, yet American courts have long accepted prior convictions as proper impeachment.10
Because the chain is weak and the evidence risky, Rule 609 sorts convictions by the nature of the crime, the identity of the witness, and the age of the conviction. Five features carry most of the structure:
- A conviction for any crime, whatever its punishment, must be admitted when the court can readily determine that establishing its elements required proving, or the witness's admitting, a dishonest act or false statement. No balancing applies.11
- A conviction for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant. When the witness is a testifying defendant, it comes in only if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant.12
- Once more than ten years have passed since the conviction or the release from confinement, whichever is later, the conviction is admissible only if its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect and the proponent has given reasonable written notice.13
- A conviction that has been pardoned or annulled on a finding of innocence is inadmissible. So is one set aside on a finding of rehabilitation, unless the person has since been convicted of another crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year.14
- A juvenile adjudication comes in only in narrow circumstances, among them that it was an adjudication of a witness other than the defendant and that admitting it is necessary to fairly determine guilt or innocence.15
The balancing tests, the special treatment of the accused, and the ten-year limit all answer problems that come from using a conviction as a clue to character. The rules distinguish an accused who testifies from ordinary witnesses, and they weigh probative value against prejudice to the defendant.16 The prejudice is the risk that a jury told to judge truthfulness will instead treat the conviction as a sign of bad character and, when the witness is the accused, of guilt. The ten-year limit rests on a different weakness: character is assessed at the time of trial, so a conviction loses probative force as it ages.17 Rule 803(22) needs none of these devices because it does not rely on a character inference. The judgment is offered for what it decided about the events, so no propensity step needs policing, and the rule's conditions instead describe the judgment itself: how it was entered, how serious the crime was, whether the fact was essential, and against whom it runs.18
The carve-out in subparagraph (D) follows from the same contrast. The requirement that a prosecutor's judgment run against the defendant exists because a criminal defendant cannot confront and cross-examine the witnesses in someone else's trial, so a prosecutor may not use a third person's verdict to prove a fact against the defendant.19 Impeachment raises no such concern, because it does not ask the jury to adopt the earlier verdict as proof of any fact in the present case, and the witness under attack is on the stand. The requirement also could not apply to impeachment without wrecking it. A conviction offered to impeach is a judgment against the witness, so a prosecutor confined to judgments against the defendant could impeach only the accused, and Rule 609's provisions for witnesses who are not defendants would do no work.20 A prosecutor barred from using a third person's conviction to prove a fact may therefore still raise a testifying witness's conviction for credibility, if Rule 609 allows it.21
The two rules are separate gates, and a conviction can pass one while failing the other. A misdemeanor conviction for making a false statement fails the more-than-one-year requirement of Rule 803(22)(B), yet Rule 609 admits it to impeach, because that rule reaches dishonesty crimes whatever the punishment.22 The gates share one feature: under each, a pending appeal does not bar admissibility, and the pendency may be shown.23 The usual exam error is to run a witness's credibility problem through the essential-fact and felony-grade conditions of Rule 803(22) and so exclude evidence that Rule 609 would admit.
Guilty Plea Versus Judgment
Rule 803(22) admits “evidence of a final judgment of conviction,” and its first condition accepts a judgment entered after a trial or a guilty plea.25 The judgment is the object the rule reaches: the court's recorded declaration of guilt. A guilty plea is separate evidence, because it is what the defendant said in court before any judgment existed. A litigant whose opponent was convicted on a plea therefore holds two exhibits, and each must clear the hearsay rule by its own route. Treating them as one applies the judgment exception's conditions to evidence that never depended on them.
The plea comes in through the rules on admissions. A guilty plea that has not been withdrawn admits all matters well pleaded in the indictment or information, which is why it is often admissible in a later civil action arising out of the same facts.26 The proponent offers the plea to show that the offender admitted the facts, not to prove the facts recited in the charge. When the plea is the admission of a party-opponent, it comes in under Rule 801(d)(2). When the offender is a nonparty, it may come in as a statement against interest under Rule 804(b)(3), so the person who pleaded need not be the defendant in the case at bar.27
The judgment is different evidence and needs an exception of its own. Rule 803(22) admits it to prove any fact essential to the judgment, and its conditions attach to the judgment alone.28 The crime must be punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than a year, the evidence must prove a fact essential to the judgment, and a prosecutor who offers the judgment in a criminal case for a purpose other than impeachment must offer one entered against the defendant. A plea offered as the defendant's own admission is tested under the rule on admissions, and none of those conditions applies to it.
Each route is independent, so an objection that defeats one exhibit leaves the other untouched.29 Exam stems exploit that pairing. When the proponent offers the plea, the analysis runs through the party-opponent and against-interest rules. When the proponent offers the judgment, it runs through the conditions of Rule 803(22), and the plea rules do not enter.
Two situations leave neither exhibit available. A guilty plea later withdrawn falls under Rule 410, which also governs nolo contendere pleas whether or not withdrawn, along with statements made to a prosecuting attorney in plea negotiations that do not end in an unwithdrawn guilty plea.30 Withdrawal leaves no conviction resting on the plea, so there is no judgment for Rule 803(22) to reach, and the exception cannot rescue the plea. The nolo contendere plea falls on the same side of the line: Rule 410 governs the plea, and a judgment entered on it fails subparagraph (A).31
Civil Judgments and Rule 803(23)
Rule 803 gives judgments two hearsay exceptions, and they divide the ground by the kind of judgment and the subject it decided. Rule 803(22) admits a final judgment of conviction for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than a year, so every route into it passes through a criminal case.33 Rule 803(23) is narrower in subject but broader in kind: it admits a judgment to prove a matter of personal, family, or general history, or boundaries.34 A civil judgment therefore cannot come in under Rule 803(22) to prove what it decided, and it can come in under Rule 803(23) only when what it decided is one of those subjects. Like every Rule 803 exception, each applies whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.35
The text of Rule 803(22) is built around a criminal case. It speaks of a trial or guilty plea, of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment, and of a prosecutor offering the judgment against a defendant.36 A civil judgment does not fit those terms, and the exception does not stretch to reach it. A litigant who offers a civil judgment against an opponent as proof of the underlying fact therefore meets a hearsay objection that Rule 803(22) cannot answer, and the exam question becomes whether Rule 803(23) supplies another way in.
A closer overlap between the two cases would not rescue the civil judgment, because the exception turns on the kind of judgment and not on how closely the cases match. A prior civil judgment is not worthless to a later litigant, but the route lies outside the hearsay exceptions. Whether an earlier civil finding binds the opponent is a question of preclusion, which belongs to the law of judgments and not to Rule 803.
Rule 803(23) runs in the other direction. It admits a judgment of any kind, but only on a short list of subjects, and only if the matter was essential to the judgment and could be proved by evidence of reputation.37 The phrase essential to the judgment confines the judgment to what the court had to decide, exactly as it does in Rule 803(22).38 The restrictions differ, though. Rule 803(22) restricts by the kind of judgment, while Rule 803(23) restricts by subject matter and asks nothing about punishment, plea, or the party against whom the judgment runs.39
Exam stems can pull a student in either direction. One tempting error is to admit a civil judgment under Rule 803(22) because it resembles a conviction and decided the fact the proponent needs. The opposite error is to reject every civil judgment on hearsay grounds and forget that Rule 803(23) admits a boundary judgment even though the judgment is civil. Two questions, asked in order, avoid both mistakes: whether the judgment is a criminal conviction that meets Rule 803(22), and, if it is not, whether it decided a matter of personal, family, or general history, or a boundary, that was essential to it and could be proved by reputation.