Concept
The Opposing Party
Former testimony; depositions
The Opposing Party
Rule 804(b)(1)(B) admits former testimony only against a party who had, or in a civil case whose predecessor in interest had, an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.1 The earlier sections asked what opportunity and motive must look like. This section asks whose opportunity and motive count, and the Rule's answer is the opponent's: the party against whom the transcript is now offered. The proponent's role in the first proceeding does not matter. A litigant who never appeared in the earlier case may offer the transcript, and the only question is whether the opponent was in a position to test the witness then.2 Early common-law cases required mutuality, so that both the proponent and the opponent had to have been parties to the former suit. Under Wigmore's guidance the common law dropped that requirement and looked to the opponent alone: in criminal cases a party to the prior hearing, in civil actions a party to the former suit or someone in privity.3
Fixing on the opponent follows from what an examination involves. A witness reaches the factfinder shaped by the examiner's skill, the examiner's tactical choices, the relationship between witness and party, and the examiner's access to information and state of preparation. Congress judged it generally unacceptable to impose all of that on a party who took no part in the earlier proceeding. It therefore refused the Supreme Court's proposal, which would have dropped the identity-of-parties requirement and admitted the testimony whenever any earlier party with a similar motive and interest had examined the witness.4 The House Judiciary Committee stated the objection directly: it is “generally unfair to impose upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is being offered responsibility for the manner in which the witness was previously handled by another party.”5
The Rule relaxes the same-party requirement in one setting only. In a civil case the testimony may also be used against a party whose predecessor in interest had the opportunity and motive, a phrase that liberalizes the same-party requirement applying in criminal cases.6 Congress never defined “predecessor in interest,”7 and courts have disagreed about how close a relationship the phrase demands. The next subsection takes the criminal side, where the Rule leaves no room for a substitute. The three after it follow the civil dispute: a narrow privity reading, a broader like-motive reading, and the point where even the broader reading stops.
Each subsection also assumes the declarant is unavailable. Unavailability does not mean the declarant is physically beyond reach. The requirement is met when the testimony is unobtainable, so a witness who is in court but cannot remember, refuses to testify, or successfully claims a privilege is unavailable.8 Some forms of unavailability have soft edges, as when the declarant is only temporarily absent or ill.9
Criminal Cases: Same Party
In a criminal case the Rule offers no substitute. The predecessor-in-interest alternative applies only in a civil case, so the party against whom the transcript is offered must itself have had the earlier opportunity and similar motive.10 When the testimony is offered against a criminal defendant, that defendant must have been a party to the former proceeding.11 Courts call this the same-party requirement. It rests on two reasons, one constitutional and one practical.
The constitutional reason is that a defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses is personal. It will not do to tell a defendant that another defendant's cross-examination satisfied it.12 The Rule as enacted removes the confrontation doubts raised by the Supreme Court's version, which would have allowed examination by a substitute.13 The practical reason is that an examination takes its character from the examiner. Skill, tactics, access to information, preparation, and the witness's relationship to the examiner's client all shape what the transcript contains, and an absent defendant chose none of them.14
Consider two defendants charged with the same bank robbery and tried separately. At the first trial a teller testifies for the prosecution, and the first defendant's lawyer cross-examines hard. The teller then dies. If the prosecution offers the transcript against the second defendant, the first branch of the Rule fails, because the second defendant never had the opportunity, and a criminal case supplies no predecessor alternative.15 The first defendant's motive may have matched the second defendant's exactly. That does not help the prosecution, because the Rule asks whose opportunity it was, and it was someone else's. Had the government instead retried the first defendant and offered the same transcript against that defendant, the first branch would be met and the contest would shift to similar motive.
The requirement runs against the party the testimony burdens and says nothing about who offers it. Only the party against whom the evidence is now offered is the focus.16
Identity of the party does not end the inquiry, because the same party must also have had a similar motive. Suppose the prosecutor at the earlier trial cross-examined the declarant about the defendant's alibi, and the testimony would now support a self-defense claim. The motives differ, and the testimony is excluded.17
The identity requirement also runs across sovereigns. When a criminal defendant offers an unavailable witness's earlier testimony, the prosecutor in the current case must represent the same party as the prosecutor in the earlier case. A federal prosecutor and a California prosecutor represent different parties, so the testimony is inadmissible.18 By the Rule's literal terms, then, a defendant in a federal prosecution cannot introduce exculpatory testimony given by an unavailable witness in a related state case. That exclusion raises due process concerns, and Congress quite likely did not intend it.19 Some courts, despite the words of the Rule, do not apply the party-identity concept when the evidence is offered against the prosecution.20 On an exam, apply the text first and say what it produces. Then add the due process argument and the courts that relax identity in the defendant's favor, without treating either side as settled.
A transcript that fails the same-party requirement may still have another route to admission. In United States v. Deeb, the court used the catch-all exception as an end run around the identity requirement and admitted against the defendant testimony from a co-conspirator's trial at which the defendant was neither present nor represented.21 The residual exception and the Confrontation Clause each receive their own treatment later in the chapter. One opinion surveying the confrontation cases describes a longstanding rule, established in Barber and refined up through Roberts, that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony.22 Unavailability also has a constitutional dimension, as when a prosecutor could have secured the declarant's presence but failed to take a step that would have done so.23
The Privity Reading
Congress did not define predecessor in interest, and two readings compete. This subsection takes the narrow one, which reads the phrase to require privity in the common-law sense. The broader reading that most courts prefer follows in the next.
The Supreme Court's draft would have admitted the former testimony of an unavailable witness against a party whenever any party in the former action, with a motive and interest similar to the present party's, had an opportunity to develop it.25 Under that draft a stranger's questioning could bind the party now facing the transcript. The House Judiciary Committee found that consequence unfair and allowed a single exception, for a party's predecessor in interest in a civil action or proceeding who had an opportunity and similar motive to examine the witness.26 The House thus replaced a test that asked whether anyone with a like stake had examined the witness with one that asks who did the examining. The words predecessor in interest mark the only door left open to examination by someone other than the present party.
The Senate Judiciary Committee treated the change lightly. It saw considerable merit in the Supreme Court's version, concluded that the difference between the two versions was not great, and accepted the House amendment.27 Both houses therefore enacted the same words while holding different views of what the words meant. The House apparently intended a narrow reading in line with the common law, and the Senate a broad one essentially similar to the Supreme Court's rule.28 Even the Senate Committee appeared not to grasp the significance of the modification, which suggests no meeting of the minds.29 That history cannot settle the question, but it supplies one firm point: reading the Rule exactly as it stood before the House's change, and ignoring the added language, would not be sensible.30
The narrow reading takes the House at its word. If the amendment confined the exception, predecessor in interest keeps its common-law meaning, which is privity.31 A predecessor in that sense is the person from whom the present party received the right, title, interest, or obligation now in litigation. A decedent is a predecessor to a personal representative and to the heirs and legatees who take from the decedent. A grantor is a predecessor to a grantee, and a principal to a surety.32 The older classifications of privity run through the same kinds of links, such as donor and donee, lessor and lessee, heir and ancestor, executor and testator.33 The tie fits the House's worry because the present party holds a right that descends from the earlier party's, so holding the present party to the earlier examination does not impose a stranger's choices.
A car-train collision shows where the line falls. Pam sues the railroad alone, alleging negligence, and the railroad calls a bystander who testifies that the signal was working. Pam cross-examines hard, and the railroad wins.34 Pate, who was also hurt in the collision, later sues the railroad. The bystander is now unavailable, and the railroad offers the transcript against Pate. Pam had the motive and the opportunity, yet under the privity reading that is not enough. No property interest passed between Pam and Pate, and Pam was neither Pate's legal representative nor a fiduciary, so Pam is not Pate's predecessor and the transcript stays out.35
Motive and opportunity do not explain the different outcomes for Pate and the executor, since Pam and Whitcomb each had both in full. The difference lies in how the present party came to hold its position: by succession to the earlier party's right in the executor's case, and by an independent claim arising from the same accident in Pate's. An exam stem that supplies a shared goal or a shared accident, without any transfer of a right or any relationship of representation, describes the failing side of this reading.
The best statement of the privity view is District Judge Stern's concurrence in Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc. A crewman, Alvarez, sued a shipowner over injuries from a fight with a fellow crewman, Lloyd. Lloyd had testified at a Coast Guard hearing that sought to determine culpability for the fight, and the shipowner offered that testimony against Alvarez.36 The Third Circuit majority held that the Coast Guard's investigating officer, who shared a community of interest with Alvarez, was Alvarez's predecessor in interest.37 Judge Stern, sitting by designation, joined the result but not the construction. He read the phrase as a term of art used in its narrow, substantive-law sense, noted that even commentators who disapprove of that traditional rule define a predecessor in interest in terms of a privity relationship, and concluded that the majority's analysis was contrary to the Rule's clear language and foreclosed by its legislative history.38 He would have admitted Lloyd's testimony under the catch-all exception, then numbered 804(b)(5) and now Rule 807, a route this chapter reaches near its end.39
Judge Stern also distinguished In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, where defendants in a private antitrust class action offered testimony from the earlier government antitrust action that had given rise to the private suit. The court there held that the United States could be a predecessor in interest of the private plaintiffs, but only after weighing special considerations.40 Those considerations included the unique relationship between government antitrust suits and the private actions that follow, which Congress has recognized and ratified, for example by tolling the statute of limitations for the private plaintiffs.41 The Lloyd panel was divided, and a later court that felt bound by the majority noted that one commentator has called Judge Stern's opinion persuasive.42
The privity reading has a price. Privity is a concept built for property and obligations, and it is of limited use in deciding whether a witness was tested as the present party would have tested the witness.43 Most courts therefore apply the language more broadly. They reason that if the earlier party developed the testimony as effectively as the present party would have, the testimony is reliable enough, and excluding it leaves no evidence from that witness at all.44 Strict privity remains a defensible account of what the House intended, but it appears too rigid.45
On an exam, present the privity reading as one side of a genuine split. An answer that treats any earlier litigant who wanted the same result as a predecessor in interest states the broader reading, and it should be labeled as such. Under the narrow reading the answer turns on a link of succession or representation, such as personal representative, heir, grantee, or surety. In a criminal case none of this arises, because the predecessor alternative exists only for civil cases.
The Like-Motive Reading
Most courts read predecessor in interest functionally, and the leading statement comes from Lloyd: “if it appears that in the former suit a party having a like motive to cross-examine about the same matters as the present party would have, was accorded an adequate opportunity for such examination, the testimony may be received against the present party.”47 The court called this “the practical and expedient view” and found that it expressed the congressional intention.48 On this view the question is what the earlier examiner wanted from the witness and whether the examiner was free to pursue it. A formal tie between the two parties is not required.
The facts of Lloyd explain the reasoning. Alvarez had been hurt in a fight with Lloyd, a fellow crewman, and sued the shipowner for failing to protect him after learning of Lloyd's dangerous propensities. The Coast Guard had earlier held a hearing to determine culpability for the fight.49 The district court took a strict view of the Rule and excluded Lloyd's hearing testimony, a view the Third Circuit did not share.50 The remedies differed, since the private suit sought monetary damages, but both proceedings advanced the same basic interest: determining culpability and, if appropriate, exacting a penalty for the same condemned behavior. The investigating officer, who preferred the charges and acted as prosecutor, tried to establish at the hearing what Alvarez tried to establish at trial: Lloyd's intoxication, his role as the aggressor, and his prior hostility toward Alvarez.51
The court also stated a method of reading the Rule. Every rule of evidence, it said, is a means to an end, and it strives to avoid wooden or mechanical interpretations in favor of those that give the factfinder a complete picture.52 That method fits Rule 804's order of preference, which ranks live testimony first, qualifying hearsay second, and complete loss of the declarant's evidence last.53 The House amendment rested on the worry that a party should not answer for how another party handled a witness.54 That worry weighs little when the earlier examiner pursued the present party's goals on the same facts. The present party then inherits handling close to what it would have chosen, while exclusion leaves no evidence from that witness at all.55
The reading changes the outcome in the railroad-crossing problem from the preceding subsection. Under privity, Pam's cross-examination could not bind Pate. Under like motive, most courts would admit the bystander's testimony against Pate so long as Pam developed it in the way Pate would have if the witness were available at the second trial.56 A parallel illustration involves two bus passengers. Testimony about the bus's speed given in one passenger's suit against the bus company may be used against the second passenger in a later suit against the company, if the other requirements are met, and the broad federal reading would probably yield the same result.57
Other courts followed Lloyd. In Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. the court joined the Third Circuit in agreeing with the Senate Committee that the difference between the Supreme Court's draft and the enacted Rule was “not great,” and it adopted the Lloyd court's position.58 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia stated the principle directly. A predecessor in interest includes any party with a similar motive to develop the testimony, privity is no longer required, and deposition testimony is admissible if another party present at the deposition had the same opportunity and similar motive as the party against whom it is offered.59 The court reasoned that on a strict liability claim, intermediate sellers such as suppliers and installers share the manufacturers' interest in showing that the state of the art required no warning and the product was therefore not defective.60 In Lloyd the link was a shared factual target, the same fight. In Zenobia it was a shared position on the same defense. In both, the later party would have wanted the same thing from the witness as the earlier examiner did.
Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc. applied the comparison to criminal and civil trials. Defendants questioning a witness at a criminal price-fixing trial sought to show that the conspiracy never occurred. The dairies facing that testimony in the civil case sought to show either the same thing or that any conspiracy involved no affirmative acts of concealment. The court found the motives not identical but substantially similar, and because most price-fixing conspiracies involve affirmative acts of concealment, it saw the dominant motive in each trial as the same.61 The inquiry compares motives and not legal status, so it is fact-bound and trial judges receive deference. A Delaware court applying its parallel rule declined to find an abuse of discretion where admissibility turned largely on findings about the relationships of the parties and the issues in the two actions.62
The reading carries a structural cost. The Rule separately requires a similar motive, so defining the predecessor as a party with a like motive makes the predecessor language repeat that element. Several courts appear to read the language out of the Rule in exactly this way, by requiring only a community of interest, which differs very little from similar motive.63 Critics say that courts reading the language to require no more than a similar interest appear to have misconstrued the provision.64 Most courts nonetheless apply the phrase broadly.65 Even among courts that reject strict privity, some take a functional approach, while others still insist on clear-cut contractual privity or some other recognized successor relationship.66 Treatise problems test the pressure point with facts like these: Neville sues Ordway, claiming she contracted a sexually transmitted disease from him, Ordway answers that she probably caught it from a third person, Stoner, and Stoner is unavailable at trial.67 Whether any earlier testimony by Stoner may be used then turns on who examined Stoner earlier and what that examiner wanted from him.
A good exam answer presents the like-motive reading as the one most courts follow and applies it by comparing the earlier examiner's goals with the present party's on the same matters. It adds a sentence noting the criticism that the reading merges into similar motive and that a privity jurisdiction would demand a successor link. An answer that finds a predecessor merely because the earlier party sat on the same side of a case skips the same-matters and adequate-opportunity requirements. The alternative also exists only in civil cases, so none of this helps a prosecutor offering testimony against an accused.
Limits on Predecessor Status
In a civil case, Rule 804(b)(1)(B) admits former testimony against a party whose predecessor in interest had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it, and the like-motive reading treats an earlier examiner as that predecessor when the examiner had the same reasons to examine about the same matters that the present party would have had.70 That reading is generous, but it is still a test, and some earlier examiners fail it. This subsection marks where the generosity ends.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. gives the clearest application. Six companies had been respondents at a hearing of the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), and the plaintiffs later sued those six together with eighteen other defendants on a conspiracy theory. The court agreed with the defendants that the six did not qualify as predecessors in interest of the other eighteen. It applied Lloyd's standard, asking whether the six had a like motive to develop testimony about the same material that the eighteen would have had if they had been represented at the hearing, and it held that they plainly did not, because the six had no motive to inquire about the participation of their present co-defendants in the conspiracy the JFTC charged.71
Joinder explains little here. Naming defendants in one lawsuit under a conspiracy allegation shows what the plaintiffs claim, not how each defendant would have questioned a witness. A respondent defending itself before the commission had reason to protect its own position and, as the court found, none to inquire about anyone else's participation. Apart from the conspiracy allegation, the court found no community of interest between the six and the eighteen, some of whom were not even Japanese corporations, and it warned that admitting the testimony would risk unfair prejudice to the eighteen merely because the plaintiffs had joined them in one suit.72 That is the prejudice the House Judiciary Committee had in mind when it called it generally unfair to charge a party with how another party handled the witness.73
The outcome leaves Lloyd standing, because the earlier examiners differed. Courts that decline to extend Lloyd stress that its earlier examiner was a government investigator, presumably impartial, who had no role in the later action, and Lloyd itself remarked on the community of interest that the government, as representative of the public, and an individual might share.74 Zenith likewise noted the factual differences between Lloyd and the case before it, which involved co-defendants with potentially conflicting interests. It found its facts much closer to Government of the Canal Zone v. Pinto, which also involved co-defendants with potentially conflicting interests, and it agreed with the Pinto analysis of the dangers in admitting testimony developed by one co-defendant against another.75
The limit is also issue-specific, and Zenith shows the other side of it in the same case. Some commission testimony concerned diaries, and the plaintiffs offered it to authenticate them against all defendants. The court admitted it. On that narrow issue, the six respondents' motive to challenge the diaries' authenticity was identical to the motive any other defendant would have had, so the six were predecessors in interest of the rest with respect to the authentication references only.76 A diary is genuine or it is not, whoever stands accused, so no defendant gains by letting a forgery pass, while the question of who joined a conspiracy can divide defendants. The same six companies who could not stand in the eighteen's place on participation could therefore stand in their place on authenticity. Status is decided issue by issue.
United States v. Feldman shows a second way a substitute examiner can fail, one that turns on stake and not on conflict. A deposition of a witness named Sanburg was offered against criminal defendants, and the court concluded that no one at the deposition had the stake needed to be deemed a predecessor in interest to those defendants, and that those who did have the stake had no reason to suspect they should be there.77 The deposition therefore failed the Rule's test. The Rule's text confines the predecessor alternative to civil cases, so in a criminal prosecution the same-party requirement is an independent bar, and Feldman matters here for its point about stake. Beside Zenith, it asks the same underlying question, whether the earlier examiner had the present party's reasons to test the witness, and it shows that different things can defeat the answer. In Zenith the six respondents had no motive to probe their co-defendants' conduct and may have had conflicting interests, while in Feldman no one present had the requisite stake at all.
Judge Stern's concurrence in Lloyd explains why the line is worth holding. He objected that a rule treating any earlier examiner with a shared interest in the same facts as a predecessor would make admissible, in later civil suits between entirely different parties, the testimony taken at every kind of administrative hearing, such as hearings on airplane disasters, misuse of broadcast licenses, or securities fraud. The party facing the transcript would then answer for flaws in how the witness was handled and in another's choice of witnesses, which is the result the House Judiciary Committee called generally unfair.78 He added that a prosecutor or investigating officer represents no ordinary party, since his interest is not that he shall win a case but that justice shall be done, so his interests go well beyond vindicating the rights of the alleged victim.79 Zenith's distinction of Lloyd points the same way: public examiners and unrelated private examiners sit at the outer edge of the generous reading.
When the earlier examiner is unconnected to the present party, the opponent has a further response, which is to show that the earlier examination was inadequate. One treatise reads the Rule to allow exclusion where the objecting party shows inadequacy by, for example, setting out additional questions or lines of inquiry it would have pursued. It adds that this challenge is not applied with rigor where the party is the same in both proceedings.80 The allocation of risk is sensible. A party that is the same in both proceedings can fairly be held to its own earlier strategic judgments and even to poor lawyering, as with preliminary hearing testimony used against a criminal defendant at trial. Where the parties are unconnected, the quality of the cross-examination deserves closer scrutiny, because the costs of poor lawyering should not fall on a separate party.81
An exam stem that joins several defendants under one conspiracy allegation and offers a transcript examined by only one of them invites the conclusion that the shared accusation makes that one a predecessor. The better analysis asks what the earlier examiner wanted from the witness, whether that matches what the present defendant would have wanted on the issue now in dispute, and whether any conflict or difference in stake separates them. It also remembers that a civil case is the only setting where the question arises at all.