Concept
The Trustworthiness Clause
Public records and reports
The Trustworthiness Clause
The three clauses of Rule 803(8)(A) sort public records by what they record, and each clause is generous. Public records are presumed reliable because the officials who prepare them act under a public duty.1 That presumption describes officials as a class, and it says nothing about this report, written by this investigator from this information. The investigator may have lacked the training for the subject, the information may have come from a source with reason to shade it, or the report may have been drafted with a lawsuit in view. Subsection (A) screens for none of those problems. Subsection (B) does: the exception applies only if "the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness."2
Because subsection (B) stands apart from the list in (A), it reaches every kind of record. In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, the Court identified the trustworthiness inquiry, and not an arbitrary line between fact and opinion, as the Advisory Committee's primary safeguard against unreliable evidence. The inquiry applies to every element of a report, so a judge has discretion, and indeed the obligation, to exclude an entire report or portions of it, whether narrow factual statements or broader conclusions, that she finds untrustworthy.3 The rules on relevance and prejudice give the court further means of scrutiny, and the opponent keeps the right to present evidence that contradicts or diminishes the weight of a report's conclusions.4 That division of labor makes a generous reading of subsection (A) workable: the exception admits first, and the clause supplies the means of exclusion afterward.
Two questions follow. Who must make a showing under subsection (B)? And what does a court look at in deciding whether the showing succeeds? The burden comes first.
Burden on the Opponent
The text of subsection (B) sets a sequence. The proponent goes first and need only place the record within a clause of subsection (A). Once the record facially satisfies the rule, the burden shifts to the opponent to demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness.5 A proponent whose record fits a clause therefore does not prove reliability, and the court asks only whether the opponent has made a showing. A bare claim that the report might be unreliable makes none.
The presumption behind the exception explains the allocation. Public records are presumed reliable because of the public duty of those who prepare them, which distinguishes them from business records, whose foundation is regularity, and subsection (B) parallels the trustworthiness provision in Rule 803(6).6 Reasons to distrust a record are also particular to that record, such as a bribe paid to its author or a method that could not support its conclusion, and the party resisting the record is the one with every reason to look for them.
The reach of the clause was once less certain. Earlier readings had to stretch the proviso to cover all three kinds of record, but the separately numbered subsection now extends the trustworthiness requirement to every category in (A), and it is no longer arguable that trustworthiness applies to only part of the rule.7 The 2014 amendment then made explicit that a record satisfying the specific requirements of (A) faces its trustworthiness challenge from an objecting party, who bears the burden to show that the sources of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.8
In civil cases the clause also reduces the importance of classification. It matters little under which subdivision a public report falls. The question is essentially whether there are substantial indications that the report is untrustworthy, and if there are none, the report is admissible without any further debate over the subdivision.9
Carrying the burden is an uphill fight. In United States v. School District of Ferndale, a school board resisted an agency finding of discrimination by pointing to gaps in the agency hearing: no subpoena power, no discovery, and no hearing-examiner expertise. The Sixth Circuit treated all of these as matters of weight that did not bar admission.10 The board described what the agency's process lacked and showed nothing about the information behind the finding. A showing has to reach the information itself or the circumstances in which the report was made.
Factors Courts Weigh
Subsection (B) tells a court what to decide and not how to decide it. The Advisory Committee filled the gap with four factors that may help in passing on a report: the timeliness of the investigation, the special skill or experience of the official, whether a hearing was held and the level at which it was conducted, and possible motivation problems, which the Committee drew from Palmer v. Hoffman and described as possible bias when a report is prepared with a view to litigation.13 The Committee added that others could be listed, and the Court in Beech Aircraft later called the four a nonexclusive list.14
The guidance comes as prompts instead of a test because the exception admits first. The Committee judged it impossible to give appropriate weight to every factor in every situation, so the rule assumes admissibility and leaves ample room for escape if enough negative factors appear.15 A record therefore need not satisfy every factor, and the opponent carries the burden of building the case for exclusion.16 A student who treats the four factors as elements the proponent must prove has reversed the allocation. Each factor names a specific way an official's conclusion can go wrong:
- Timeliness asks whether the investigation began while the evidence was fresh.
- Skill or experience asks whether the investigator was equipped for the subject at hand.
- The hearing factor asks whether the agency held one and at what level, which reflects how much scrutiny the finding received.
- Motivation asks whether the investigator had a stake in the result or prepared the report with litigation in view.
Because the list invites additions, an opponent may point in an appropriate case to a report that is overly broad, conclusory, or unsubstantiated; to a misleading difference between the issue the agency decided and the issue in the present case, or to terms used in a confusingly different sense; to the lack of a thorough investigation or hearing, or of any chance to confront the evidence; to the ex parte character of the agency's proceeding; to the undue authority a government pronouncement may carry; and to the agency's own interest.17 Other proposed considerations include the extent to which a record underlies the findings, the extent to which the findings express a policy judgment instead of a factual adjudication, the extent to which they rest on findings by other bodies that may be suspect, and, where they rest on expert opinion, whether the facts or data behind the opinion are reasonably relied on by experts in the field.18 The agency's interest does not by itself keep a report out. In S.E.C. v. General Refractories, the SEC staff's investigative findings of securities violations were admitted on the SEC's behalf against the defendant to help prove those violations, although the Uniform Rules took the opposite course by amendment.19
In Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), the factors lined up for the proponent. Sgt. John Hendrickson, a twenty-eight-year veteran of the Ohio State Highway Patrol and assistant post commander, was on duty when the accident occurred and went directly to the scene, arriving about six minutes after the collision.20 The court admitted his factual finding even though no hearing preceded it, because of the timeliness of the investigation, the investigator's skill, and the absence of bad motivational factors.21 Three strong factors carried a record that lacked the fourth.
The skill factor can also work against a report, as Fraley v. Rockwell International Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D. Ohio 1979), shows. A Navy JAG report on the causes of an airplane accident was held inadmissible there because an inexperienced investigator prepared it in a highly complex field.22 In Beech Aircraft itself, the district court found the JAG report trustworthy, and because no party challenged that finding the Supreme Court expressed no opinion on it.23 Each investigator in these two cases wrote an official conclusion about what caused an accident, and they differ only in the match between investigator and subject. The Baker sergeant brought long experience to a question within it, and the Fraley investigator brought too little experience to a question that demanded a great deal. Skill is therefore a matter of fit: a modest background may suffice for a simple matter and fall short for a complex one.
Reports can also fail because of what they are, whoever wrote them. In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1989), governmental reports on airline computerized reservation systems were excluded as untrustworthy because they did not reflect the real concerns of the business world and were interim or inconclusive in nature.24 The commentary states the same requirement from the other side: the statement must be an agency's conclusion rather than a mere accumulation of information, and it must not be an interim or preliminary document.25 The Ferndale complaints differ because they concern the procedures behind a finding the agency had reached, and the reservation-system reports were excluded for the quality of the documents themselves.
The remaining question is how far an attack on the investigator's informants can go. One court of appeals admitted an international agency's report on the shoot-down of a commercial plane over a defense claim that the report rested on the Russian version of an intercept.26 In Moss v. Ole South Real Estate, Inc., 933 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit held that a magistrate overstepped by weighing the credibility of a report's information sources, because a court should focus on the manner or methodology of the report. The same court allowed that a report lacking a reasonable basis may be excluded, and it declined to say that the bias of sources can never make a report unreliable.27 A report that repeats what outsiders told the investigator raises a separate question, because Rule 805 admits hearsay within hearsay only if each part of the combined statement conforms with an exception.28 That layer is distinct from the trustworthiness inquiry and is taken up below under statements inside public records.
Courts keep their attention on method because a judge deciding admissibility cannot sort out which informants told the truth without trying the underlying dispute, and the exception exists to avoid rebuilding an investigation in the courtroom. The opponent still has a remedy for the first attack in the right to present evidence tending to contradict or diminish the weight of the report's conclusions.29 The judge screens out reports that were built badly, and the jury weighs everything else along with the opponent's challenges to it.