Concept
Outsiders in the Chain
Business records
Outsiders in the Chain
Rule 803(6) admits a record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis only when the record was made in a particular way.1 Someone with knowledge must have made it or transmitted the information in it, and it must have been kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity.2 Those conditions picture a chain of people doing their jobs: one employee perceives a fact, reports it because the work requires it, and another writes it down. The text says only “someone with knowledge,” however. It does not say whether that person must belong to the enterprise, and the answer matters whenever a record repeats what a stranger said. Courts generally hold that the stranger's words need a footing of their own, because the exception's assurances reach only people inside the routine.3
Those assurances come from the insiders. Each participant in an ordinary business chain acts routinely, under a duty of accuracy, with the employer relying on the result.4 A record that repeats a stranger's remark therefore holds two statements: the entrant's written assertion and the remark the entry reports. Each is hearsay if offered for its truth, so Rule 805 admits the whole only if each has its own exception or exemption.5 Rule 803(6) speaks for the first layer. It offers nothing for the second, because the stranger acts under no duty of accuracy and no employer relies on the result.
The question to put to any business record that repeats someone's words is therefore who first supplied the facts, and whether that person belonged to the business. If so, and everyone down the chain did too, Rule 803(6) can carry the whole chain.6 If not, the record proves that the outsider spoke, and the outsider's words need another basis. The first subsection below explains why the line falls where it does, and the second shows how to supply that basis.
The Business Duty Requirement
The person at the head of the chain needs two things: knowledge of the matter and a place in the enterprise's routine. The commentary on the rule states both when it says the rule requires “an informant with knowledge acting in the course of the regularly conducted activity.”7 A bystander who watched an event closely satisfies the first demand and fails the second, so a clear view does not carry the bystander's account into the exception.
The commentary's own illustration is a police report that incorporates what a bystander told the officer: the officer qualifies as acting in the regular course, and the informant does not.8 Johnson v. Lutz, the leading case, held a report prepared that way inadmissible, and most authorities have agreed.9 The New York court decided Johnson under New York's version of the Commonwealth Fund Act and excluded the officer's report to the extent it rested on a bystander's information and not on the officer's personal knowledge. Courts have generally followed that analysis under various formulations of the exception, including Rule 803(6).10
The report therefore splits into two layers. The officer's act of writing down what he heard is attended by official duty and regularity, the marks of a business record. The bystander's assertion has no such support.11 Unless her statement independently qualifies, as an excited utterance or a present sense impression for example, or is offered for something other than its truth, such as impeaching her testimony by an inconsistent statement, the evidence is inadmissible.12
The line falls at the bystander because of where the exception gets its reliability. When every participant, including the one who supplies the information, acts routinely under a duty of accuracy with the employer relying on the result, the guarantee runs the whole length of the chain. When the supplier does not act in the regular course, “an essential link is broken; the assurance of accuracy does not extend to the information itself, and the fact that it may be recorded with scrupulous accuracy is of no avail.”13 The officer's careful transcription proves that the bystander said the words. Whether the words are true depends on the bystander, who works under no duty of accuracy and for no employer relying on the result. A person outside the regular course thus breaks the trustworthiness chain just as a person without firsthand knowledge does.14
The text of Rule 803(6) never states this limit in terms, yet many cases exclude a record when the first person in the chain, the one with firsthand knowledge, is not part of the business.15 Firsthand knowledge answers only the knowledge requirement. It does not move a source inside the routine.
Outsiders are not limited to bystanders at accidents. In Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., a hospital record noted that the plaintiff's sister had told a social worker the plaintiff had been a habitual liar all her life. The Fifth Circuit treated the record as double hearsay. When the source and everyone else in the chain act in the regular course, Rule 803(6) covers the layers together; when the source is an outsider, the rule does not by itself admit the record, and the outsider's statement must fall within another exception.16 The sister and the bystander knew different things, one a lifetime of character and the other an event at an intersection, yet the analysis comes out the same. The defect lies in the source's position outside the routine, not in the quality of the source's information.
Commercial records raise the same problem. A customer who reports a product malfunction to a business that logs the complaint is an outsider, and Rule 803(6) alone cannot admit the log to prove the malfunction.17
The hypothetical shows why the analysis starts by tracing each entry to its source. A record that says “X told me Y” displays its second layer. A record that states Y flatly may hide it. Johnson excluded the report to the extent it rested on information the bystander supplied instead of the officer's own knowledge, so the working question is whether the entrant could have known Y firsthand.18
Losing the outsider's layer does not make the record worthless. The entry still shows, through the officer's routine, that the bystander made the statement. That suffices when the statement matters only because it was said, as when a party offers it to impeach the bystander's testimony by a prior inconsistent statement.19 Offered for its truth, the outsider's layer needs independent support.
Admitting Through a Second Exception
An outsider's statement inside a business record comes in for its truth only if it independently fits another exception or exemption. Rule 803(6) stands behind the record layer and leaves the outsider's layer bare, and Rule 805 settles the consequence: unless some exception or exemption “guarantees” each statement in the chain, the evidence is inadmissible.21 The record's routine reliability does not spread inward to the outsider's remark.
Each layer needs its own basis because each carries a different risk. The record layer asks whether the entrant faithfully wrote down what insiders reported, and the routine of duty and employer reliance addresses that risk.22 The outsider layer asks whether the outsider perceived accurately and spoke truthfully, and nothing in the enterprise's routine touches that question. The second layer must therefore come from a rule built for statements of that kind. Some such rules are exceptions. Others are exemptions: Rule 801(d)(2), for example, takes an agent's admission outside the hearsay definition altogether.23 Either kind can supply the outsider's layer.24
A police report shows both layers working in one document. An officer records a driver's damaging statement, and the driver later becomes a party. The driver's words qualify as an admission, and the report proves they were made. That the officer has no firsthand knowledge of whether the statement is correct is immaterial if recording that kind of information was the officer's responsibility.25 The officer's routine covers one layer and the party's admission covers the other. A bystander's remark in the same report has no second rule behind it.
Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski puts both layers in a single exhibit. An outside firm, Purcell, hired to monitor compliance with workplace rules, investigated a workplace dispute at Norcon. Bruce Ford prepared a report at the request of a Purcell staff member after speaking with people who worked for Norcon and for Purcell.26 The court admitted the report to prove what Norcon employees Stampley, Ruder, and Coyle and Purcell employee Flechsing had said. It invoked the business-records exception to admit the Ford report and the admissions doctrine to take those statements as proof of what they assert, that Posehn engaged in misconduct.27
The court found merit in the admissions argument. Coyle and Stampley were agents speaking while employed by Norcon, and as supervisors and safety employees they apparently had jobs that required them to report alcohol use and sexual harassment, especially in response to an employer-initiated investigation. Admitting the Ford memo was therefore not error.28
Taken apart, the exhibit has layers. Ford's memo is Purcell's record, and Flechsing, a Purcell employee, stood inside that routine. The Norcon employees did not, so the admissions doctrine supplied their layer. The note following the case asks whether either theory would suffice alone, and the layers show why neither does. Admissions reach only what Norcon's agents said and leave Ford's writing unsupported. The business-records exception reaches Ford's writing and Flechsing's words but cannot vouch for what Norcon's employees told him.29
The dealership's routine produced both orders the same way. What differs is the speaker: the customer's words, offered against her, are an admission, and the neighbor's words fit no rule.
The third step does the work. The second layer may be an admission, as in Norcon; it may be an excited utterance or a present sense impression; or it may be a statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment.30
Hospital charts show the same two steps with a different second layer. They commonly contain entries in the form of opinions, such as diagnoses, prognoses, and test results, and the rule expressly covers diagnoses and opinions alongside acts, events, and conditions.31 The record layer therefore rarely causes trouble. The difficulty lies in what patients and their families tell the staff.
The medical-diagnosis exception can supply the second layer. It covers a statement made for, and reasonably pertinent to, medical diagnosis or treatment, one that describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.32 In Zapata, the sister's remark to the social worker was a second level of hearsay that needed such a basis under Rule 805. The court reasoned that the remark might be background information pertinent to a psychiatrist's diagnosis, but it did not decide whether admitting the remark was error, because any error was harmless. The medical-diagnosis route is therefore a plausible theory the court left open, not a holding that relatives' statements in hospital charts are admissible.
Petrocelli v. Gallison shows what happens when no one names the second theory. The court there noted that the Petrocellis never argued, below or on appeal, that the references in the medical records derived from statements by Petrocelli or his wife to doctors at Massachusetts General Hospital and were therefore admissible as patient history. Courts do not ordinarily decide cases on theories never presented or argued, and the court declined to rest on this one.33 The lesson is practical: a party who needs a second-layer theory must raise it.
Pertinence is judged statement by statement, so one chart entry can carry a qualifying patient statement and a non-qualifying one side by side.
The same attention to the source carries into the neighboring rule on missing entries. Rule 803(7) lets a party use the absence of an entry to prove that a matter did not occur, if a record was regularly kept for matters of that kind, unless the opponent shows that “the possible source of the information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”34 A later section takes it up.