Concept
Special Record Types
Business records
Special Record Types
Rule 803(6) admits “a record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis,” and the phrase ties the exception to no particular medium and no particular kind of enterprise.1 Three kinds of record press that breadth hardest: a record that states an opinion or diagnosis, a hospital chart built from many hands, and data held on a computer. None needs a new exception. Each calls for the same conditions, applied with attention to the point where they strain.
The rule stretches this far because its justification lies in the process that produces the record. People with knowledge report facts as part of their jobs, the enterprise depends on the result, and nobody writes with a dispute in view. That routine can exist in a surgeon's operative report or a computer log as readily as in a merchant's ledger. Every record type must therefore satisfy the foundation conditions of subsections (A) through (D): the information came from someone with knowledge and was recorded at or near the time,2 a regularly conducted activity kept the record,3 making it was a regular practice of that activity,4 and a custodian, another qualified witness, or a proper certification vouches for all of that.5 The opponent may then invoke the trustworthiness clause of subsection (E), which lets the opponent show that the source of the information or the circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness, whatever the form of the record.6
What differs from one record type to the next is where that analysis comes under strain. A record that states an opinion or diagnosis strains the knowledge element and the trustworthiness clause, because a conclusion is only as reliable as the basis behind it. A hospital chart usually meets the foundation with ease, since the institution charts its work as a matter of routine, but its contents come from many people, some of them outside the hospital's routine, so the analysis of outsiders in the chain returns. A computer record tests the foundation witness, who must understand how the data are gathered, stored, and retrieved, and it tests the timing element, which looks to the original entry and not to a later printout. The opinion comes first, because the rule's text names it most directly.
Opinions and Diagnoses
Rule 803(6) opens by naming what it covers: a record of “an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis.”7 The last two words let a record state a conclusion as well as an observation. A chart that records a fractured wrist after the physician read an X-ray, or a prognosis for recovery, states an inference drawn from facts instead of a fact the writer perceived directly, and the rule treats it like any other entry once the foundation conditions are met. The Advisory Committee explained the choice. Opinions rarely appeared in traditional business records, which were purely factual, but they now commonly appear as medical diagnoses, prognoses, and test results, so the rule includes diagnoses and opinions alongside acts, events, and conditions as proper subjects of admissible entries.8
The change matters because older law pointed the other way. The federal statute that preceded the Rules reached a record of any “act, transaction, occurrence, or event” and said nothing of opinion or diagnosis.9 Many common-law decisions likewise refused to admit opinions in business records, and some state provisions, California's among them, still confine admissible business records to acts, events, and conditions.10 The concern behind the older limit is easy to see: a conclusion is only as good as the judgment behind it, and the writer is not in court to explain it. Rule 803(6) nonetheless rejects the blanket exclusion for a practical reason. Many modern records, medical ones above all, consist largely of professional judgments, so a rule that admitted only bare observations would strip them of what they exist to communicate. The exception's own reasoning reaches the opinion too. A physician charts a diagnosis because the job requires it, the hospital relies on the entry to decide treatment, and the entry is written before any dispute, the same routine features that support a record of a temperature reading.
That an opinion belongs to a category the exception can reach does not show that this opinion deserves belief. When an expert testifies live, the court can probe qualifications and the basis for the opinion, and the witness faces cross-examination. The author of a record is absent for all of that. The exception's routine vouches mainly that the writer actually reached and recorded the conclusion as part of the job, and it says much less about whether the writer was qualified or reasoned soundly. The court therefore keeps its other tools: the trustworthiness clause of Rule 803(6)(E), the balancing of probative value against its counterweights under Rule 403, and the standards for expert opinion under Rule 702, any of which can bar an ill-founded opinion or one from an unidentified or unqualified writer.11 Courts apply these tools with varying severity. Some decisions are extremely suspicious of nearly every conclusion, others admit them almost without limit, and others distinguish the more reliable kind, such as a diagnosis of a broken bone, from the more debatable kind, such as a statement that an injury may develop into cancer.12
An entry can fail on exactly this ground even when the hospital's routine is beyond question. Suppose a plaintiff claims that job-related stress and mistreatment caused “transient global amnesia,” and his hospital record, after a three-day stay, states that diagnosis. The record does not describe the infirmity, and it says nothing linking the amnesia to his work experiences. A court would likely hold the entry untrustworthy, because its cryptic nature leaves the particulars of the disease and its cause to sheer speculation and gives the doctor's conclusion no visible basis.13 The objection targets the entry's silence about its own basis, and diagnoses remain a covered category. The causal link the plaintiff needs appears nowhere in the chart, and a record cannot prove what it does not say. Petrocelli v. Gallison shows the same defect. A notation about a cut nerve was so cryptic that pure guesswork was needed to divine the source of the information, so the trial court could doubt that the doctors who recorded it were rendering professional judgments, and it acted within its discretion in refusing to admit the notation as a business-record “opinion or diagnosis.”14
This entry and the amnesia entry both record a physician's conclusion in a hospital's ordinary work, so those shared features cannot explain why one comes in and the other likely stays out. The fracture entry shows a basis the court can see, while the amnesia entry offers a label with nothing behind it. A fracture read from an X-ray sits at the reliable end of the range, and a recorded statement about what caused a condition, or what it may become, sits closer to the debated end, where the court needs to see more before it accepts the writer's judgment.15
A bar-exam stem that quotes a diagnosis from a chart usually asks two things at once. The first is whether the exception reaches opinions at all. It does, so an objection that opinions are not business records fails. The second decides the stem: whether this opinion comes with a visible basis from a writer of apparent competence, and whether any remaining objection under the trustworthiness clause or Rules 403 and 702 has force. The next section takes up hospital records, where such opinions share a page with statements by patients and relatives and raise the outsider problem again.
Hospital Records
A hospital chart is tested under Rule 803(6) like any other regularly kept record. The rule reaches a record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis kept in a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not it operates for profit.17 The final clause matters here, because many hospitals are charities and a very few jurisdictions deny business status to a not-for-profit organization. The federal rule has no such restriction.18
The foundation is easy because of what a hospital does. Its business is diagnosis and treatment, so charting the facts that bear on them is part of the work: nurses record temperature and vital signs on a schedule, physicians record findings and orders, and the staff relies on the chart to decide what to do next. Reliance, a duty of accuracy, and entry before any dispute carry the exception generally, and a hospital chart displays all three. Some decisions ask whether an entry was routine or regular, but the question has force only for a non-repetitive, unusual entry, and courts usually relax the requirement to cover any health matter.19
Content is where the difficulty lies, because a chart is a composite and each line rests on a different person. Lines that report what staff observed, did, or concluded fit comfortably, since nurses and physicians pass information to the record-keeper as part of the hospital's routine, which supplies the “someone with knowledge” the rule describes.20 Opinions and diagnoses ride along under the rule's own wording, subject to the limits from the preceding section. A conclusion with no visible source still draws the trustworthiness objection, as the cut-nerve notation did in Petrocelli v. Gallison, where the court could not tell whether the notation reflected the doctors' own judgment or information supplied by the patient or his spouse.21
Statements by a patient or a family member present the outsider problem developed earlier in this chapter. A patient who relates personal history takes no part in the hospital's routine, so the chart's regularity does not vouch for what the patient said. The entry proves that the statement was made, and the statement comes in for its truth only if it independently fits another exception. The usual second layer is the exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment, under which a statement of medical history, symptoms, or the inception or general character of the cause comes in if it is reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.22 In Merrow v. Bofferding, the Michigan Supreme Court admitted a doctor's record that the plaintiff was hurt when his arm “went through the window,” an entry that presumably reflects the plaintiff's own account, and it illustrates how a patient's recorded description of the injury can come in.23
The same fact, whether a detail bears on diagnosis or treatment, therefore controls two separate questions. A hospital's regular course is diagnosing and treating, so a detail connected to treatment is something its routine produces and relies on. A detail with no such connection is not something the routine ensures was accurately recorded, which is why extraneous information unrelated to diagnosis or treatment can create a problem.24 A patient's statement of that unrelated detail also fails the pertinence test for the medical exception. A germane statement clears both layers, and a non-germane one fails both.
All three entries sit on one page, were written under one routine, and may have come from the same hand. Their connection to treatment alone decided each outcome, and it decided it at both layers.
The tempting error on an exam is to admit the whole chart at once because a hospital is an obvious regular enterprise. That answer tests only the record layer and leaves every outsider's remark and every unrelated detail unexamined.
Computer and Electronic Records
Almost every record discussed so far, from ledgers to hospital charts, now begins life as stored data, yet Rule 803(6) needs no special provision to reach it, because the rule admits “a record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis” and says nothing about the medium.26 The vocabulary changed over time. The earlier text covered a “data compilation, in any form,” language aimed at computer storage, and the current text says simply “record.”27 The Advisory Committee explained that the older phrase meant any means of storing information other than conventional words and figures, electronic computer storage included but not exclusive.28 The Rules' general definitions agree: a reference to written material or any other medium includes electronically stored information.29
An electronic record therefore meets the same conditions as a paper one, and digital evidence is admissible whenever hardcopy evidence of the same type would be.30 A spreadsheet recording layoffs, offered to prove their timing and extent, comes in on a showing that it is a regular recording of a regularly conducted activity.31 The reliability theory is unchanged: the enterprise relies on regularly kept records, whether the entries were made with a quill or a keyboard.32 What changes is the method of proof. A paper ledger can be inspected and its keeping traced step by step, but stored data cannot be inspected until it appears in a printout.33 The foundation witness must therefore explain how the data are gathered, stored, and retrieved, and sometimes something about the software that manages them.34
Computers add human factors. Programming and software development afford more frequent chances for error than a clerk's pen, and the accuracy and security of the data can be questioned. Courts nonetheless impose no rigid requirements. The trend is against requiring the proponent to call the programmer, and in the typical case the proponent need not show periodic testing for programming errors or eliminate every possibility of altered data or errors in data entry or programming.35 The Seventh Circuit applied that approach in United States v. Briscoe, holding that regular testing of a computer for internal programming errors is not a prerequisite to admitting its records.36
A rule demanding expert proof of mechanical perfection would turn the routine foundation for every ledger into a technical trial, and it would hold electronic records to a standard that paper records never had to meet. Reliance by the organization offers a workable substitute, because an enterprise that runs its billing or inventory from a system has its own reason to notice and correct one that keeps producing wrong figures. That reliance may by itself supply enough indication of reliability, absent a realistic challenge.37 The qualifier matters. When the opponent raises a legitimate question about how a program operates, the proponent may have to show that it produces reliable results,38 and the trustworthiness clause remains available to an opponent who can point to a problem with the source of information or the method of preparation.39 The foundation can also fail at the thin end. In In re Vinhee, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed a refusal to admit computer records because the plaintiff's witness knew little about the software or hardware, the plaintiff did not cure that gap, and no testimony showed that the plaintiff conducted its operations in reliance on the computer's accuracy in retaining and retrieving the information.40
Printouts raise a different puzzle. Read literally, Rule 803(6) asks whether the item offered was made at or near the time of the event, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, and made as a regular practice, and a printout ordered for trial seems to fail all three, especially if it sorts, compiles, or selects.41 Most courts resolve the puzzle by treating the data in the database as the document that must satisfy the rule and an accurate printout as its alter ego: the regularity inquiry looks to the information in the computer, and the timing inquiry looks to when it was entered. Some disagreement remains.42 The people who entered the data did so near the time of each transaction, as part of their jobs, before any dispute, and the later act of printing adds no new assertion that needs a guarantee of its own. Data published on a website keeps its business-record character in the same way, even when the copy offered was printed for litigation.43
Two decisions mark the line between that scene and a printout built for an investigation. In United States v. Sanders, the Fifth Circuit allowed printouts generated in preparation for litigation to come in as business records because the program performed no special operation on the data and returned it exactly as it had been routinely entered. In United States v. Blackburn, the Seventh Circuit excluded printouts created at the F.B.I.'s request as not kept in the regular course of business, although it admitted them under the catch-all exception, which requires trustworthiness.44 Selecting data for a case invites a charge of cherry-picking, but most litigation requires choosing relevant data from a broader database, so a printout made fairly and accurately from a database that itself meets the rule's requirements should raise little concern.45 A stem that stresses a printout was run after suit was filed is therefore asking whether the printing changed the data, and the date of printing alone does not defeat the exception.
A written certification can lay the foundation in place of a live witness. Rule 803(6)(D) allows the foundation facts to be shown by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12).46 That works like other self-authenticating writings, which a court accepts for what they purport to be without an authenticating witness.47 The opponent must receive notice and the records themselves for verification and possible challenge, and courts expect the signer to show familiarity with how the records are created and maintained instead of reciting the rule's words. In United States v. Hassan, screen shots of Facebook posts and YouTube videos were admitted with certificates from Facebook and Google custodians verifying that the pages and videos had been maintained as business records in the course of regularly conducted activity.48 Such a certificate speaks to how the platform keeps its data. Whether what a user posted is true is a separate question: the act of entering or posting a statement is its own level of hearsay and must satisfy its own exception when the content is offered for its truth.49
Posted material follows the same two steps. A witness who viewed a site can describe what appeared, and doing so raises no hearsay problem until someone offers the content to prove its truth.50 A document that a business or government office publishes on its own site in the ordinary course can satisfy Rule 803(6) or 803(8) when the traditional criteria are met.51
Not every electronic message is a business record, and the tempting error is to assume that anything issuing from a business is one. An email does not qualify merely because it comes from a business or its employee. Many are one-time and non-routine, are not written under the author's assigned duties, or are personal.52 In United States v. Ferber, the government offered a multi-paragraph email from a subordinate to a superior describing a telephone call with the defendant, who was not a coworker and who had incriminated himself in the call. The district court rejected the email under the exception. Even if the employee routinely wrote such emails, nothing showed that the employer required records of that type to be made and maintained, and a document needs some evidence of a business duty to make and regularly maintain records of its type.53 Ferber stands opposite the sales database. Both are electronic and both came from a business, but a routine the company maintains and relies on produced the sales entries, while one employee's habit of reporting a call produced the email. The email also repeated an outsider's words, a second problem, because each layer of hearsay must satisfy an exception on its own.54