Concept
Read, Not Received
Learned treatises
Read, Not Received
The last sentence of Rule 803(18) controls how a qualifying passage reaches the jury: "If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit."1 Once an expert has sponsored the passage and the work has been established as a reliable authority, the jurors learn what it says by hearing it read aloud, with the expert on the stand free to interpret or comment on it.2 The book, journal, or pamphlet is never marked as an exhibit and never goes to the jury room. The foundation conditions decide whether the statement comes in at all; this sentence decides the form it takes once the judge lets it in.
Two dangers explain the limit, and both arise only if jurors can keep the writing after the testimony ends. The first is undue emphasis on a text received as an exhibit. The second is that jurors with the text in the jury room could find out-of-context or inapplicable passages that no one examined or challenged in open court, and could try to interpret and apply technical material without expert guidance.3 Reading the passage aloud while the expert is on the stand avoids both, because the jury hears the expert's view of the passage's validity and of how it bears on the issues in the case.4 The bar on exhibits also completes what the sponsorship requirement starts. Sponsorship ensures that an expert is available to assist the fact finder and to explain how to apply the materials, and keeping the materials out of the jury room keeps them under that sponsorship.5
In Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, the plaintiff argued that the failure to admit a written Code as an exhibit required reversal. The court rejected the argument for two reasons. The plaintiff had not urged admission of the Code under Rule 803(24), the residual provision taken up in a later section, and no substantial right of the plaintiff was affected, because the relevant sections had already been read and shown to the jury.6 The jurors had the Code's relevant content before them, so exhibit status would have added little.
A court that receives the work as an exhibit anyway commits an error, but not always one that requires reversal. In a case against Chrysler, the trial court received two Cal-span reports as plaintiffs' exhibits after all testimony had closed, and Chrysler did not object when the reports were offered. The appellate court acknowledged that Rule 803(18) bars receiving such reports as exhibits, then held the error, if any, harmless: no one had objected, and the jurors did not take the reports into the jury room during deliberations.7 A Texas court applying its parallel rule, Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 803(18), reached the same result for a videotape. It called receiving the tape as an exhibit "clearly erroneous" but harmless, because nothing in the record suggested the jurors had a video cassette recorder with which to review the tape during deliberations, so they could not have misapplied it.8
Neither decision approves of exhibit status, and each holds only that the particular mistake did not matter. In the Chrysler case, harmlessness rested on two facts: the opponent had not objected, and the reports never reached the jury room. In the Texas case, the jurors had no practical means of reviewing the tape, so the danger the rule guards against never arose.
Both decisions apply harmless-error review, in which an appellate court asks whether the mistake could have affected the result and leaves the judgment alone if it could not. A lawyer who wants relief from an erroneously received exhibit must therefore object when the exhibit is offered, and should be ready to show that the jury could use the document in deliberations. Chrysler's silence at trial weighed against it on appeal.9 One procedural question also remains open. A federal appellate footnote traced the uncertain record partly to the rule's read-not-received sentence and noted that the trial judge may have thought statements used for impeachment were not being read into evidence under Rule 803(18), because counsel had made no formal offer. The court left unanswered whether the rule requires such an offer, since the defendant had not raised the point.10 Until a court resolves that question, a careful lawyer states the offer on the record.
Rule 803(5) uses almost the same sentence for a recorded recollection, with one addition: the record may be received as an exhibit only if an adverse party offers it.11 The bar against the proponent rests on the view that a recorded recollection is no better, and in many instances not as good, as trial testimony, and that a writing handed to the jury might seem weightier than the oral testimony.12 Rule 803(18) has no adverse-party carve-out. Either side may have a qualifying treatise statement read to the jury, and neither side may have it received as an exhibit, so a question in which the adverse party offers the book as an exhibit does not change the answer.
Connecticut departs from the federal baseline, as Connecticut decision explains. Its rule allows jurors to examine more fully the text of a technical and complicated discussion that may be unfathomable to a nonexpert who heard it recited only once. The court conceded that the concerns behind the federal rule cannot be completely obviated when the materials go to the jury room, but said trial courts can minimize the dangers by exercising discretion over which items are admitted as full exhibits.13 A question that does not signal a state-law variation is answered under the federal rule.