Concept
Reliable Authority
Learned treatises
Reliable Authority
A passage can be called to an expert’s attention on cross-examination, or relied on by an expert on direct, and still come from a source that no one has shown to deserve trust.1 Sponsorship ties the passage to a witness, but it says nothing about the book. Subsection (B) of Rule 803(18) fills that gap with a separate condition: the publication must be “established as a reliable authority by the expert’s admission or testimony, by another expert’s testimony, or by judicial notice.”2 Until the proponent makes that showing, the exception stays closed, however skillfully the sponsoring expert was handled.
The author of the passage is absent and cannot be cross-examined, so the exception needs some other assurance that the statement deserves belief. Learned treatises supply it because “they are written primarily for professionals and are subject to scrutiny and exposure for inaccuracy, with the reputation of the writer at stake.”3 That description fits some publications and not others, and subsection (B) asks which kind the proponent has offered.
The judge answers that question. Under Rule 104(a), the judge asks whether professionals in the field consider the material reliable, and a finding that they do makes statements in it admissible for their truth when they are used in the direct or cross-examination of an expert witness.4 The proponent must persuade the judge with whatever foundational evidence is presented before invoking the rule.5 A statement that clears both conditions may be read to the jury but not received as an exhibit.6
The rule names three ways to make the showing and joins them with “or”: the expert’s own admission or testimony, another expert’s testimony, and judicial notice.7 Each looks outside the book. They differ in who does the vouching, and the easiest place to begin is the witness already on the stand.
Admission by the Expert
The first route asks the least of the proponent, because the publication may be established as reliable “by the expert’s admission or testimony.”8 Two witnesses fit that description. One is the opposing expert, who is asked on cross-examination whether the book in the examiner’s hand is a standard work. The other is the proponent’s own expert, who relied on the book on direct examination and can tell the jury that professionals treat it as authoritative. Either way, the foundation comes from someone who knows the literature, and the proponent needs no further witness.
A practitioner knows which texts colleagues consult, so the witness’s statement that a work is authoritative is direct evidence of the fact subsection (B) asks the judge to find. The witness’s position on the stand shapes how readily the statement is given. A party’s own expert has every reason to vouch for a book that supports the opinion. A cross-examined expert has a reason to refuse, since agreement hands the examiner a passage that contradicts the opinion. Because the challenged witness can decline, the rule offers two alternatives: another expert’s testimony and, rarely, judicial notice.9
An admission need not use the word “authoritative.” In Dawson v. Chrysler Corp. plaintiffs’ counsel cross-examined a defense expert about reports from which the expert had calculated some data, asking whether the reports were reliable in that regard. The expert answered, “Well, I have no reason to doubt their test data reflected in [the] reports.”10 The court treated that answer as an inferential concession of authoritativeness, noted that the defense had not objected to use of the report, and held that use of the reports on cross-examination was not precluded by Rule 803(18).11
What carried the inference was the expert’s own use of the reports. Someone who took numbers from a report to build an analysis can hardly tell the jury that the field disregards it, and an answer that declines to doubt the data vouches for the source. The court’s remark that no objection was made is a reminder that a party who thinks the foundation thin should say so when the passage is offered. For the cross-examiner, the lesson is to ask how the witness has used or regarded the work. Questions that tie the witness’s own practice to the book can build the showing without the witness ever saying the word.
Where no one vouches, nothing is built. In Dawsey v. Olin Corp. neither the cross-examined expert nor any other witness testified that the NIOSH manual was a reliable authority, so the trial court correctly barred the plaintiffs from using statements in the manual to cross-examine him.12 The contrast with Dawson is instructive. The Dawson expert had used the reports and declined to doubt them, which supports an inference of reliability. The Dawsey record held no testimony of any kind vouching for the manual, and nothing took its place. The court also said what the plaintiffs could have done instead, a point the next subsection takes up.
The two toxicologists show how the rule keeps its two conditions apart. Calling a passage to a cross-examined expert’s attention satisfies subsection (A), and that same expert’s rejection of the work leaves subsection (B) open for proof through another expert or the court. A proponent whose own expert relied on the book can complete both conditions through that one witness.
Another Expert’s Testimony
When the expert under cross-examination will not concede that a work is authoritative, another expert can provide the foundational testimony instead.14 The rule says so in terms: a publication may be established as reliable “by another expert’s testimony.”15 Reliability is a fact about how a profession regards a work, and any qualified member of the profession can speak to it. The rule does not require that the voucher be the witness being questioned.
This alternative takes away the challenged witness’s veto. An expert who knows that a standard text contradicts the opinion just given could otherwise defeat the passage with one sentence of denial. Under the rule, the denial is evidence the proponent may answer with a second expert, and the judge decides on the whole foundation presented.16 The court still needs a real showing. What the alternative removes is the hostile witness’s power to decide whether that showing can be made.
Courts treat the showing as a condition, not a formality. In Schneider v. Revici the court of appeals explained that the foundation exists to establish a treatise’s trustworthiness as professionals in the field view it, and that failing to lay it requires excluding the treatise, because the court has no basis on which to view it as trustworthy.17
Dawsey shows how the second-expert route would have worked. The court said the plaintiffs had merely to obtain copies of the original articles and have Dr. Comstock “or one of their own numerous experts” identify the articles as authoritative.18 The second expert was theirs for the asking. What was missing was a question put to a witness.
A cross-examiner whose own expert has not yet testified has a way to proceed. If the cross-examiner wishes to use a treatise on an expert who will not vouch for it, the proponent can ask to introduce it subject to her own witness later testifying to its reliability.19 That accommodation fits the order of a trial, since the opposing expert is on the stand now and the cross-examiner’s expert may not appear for days. It also carries a duty: the promise is kept only when the later witness is actually asked the question. Lawyers make the same kind of promise in other settings. In an illustrative colloquy over a recovered pistol, a prosecutor answers a foundation objection by pointing to ballistics and fingerprint testimony still to come.20
The dependable method, then, is a second qualified expert who has been asked directly whether the work is recognized as authoritative. Judicial notice, the rule’s third route, remains available but rare, and the witness who would inform the court may well moot the need for it.21
Judicial Notice
The last clause of subsection (B) names the third route, “by judicial notice.”23 Under it, the court accepts without proof from either side that professionals in the field regard the work as trustworthy. Because the three routes are alternatives, a court that takes notice has satisfied subsection (B) without any witness vouching for the book. The route exists because a few works are so widely recognized that asking a witness to confirm their standing would be an empty exercise.
The route is rare, and the reason lies in what the court would have to know. To the extent a work is indisputably authoritative, Rule 803(18) lets the court take judicial notice of that fact, with Rule 201 supplying the general machinery.24 The clearest cases are a work adopted by medical schools as a required text and a work written by a renowned authority. The difficulty is that the court must somehow be sure of the author’s reputation or of how many schools use the text. A witness might be necessary to inform the court, and that testimony might well moot the need for notice.25 The witness who could tell the court how widely a book is used is an expert, and that expert can simply be asked whether the work is authoritative, which already satisfies the expert-testimony route. A proponent who must call a witness anyway gains nothing by routing the showing through notice.
Because notice does not depend on the challenged expert, it can in theory answer that expert’s refusal. Some courts permitted use of such material to impeach without regard to whether the witness relied on or acknowledged its authority, if the cross-examiner established or the court judicially noticed the general authority of the material.26 A work that a qualified expert has just disowned is hard to call indisputable, however, which is why an expert’s refusal usually sends the proponent to a second expert and not to the judge.
Even a successful request for notice answers only subsection (B). The sponsorship condition in subsection (A) remains, so the passage must still have been called to a testifying expert’s attention on cross-examination or relied on by an expert on direct.27 A work’s fame therefore supports at most the reliability condition, and it says nothing yet about sponsorship.28