Concept
Other Routes to Admission
Former testimony; depositions
Other Routes to Admission
A transcript that fails Rule 804(b)(1) has lost one road into evidence, not every road. The exception admits earlier testimony only when the declarant is unavailable, the testimony was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, and it is now offered against a party who had (or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in interest had) an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.1 The earlier sections showed how a transcript can fall short. The statement may be an affidavit instead of testimony, the opposing side may have had no chance to question the witness, or the earlier examiner may have lacked a motive like the present party’s. This section asks what remains for the proponent after one of those failures.
The answer is sometimes a good deal, because those limits belong to a single exception. They say when an unavailable witness’s earlier testimony comes in as former testimony, and they say nothing about other theories on which the same words might be offered. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth, so testimony offered for another purpose raises no hearsay problem and needs no exception. Other exemptions and exceptions carry their own foundations, and those foundations do not borrow the elements of Rule 804(b)(1). A court that excludes a transcript under Rule 804(b)(1) has therefore decided less than it appears to have.
The two routes taught below differ in how settled they are. The first applies the ordinary definitions, exemptions, and exceptions to prior testimony and draws little controversy. The second asks whether a transcript that narrowly misses Rule 804(b)(1) can be rescued by the residual exception, now Rule 807, and the courts disagree about that. On an exam, present the first as a plain alternative theory and the second as one side of a genuine split.
Other Uses of Prior Testimony
The elements of Rule 804(b)(1) bind a proponent only when the proponent chooses that exception as the road into evidence. The same words can often be offered another way, and when they are, only the requirements of that other way apply.2 The reason lies in what the elements are for. Unavailability and a prior chance to cross-examine let a transcript stand in for a live witness whose accuracy the factfinder must trust. Where no one has to trust the declarant’s accuracy, or where another guarantee takes its place, those safeguards have no work to do.
The first alternative is a purpose for which the truth of the testimony does not matter. Four such purposes recur: showing the act of perjury, showing that testimony against the accused gave the accused a motive to retaliate against the witness, refreshing a witness’s recollection, and impeaching a present witness by proving that the earlier testimony was inconsistent.3 In each, the transcript matters because the words were spoken. A perjury prosecution offers the transcript to show what the defendant swore, and other evidence shows the oath false. A witness who has forgotten reads the transcript to refresh memory, and the evidence is what the witness then says, not the page. Impeachment shows that the witness has told two stories, which bears on credibility whichever story is true.
A second alternative applies when the transcript records the testimony of the very party it is offered against. An opposing party’s former testimony is admissible against that party under Rule 801(d)(2) without the foundation that the former testimony exception demands.4 The Rules treat these statements as not hearsay even though they fit the definition, so they work in effect as exceptions with conditions of their own.5 Unavailability, opportunity, and similar motive drop out. The practical logic is plain enough: a party who spoke can take the stand to explain or deny its own words, so the protection Rule 804(b)(1) gives against untested transcripts has little to add.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. shows this route at work and shows it carrying less than a proponent might hope. The plaintiffs listed passages of earlier testimony by five company witnesses that referred to exports, and the court asked under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) whether each witness in fact held a position that gave him responsibility for exports.6 Fujio, a senior managing director of MEI, drew an inference. The record did not show his export duties, but the court inferred from his senior position in the Matsushita parent company that his duties more probably than not related to export, so his export reference came in against MEI only.7 The court never asked whether Fujio was unavailable or whether anyone had a similar motive to examine him. It asked how he related to his employer.
The same opinion shows a neighboring route failing. The exception for statements against interest, Rule 804(b)(3), was not met. All the declarants except Yajima were not unavailable, since their depositions could have been taken, and the plaintiffs showed nothing from which the court could infer that the declarants knew their statements ran against their personal interests. The testimony also generally matched the defense offered in the Six-Company Case, so it was not even against the employers’ interests.8
A third alternative applies when the declarant is testifying at the present trial. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) supplies the basis for receiving a witness’s prior inconsistent statement, and it requires the declarant to be “subject to cross-examination” about that statement.9 That exemption is what lets earlier testimony prove its own truth, where impeachment alone only discredits the witness. The contrast with Rule 804(b)(1) is the point to hold. Both provisions lean on cross-examination, but former testimony requires a prior chance to cross-examine the declarant, while the prior inconsistent statement exemption requires a present one. The two are mirror images. A declarant on the stand and answerable for the earlier statement makes an earlier cross-examination unnecessary, and the same presence ordinarily makes the declarant available, which closes Rule 804(b)(1). One text goes so far as to ask whether a single witness can be both “subject to cross-examination” under Rule 801(d)(1) and “unavailable” under Rule 804(a).10 That puzzle is a reason to test each route on its own terms.
Other hearsay routes carry their own foundations as well. If the transcript is offered for its truth under a different exception, such as recorded recollection, only that exception’s requirements must be met.11 An exam stem that reports a witness who is alive and present, or a party who never had a chance to cross-examine at the earlier proceeding, closes only the Rule 804(b)(1) route. Each alternative above should be tested before the transcript is excluded.
Near Misses and Rule 807
A transcript can fail Rule 804(b)(1) at the declarant’s unavailability, at the nature of the earlier proceeding, or at the opportunity and motive of the party now facing it, and a transcript that misses by a small margin may still be sworn, detailed, and believable. Before a proponent argues that it should come in anyway, the miss has to be real, and courts do not find a failed opportunity lightly. Where a right to counsel exists when the testimony is offered, a denial of counsel when it was taken makes it inadmissible. A general finding of ineffective representation does not by itself require rejection, and the court asks whether the cross-examination was adequate on the facts. Improper judicial interference can make the opportunity inadequate, but restrictions on cross-examination do so only when very substantial, and some courts require that they make the testimony inherently unreliable. That a party was less able to impeach the witness earlier ordinarily does not bar later use.17
When the miss is real, the proponent’s fallback is the residual exception, a general provision for hearsay that is reliable but fits no listed category. The decisions in this section cite it under its former numbers, Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), and the entry for former Rule 804(b)(5) now reads only that it was transferred to Rule 807.18 The question is whether a near miss, meaning a statement that fits the former testimony exception except for one failed element, may use that route. The courts have not agreed.
United States v. Clarke allowed the route. Michael Clarke gave testimony at his own suppression hearing that later became evidence against his brother Christopher. At Christopher’s trial, Michael refused to testify, and the district court declared him unavailable.19 The district court found the hearing testimony highly reliable and trustworthy because Michael had no motive to lie at that hearing or to implicate his brother for any ulterior purpose, and it found the testimony more probative on the point than any other evidence. Over Christopher’s objection, it admitted the testimony under former Rule 804(b)(5).20 Rule 804(b)(1) could not carry the transcript, because Christopher had no opportunity to develop the testimony.21
On appeal, Christopher argued that admitting a near miss would undermine the protections of the evidence rules and violate the Confrontation Clause. He asked the court to read the residual provision, which reaches “[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,” as limited to statements that no earlier exception touches.22 The court refused. “Specifically covered” means exactly what it says, so a statement that does not meet all the requirements of an earlier exception is not specifically covered by it.23 The court added that grand jury testimony, like the suppression hearing testimony here, is prior testimony the defendant never cross-examined and is therefore inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(1). Even so, the circuit had affirmed its admission under Rule 804(b)(5) on a number of occasions, finding other guarantees of trustworthiness.24
The reasoning follows the text. The residual provision asks whether an exception covers a statement, not whether the statement resembles one. The conditions of Rule 804(b)(1) describe one package of assurances, an oath together with an adversary examination, and the residual provision stands ready for statements whose reliability rests on a different package. Clarke does not make admission automatic. The district court there relied on specific findings about the lack of any motive to lie and the lack of better evidence, and the residual provisions require that the statement be “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.”25
The opposite position comes from Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., the same case that supplied the admissions example above. The court there considered the residual exceptions inapplicable to former testimony.26 It reasoned that the residual exceptions cannot be invoked when a specific exception sets conditions for a clearly defined category of hearsay, and it chose former testimony as the example, since Rule 804(b)(1) applies to a clearly defined category and specifies conditions that evidence in that category must meet. The court would not consider a proffer of former testimony under the residual exceptions if the testimony failed the specific requirements of Rule 804(b)(1), such as unavailability of the declarant and similarity of motive at the former hearing. It would treat other specific exceptions that cover clearly defined categories the same way if the evidence fell within them.27 Its added reason was protective: the express requirements of the residual exceptions should be applied rigorously, so as not to vitiate the hearsay rule and the specific exceptions.28
Both opinions accept that the residual exception exists to catch reliable hearsay outside the listed categories. They differ over whether former testimony is a category whose conditions the residual route may bypass. Clarke reads a failed element as taking the statement outside the exception, which leaves the residual route open. Zenith reads the conditions of Rule 804(b)(1) as the complete statement of when a transcript may stand in for a live witness, so a proponent who cannot meet them cannot substitute an argument about reliability.
Judge Stern’s concurrence in Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc. puts the residual exception to a third use. The majority held that the Coast Guard investigating officer shared a community of interest with Alvarez and so was Alvarez’s predecessor in interest. Stern joined the result but rejected that reading as contrary to the Rule’s clear language and foreclosed by its legislative history, and he would have admitted Lloyd’s Coast Guard testimony under the catch-all exception, then Rule 804(b)(5), instead of under Rule 804(b)(1).29 The majority reached the result by reading the predecessor language broadly, and Stern reached it by reading that language narrowly and sending the leftover transcript to the residual exception. The two debates in this chapter therefore connect: the narrower a court reads “predecessor in interest,” the more trustworthy civil transcripts fall just outside Rule 804(b)(1), and the more work the residual exception does.30 A court following Zenith could not take Stern’s route.
The criminal setting shows what is at stake. In United States v. Deeb (11th Cir. 1994), the court used the catch-all to admit against a defendant testimony from his co-conspirator’s trial at which the defendant was neither present nor represented, which the secondary source treats as an end run around the identity requirement of Rule 804(b)(1).31 Some courts, despite the words of the rule, do not apply the party-identity concept when the evidence is offered against the prosecution.32 State practice pairs the two provisions too. In Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., the Delaware chancellor found the criteria of the state’s former testimony rule met and found that Riboud’s testimony was taken under circumstances offering indicia of reliability. Given the court’s broad discretion, the Delaware Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and no reversible error.33
An exam stem that ends with the proponent’s argument that the transcript is reliable anyway is inviting this analysis, and answers go wrong in two directions. An answer that stops once Rule 804(b)(1) fails misses the residual route. An answer that treats a sworn, believable transcript as automatically admissible under Rule 807 skips both the split and the proponent’s burden to show trustworthiness and need. Against an accused there is a further layer. Christopher Clarke raised the Confrontation Clause objection to the near-miss theory,34 and the Clause is a separate constitutional test, covered in the preceding section. A near miss against an accused is very often a transcript the accused never had a chance to cross-examine, so a hearsay ruling for the proponent leaves the constitutional question still to be answered.