Concept
Using the Record at Trial
Past recollection recorded
Using the Record at Trial
Once the judge finds the foundation satisfied, two questions about trial use remain: how the jury meets the record, and which version of it the proponent must bring. The last sentence of Rule 803(5) answers the first. It lets the record be read into evidence but lets it be received as an exhibit only if an adverse party offers it.1 The original-writing rule, Rule 1002, answers the second, because records that satisfy the requirements of recorded recollection are subject to it.2 Neither answer reopens the foundation. Both govern what the proponent may do with a record that has already come in.
Read, Not Received
A proponent who has satisfied every foundation condition still cannot hand the jury the paper. Rule 803(5) permits two forms of presentation and gives the proponent only one: the record may be read into evidence, but it may be received as an exhibit only if an adverse party offers it.3 Reading is an oral event, so the jury hears the contents once, in open court, as it hears every witness. An exhibit, by contrast, is a document the jurors may be allowed to carry into their deliberations.
The limit follows from what a recorded recollection is: a substitute for oral testimony that is no better than that testimony and, in many instances, not as good.4 Jurors hear testimony aloud and afterward hold it only in memory. A document in the jury room would stay whole on the table, might appear more weighty than the oral testimony of the other witnesses, and might draw more of the jury's attention than its memory of that testimony does.5 The provision is designed to keep the record from going to the jury room during deliberation, which leaves the recorded recollection on the same footing as the testimony it replaces.6
The adverse party decides whether the jury receives the paper. The exception allows the document to be treated as an exhibit at the opponent's option, and once it becomes an exhibit the jury may be allowed to have it during deliberations.7 The proponent cannot claim for the writing the extra attention that the exhibit form invites.
Nothing in the limit casts doubt on the exception itself. A defendant in Ohio argued that the state had not recognized 'past recollection recorded,' that the statement was hearsay, and that its admission denied him confrontation and cross-examination. The court held the statement properly admitted and found no constitutional violation.8 The confrontation objection returns later in this chapter, in the setting of police reports.
Two federal decisions show the limit at work against a proponent who goes too far. In one, the defendants called a police sergeant and introduced his accident report themselves. The court was convinced that the sergeant remembered basically what the report said, but it called the exhibit provision the more important obstacle: because the defendants had introduced the record, Rule 803(5) would not have made it admissible as an exhibit.9 In United States v. Marcantoni, the court noted that if Rule 803(5) was the sole basis of admissibility, the witness's notes themselves, as distinguished from a recital of them, should not have been received as an exhibit in the Government's case-in-chief.10 The two courts draw the line in the same place. Reciting the record is the permitted form and handing up the paper is the forbidden one, whether the proponent is a civil defendant or the Government.
Whether receiving the proponent's record as an exhibit is invariably reversible error is unsettled. One court of appeals observed that the defendant's objection had focused on the reading of the document to the jury. It expressed no opinion on whether receiving a past-recollection-recorded memorandum as an exhibit, when no adverse party offered it, would invariably be reversible error now that Rule 803(5) is effective, and it found no basis for reversing.11 That decision leaves the question open, so the objection actually made and the circumstances of the trial remain what matter.
The limit is a term of the exception, so it bites when the exception is the only basis for admission.12 In Wilson v. Key Tronic Corp., counsel offered the SNARL document as Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 after an agency official testified that he had refreshed his recollection of what he told Mrs. Wilson, and counsel called the document the best evidence of what he probably told her.13 The court said that if SNARL was admitted under the recorded-recollection exception, it should have been read into evidence in pertinent part rather than admitted in its entirety as an exhibit, unless offered by Key Tronic or the County. It added that evidence not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay.14 That reminder marks the escape route. A document that is admissible on some other ground, including a nonhearsay purpose, does not carry the exception's exhibit limit with it, because the limit belongs to the exception and not to the document.
Massachusetts reasons differently about the same problem. Bendett v. Bendett reasoned that a writing adopted by a witness might carry some inherent evidential weight apart from the adoption, and that neither party was entitled to have that weight thrown into the scale unless the writing was admissible on some other ground.15 That is the federal rule's worry about weight, put as a thumb on the scale. Fisher v. Swartz then observed that when a memorandum of past recollection is put in evidence, the witness will usually have read its contents to the court or jury already, so admitting the writing adds little or nothing and would generally be treated as harmless error. The court preferred a 'less squeamish approach': rather than call the admission error that does no harm, it would say there is no error at all.16
Fisher stopped short of automatic admission. It recognized that the writing's probative value might be outweighed by the risk of substantial danger of undue prejudice or of misleading the jury, and it said that in such a case the trial judge, exercising sound discretion, might be justified in excluding the writing.17 Massachusetts thus controls the danger case by case, while Rule 803(5) controls it by text.18 Because Fisher is a state decision, the text of the rule governs a federal problem.
Originals and Recordings
A recorded recollection raises two questions of form that the foundation conditions leave open: which version of the writing the proponent must produce, and what counts as a record. The first has a definite answer, because records that satisfy the requirements of recorded recollection are subject to the original-writing rule, Rule 1002.20 The second turns on how broadly the word record reads, and Rule 803(5), which speaks only of a record, does not define it.21
The preference for originals comes from what the exception does with the writing. A recorded recollection is itself the evidence: the witness has lost the memory, so the jury learns the facts only from the words on the page. When the words are the proof, an exact version matters, and every copying adds a chance of error. The court said as much in Dayan v. McDonald's Corp.: the original contemporaneous memorandum is preferable to a copy because inaccuracies may occur in the transcription process.22 Freshness and accuracy, moreover, are tested against the writing the witness made or approved, so a retyped version carries no assurance from the witness about the retyping.
The preference yields when the original is gone. Dayan recognized that where the original memorandum is unavailable, a transcribed copy setting forth the observations originally recorded may be admitted if the offered document is sufficiently reliable. The reports offered as past recollection recorded were, for the most part, limited to numerical findings (equipment temperatures, product holding times, cooking times) copied directly from the inspectors' field notes, and the field notes had been destroyed.23 The court admitted the reports even though they were essentially copies, for four reasons. The inspectors recorded their observations precisely when they made them. The reports were prepared shortly after the inspections, directly from the notes, and contained the same observations. The notes' absence was explained by custom and not by fraud or mischief. And the reports were the best evidence available of the numerical observations.24 The court treated any error in admitting nonnumerical data as harmless, because the inspectors had also testified to those matters from present recollection refreshed by the reports and photographs, subject to cross-examination.25
The officer's notebook and the inspectors' field notes differ on the one point that decides: whether the original could still be had and, if not, why. Both writers recorded promptly, so promptness cannot explain the different results. In Dayan the reports were the best evidence available because the notes had been lost for an innocent reason. The officer's typed summary is not, because the notebook is in a file down the hall.
The original-writing requirement applies only when the writing is the evidence, and Fisher v. Swartz shows where the line falls. The court inferred that the writing before it was a record of the witness's past recollection, treated as such by counsel and the trial judge. It found confirmation in three facts: the statement contained more than a hundred items, it was the memorandum from which the witness read, and the plaintiff tried to obtain the original.26 From that classification came the rule. The original is not necessary when a writing only revives present recollection, but it is necessary, if procurable, when the writing records past recollection.27
The contrast follows from what each kind of writing does at trial. A writing used to refresh is a trigger, so a carbon copy or a photocopy revives a memory as well as the original does, and the jury never sees the contents, because only the witness's resulting testimony is evidence. A writing offered as recorded recollection reaches the jury through its words, so those words have to be right. A fact pattern that mentions a carbon copy, a retyped list, or a clerk's summary therefore first asks whether the witness's memory came back.
The word record raises the second question, because a witness may have spoken into a voice-memo app instead of writing anything down. A recording would seem to be a record without too much of a stretch. Rule 101 defines record to include a memorandum, report, or data compilation, and it adds that a reference to any kind of written material or any other medium includes electronically stored information. The text is not entirely crystal clear on this particular question, but it helps, and a recorded oral memo is probably included in Rule 803(5).29
A recording of the witness's own voice also needs no separate approval. It does not make sense to require fresh-memory approval or adoption of a sound-recorded memo when the voice is the witness's and the witness vouches for its accuracy.30
The maker of the record need not be the witness. Delaware's comment to its counterpart of Rule 803 says that the rule should be read more broadly than its literal language, and that a recorded statement should qualify even if another party recorded it, so long as the statement appears to reflect the witness's prior knowledge.31
Automatic transcription adds a further question. If a witness dictates to a smartphone that converts speech to text, the transcription might be offered by bringing the phone to court or by a printout. The probable answer is that the witness need not have seen and approved the output while the matter was fresh, if the process is properly established.32 Whether the process was properly established, and which of the audio file, the transcript, or the printout counts as the original, are questions for the discussion of authentication and the original-document rule in chapter 11.