Concept
Palmer v. Hoffman: Regular Practice Is Not Enough
Business records
Palmer v. Hoffman: Regular Practice Is Not Enough
Regular preparation does not, by itself, bring a record within the business-records exception. Palmer v. Hoffman, the classic limit on the exception, makes the point. The Supreme Court decided it under an earlier federal statute, not the Federal Rules of Evidence, and held that a railroad could not offer its engineer's statement about an accident as a business record. The railroad had offered to prove that taking such statements was its regular practice, and the Court excluded the statement anyway, because it was calculated for use in court, not in running the railroad. A writing can be made routinely by someone who knows the facts and still look nothing like the payroll or the ledger that the exception exists to admit.
The Act at issue made a writing or record admissible as evidence of an act, transaction, occurrence, or event if it appeared that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of that business to make such a record at the time of the event or within a reasonable time afterward.1 After the collision, the railroad's engineer signed a statement giving his account of it, and he died before trial. The railroad offered to prove, in the Act's own language, that the statement was signed in the regular course of business and that making such a statement was the regular course of that business. The trial court sustained the objection to the statement, and the Supreme Court held it inadmissible.2
The Court started from what a railroad's records are for. A railroad, like any enterprise, keeps numerous books and records that are essential to its conduct or useful in its efficient operation. The business world treated such records as reliable for major decisions, yet the hearsay rule hedged their use in litigation and greatly increased the time and cost of proof when many people had made them. That problem started the movement toward the legislation the Act embodies.3
The engineer's statement fell into “quite a different category.” It was not a record made for the systematic conduct of the business as a business. An accident report may give management information on which to act, but it is not typical of entries made systematically or as a matter of routine to record events, to reflect transactions with others, or to provide internal controls.4 Payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, and bills of lading serve the business. The engineer's reports, by contrast, were “calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business,” and their “primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading.”5
The offer of proof did not save the statement. Paying tort claims caused by employees' negligence is a common part of conducting a business, but that does not make a report about one accident a record of the business's systematic conduct.6 If regularity of preparation were enough, it “would become the test rather than the character of the records and their earmarks of reliability.”7 On that test, any enterprise could qualify its own account of an event simply by adopting a routine for producing one.
The Act's weight provision gave the railroad no help either. The Act said that the circumstances of making a record should affect its weight, not its admissibility, but that provision comes into play only when the Act's other requirements are met.8 The Court tied “regular course” to the business itself: the phrase “must find its meaning in the inherent nature of the business in question and in the methods systematically employed for the conduct of the business as a business.”9
Holding the railroad constant shows how the test works. The same railroad that could not offer its engineer's statement could offer its payroll records to prove wages or a bill of lading to prove a shipment, because those records are made systematically to run the railroad.10 The proponent is the same in both cases, and only the character of the record changes the result. The question in a Palmer problem is therefore never who offers the record. It is what the writing was made for.
Palmer drew a dissent that still frames the main objection to it. Judge Clark argued that its basis for exclusion proves too much: “I submit that there is hardly a grocer's account book which could not be excluded on that basis.”11 The line is hard to draw at the edges, because a record made with litigation in view can still be routine for the business that makes it. A physician's evaluation report of a personal injury litigant, for example, would appear to be in the routine of his business.12
Under the current rule, the concerns behind Palmer surface in two places instead of one categorical bar. The regular-practice condition asks whether making the record was a regular practice of the activity, which screens out the one-off writing.13 The trustworthiness clause lets the opponent defeat an otherwise qualified record by showing that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.14 Unlike the weight provision that failed the railroad, the clause operates on admissibility: when the opponent makes the showing, the record stays out of the exception.
Placing the concern in the trustworthiness clause lets a judge look at the particular record. A favorable record with a possible legal motive behind it is suspect when the business that prepared it offers it in litigation to support its own position. The same record may be more trustworthy when the opposing party offers it against that business, or when it belongs to a business that is not a party at all, such as a bank's record of a customer charged with an income tax violation.15 Some courts have fastened on the wording of the “regular practice” requirement and the intention of Congress behind it, but the general focus is on whether the basic concern of trustworthiness is met for non-routine records.16 The next section shows how that clause operates.