Concept
Foundation Requirements
Past recollection recorded
Foundation Requirements
Rule 803(5) sets out what the proponent of a recorded recollection must prove, and it does so in three clauses. Clause (A) requires a record on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately.1 Clause (B) requires that the witness made or adopted the record when the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory.2 Clause (C) requires that the record accurately reflect the witness’s knowledge, a condition the next section takes up.3 This section covers clauses (A) and (B), which together raise four questions. Did the witness once know the matter? Is the witness’s memory now inadequate? Was the record made while memory was fresh? Did the witness make or adopt it? A fifth question arises when two people share the work of observing and recording.
The proponent bears the burden on each point, because the proponent is the party asking for an exception to the hearsay rule.4 The judge, not the jury, decides whether the foundation is satisfied. The jury’s task begins afterward, when it decides how much weight an admitted record deserves.5 Admission therefore settles only that the record is likely to be accurate, and the opponent remains free to persuade the jury that the record is wrong.6
The rule does not say how the proponent proves the foundation. The Advisory Committee left the method of establishing initial knowledge, contemporaneity, and accuracy to the circumstances of each case.7 In the usual case the witness on the stand supplies most of the proof: what the witness knew, why memory has failed, and when and how the record was made. Other testimony can fill the gaps the witness cannot, as the discussion of two-person records shows.
Two consequences of admission belong to later sections. An admitted record may be read to the jury, but it may be received as an exhibit only if an adverse party offers it.8 One court, noting that the witness will usually have read the memorandum aloud before its admission, preferred to say that admitting the writing is no error at all rather than harmless error.9 The Advisory Committee Note on Rule 803(5) also records that courts accept the exception despite confrontation clause challenges.10
Prior Knowledge of the Matter
Rule 803(5)(A) opens by requiring a record “on a matter the witness once knew about.”11 Courts apply that language as a personal-knowledge requirement: the proponent must show that the witness once had personal knowledge of the matter.12 The Illinois appellate court in Dayan v. McDonald’s Corp. put it first among its four requirements, demanding that the witness have had firsthand knowledge of the event recorded.13 The knowledge must also have existed when it counted. The witness must have known the information when the witness made the record or accepted it as accurate.14
The requirement does real work. A recorded recollection replaces the witness’s memory, and the witness can answer for it only if the witness perceived the matter. A witness who saw, heard, or did the thing recorded can swear that the entry was accurate when made, and the opponent can cross-examine about how the entry came to exist. A witness who knows the matter only from someone else’s report has nothing to swear to except that the report was made. The record would then carry the unexamined account of the person who did perceive, and that person, the only one who could be questioned about the perception, would be absent. The exception would become a channel for second-hand information.
Dayan shows the pattern the condition looks for. The portions of the huissiers’ reports offered as past recollection recorded were, for the most part, numerical findings, such as equipment temperatures, holding times, and cooking times, copied directly from entries in the original field notes.15 The huissiers’ observations had been recorded at the moment they were made, so perception was followed at once by a record of it.16
The gap in the aisle five and six entries need not be fatal. If the assistant also testifies, swearing that the counts were made and called out accurately, and the manager swears that he recorded what he heard accurately, the two witnesses together can supply what neither supplies alone. The rule says little about such arrangements. The Advisory Committee Note accepts multiple-person involvement in observing and recording, and the commentary concedes that the rule is less clear on the point than might be desired.17 The last section of this unit works through how the testimony must fit together. A related question arises when the witness did not write the record but approved it, and the section on adopted records takes that up. In every version the first-hand-knowledge requirement stays. The variations only spread the knowing and the recording across more than one person.
Insufficient Present Memory
The second half of Rule 803(5)(A) asks about the present. The matter must be one the witness “now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately.”19 That test measures a degree of memory loss, and the degree is forgiving. Older formulations asked whether the witness retained any recollection apart from the record. Florida decisions before its evidence code, for example, emphasized that the witness “had no present recollection,” whereas the Florida statute now finds a sufficient foundation if the witness merely “now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately.”20 The federal rule works the same way. The proponent need not show that the witness lacks all independent recollection. It is enough that the witness cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately.21 A witness with no memory of the information qualifies, and so does a witness with only slight memory.22
The Advisory Committee Note explains why the test is framed this way. The principal controversy over the exception was whether to require impaired memory at all, and the Committee observed that if only the accuracy of the evidence mattered, impairment of the witness’s memory would add nothing to it.23 The guarantee of trustworthiness lies in the freshness of the record, and the failure of the witness’s memory does not add to it. What the memory condition does is confine the exception to witnesses whose live testimony falls short. A witness who can testify fully and accurately from memory has no need of a substitute and should testify. Because the authorities are divided on the requirement, a state-court question should be checked against local law.24
The court decides under Rule 104(a) whether the witness’s memory is impaired enough, and one recognized way to satisfy the requirement is to show that the record fails to refresh the witness’s recollection.25 A failed refresh is the usual proof because the judge cannot look into the witness’s mind and must rely on what the witness can be seen doing. Shown the writing, the witness says it brings nothing back. That answer is evidence on the impairment question and not a separate element, since the rule asks only whether the witness can recall well enough.26
United States v. Senak shows a failed refresh at work. The witness, Gilarski, testified that she could not remember any further conversation with Senak, and she was handed a two-page statement to refresh her recollection. After reading it, she said it did not refresh her memory of the conversations she had with Senak in 1968, and the government offered the statement as recorded recollection.27 The Seventh Circuit adopted a standard it found consistent with the modern concept of admitting relevant evidence, and it held that lack of present recollection was sufficiently shown.28 The defense had objected that she had recalled everything up to the point at which she had testified. The court answered that counsel could have cured the objection simply by making clear that he was asking about further conversations at a later time, which tells us that impairment is measured against what the witness is asked to supply.29
A witness with no independent memory of a routine task is the cleanest case. In United States v. Marshall, a chemist had no independent recollection of the results of the tests he performed. He acknowledged that his analyzed evidence report was accurate, and the report had been prepared contemporaneously with the tests, so the court of appeals upheld the district judge’s ruling that it was admissible as past recollection recorded.30
Partial memory does not defeat the exception. A witness who says, “I can’t remember exactly what they were, just that it was something about that,” keeps the gist and has lost the words.31 In Ohio v. Scott, the defendant argued that Ohio had not recognized past recollection recorded, that the statement was hearsay, and that its admission denied him confrontation. The Ohio Supreme Court held the statement properly admitted as past recollection recorded.32
The exception fails when memory is serviceable. In Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., the court found that a sergeant remembered basically what his report said, although he refreshed himself from it from time to time, and no testimony showed that he needed the report to testify fully and accurately. The court gave a second and, in its words, more important reason as well: a memorandum may not itself be received as an exhibit unless an adverse party offers it.33
Recanting witnesses present a different problem. Witnesses the proponent needs are not always friendly, and a direct examiner may have to call a hostile one.34 In Polite v. State, the Florida Supreme Court described a district court decision in which witnesses testified that they did remember the evening of the crime, and their testimony contradicted their earlier statements to law enforcement. The district court held that the State had failed to establish two critical threshold requirements of the recorded recollection exception.35 A witness who remembers the events and tells a different story has not run out of memory. The record would contradict that testimony and would not replace a memory that failed.
The hardest posture is the witness who refuses to testify. In Demby v. State, a witness named Lehman had given Detective Williams a videotaped statement about his conversations with Flonnory, and at trial he invoked the Fifth Amendment. The Superior Court reasoned that, because Lehman refused to testify, it could not be said that he had insufficient recollection.36 The Delaware Supreme Court observed that the videotape was an accurate record made when the conversations were fresh in Lehman’s mind, so the only missing predicate was insufficient recollection.37 It then noted the defense argument that the invocation was a legal bar to “recalling” the statements on the stand and said it was not necessary to decide that issue in the appeal.38 Demby raises the question and does not answer it, so it cannot be cited as a holding on Rule 803(5).
Record Made While Fresh
Rule 803(5)(B) adds a timing condition. The witness must have made or adopted the record “when the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory.”40 The rule tests the state of the witness’s memory at the moment of recording. It sets no deadline measured in days, and the difference matters because freshness is the source of the exception’s reliability. The Advisory Committee Note finds the guarantee of trustworthiness in the reliability inherent in a record made while events were still fresh in mind and accurately reflecting them.41
Freshness earns that trust by comparison with the alternative at trial. Senak records the point: statements made substantially nearer the event than the trial suffer less from errors of memory than testimony drawn from present recollection on the stand.42 Dayan drew the consequence. A record prepared at or near the time of the event, while the witness had a clear and accurate memory, carries enough circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that its reliability is seen to outweigh the weakness caused by the opponent’s limited ability to cross-examine.43 Senak also states the distinctive requirement precisely. The witness must have clearly and accurately remembered the knowledge at the time the witness made the writing or recognized that it was correct.44
Courts state the condition in two ways. The older formula asks whether the writing was made or recognized as correct “at or near the time” of the events, and the four-part test applied in Dayan uses it.45 The federal rule moves the question from the calendar to the mind. Senak took the flexible course. Although one decision suggested that the statement must be recorded contemporaneously, the court thought the better view was that the trial judge’s discretion should not be bound by an inflexible rule and should be exercised case by case, with attention to every pertinent circumstance, the lapse of time included, bearing on the likelihood that the statement accurately records the event.46 Time therefore remains evidence about memory. A short gap usually makes the showing easy, and a long gap makes it harder without ending the inquiry.
A failed foundation shows how the pieces interact. In Jim’s Excavating Service, Inc. v. HKM Associates, the offered letter did not meet the foundational requirements for three reasons. It was not written when the facts were fresh in Mishler’s memory, not all of its entries were made by him or under his direction, and he could not state that the entries accurately reflected his memory. The court held that the District Court did not err in refusing to admit the letter for lack of foundation.47 Freshness was one defect among three, and the defects overlap. A record that others helped write cannot show what the witness remembered while the matter was fresh.
Dayan supplies the passing side. The huissiers’ observations were recorded precisely when they were made, and the official reports were prepared shortly after the inspections directly from the original notes. The court admitted the numerical data in them.48
Senak shows how far a reviewing court may go the other way. The FBI statement there resulted from an interview some three years after the events it described. The defendant had not raised that objection at trial, so the court reviewed only for plain error and observed that the reference to the three-year gap should have triggered an objection then, and not for the first time on appeal.49 Senak therefore does not approve long gaps in general. It confirms that the trial judge decides on all the circumstances and that a party who stays silent about the gap will have difficulty complaining later. Other courts applying the same case-by-case approach have excluded evidence for reasons tied to the witness’s memory when the statement was given. In United States v. FMC Corp., grand jury testimony was excluded partly because the witness had memory lapses when he gave it.50 Freshness concerns the witness’s memory when the record was made, so a prompt record can still fail if the memory behind it was already unreliable.
The same timing question governs a record the witness did not write but approved, since freshness is then measured at the moment of approval, a point the next section develops. Freshness also leaves the accuracy condition untouched, because even a prompt record must correctly reflect what the witness knew.
Records Adopted by the Witness
Rule 803(5)(B) requires that the record have been “made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory.”52 The two verbs describe two routes to one result. A witness who wrote the record made it. A witness who did not write it can still qualify by adopting it, which means reading or hearing a record that someone else prepared and accepting it as a correct statement of what the witness knew. The timing clause attaches to whichever act the witness performed, so an approval, like a writing, must occur while the matter is fresh.
Adoption counts because of what makes the exception tolerable at all. A record may stand in for a failed memory when the witness can say, under oath, that it captured what the witness knew while that knowledge was fresh. Where the witness wrote every word, authorship supplies that assurance. Where someone else held the pen, the assurance has to come from review. Reading the finished text against fresh memory is the moment at which the witness compares the words to what the witness knows and accepts or corrects them. Without that moment, nobody with knowledge stands behind the content. Senak’s statement of the freshness requirement points the same way, since it measures memory at the time the witness made the writing or recognized that it was correct.53
Dictation shows adoption in its ordinary form. A transcription made by someone else can qualify at least if the witness approved or adopted it while the facts were still fresh, even if the original dictation was not the witness’s own.54 Senak shows why the timing of the review matters more than who held the pen. The defendant there objected that the government had not produced the FBI agent to testify that he took the witness’s statement down verbatim. The court treated such objections as a distraction from the real weak point, the three-year gap between the events and the interview, which the defendant had not raised at trial.55
An intermediary produces the opposite result when the witness cannot show approval of the final text. In Jim’s Excavating, the letter included entries that were not all made by Mishler or under his direction, and he could not state that the entries accurately reflected his memory. The court upheld its exclusion.56 Mishler could not claim authorship of all the entries, and he could not claim adoption either, because adoption requires the witness to vouch that the text reflects what the witness knew. The pathologist’s notes differ on exactly that point. She read the finished product soon after and approved it.
Some authorities read “made or adopted” more generously than the text suggests. The comment to the Delaware rule says that the rule should be read more broadly than its literal language, so that a recorded statement can qualify even if another party recorded it, provided it appears that the statement does in fact reflect the witness’s prior knowledge.57 The generous reading is easiest to defend for a record that preserves the witness’s own words. It does not make sense to require fresh-memory approval of a sound recording if it is the witness’s voice and the accuracy requirement is met.58 The comment’s own condition shows where the reading stops. A text that others wrote or edited, like Mishler’s letter, gains nothing from the broad reading unless the witness can say that the words are the witness’s own account. On a federal exam, apply the text of Rule 803(5)(B): the witness made the record, or reviewed it and approved it while the matter was fresh.
One variation remains unsettled. What if a witness statement is transcribed but not reviewed by the witness until after the memory loss occurred? Some states, California among them, provide for that situation expressly. The Federal Rules may allow such a statement if the transcriber testifies to the accuracy of the transcription, but that result is not certain.59 A different route to a similar result appears in the next section. Booz held that, even though the witness had not read the report, enough indications of accuracy existed to go to the jury if the recorder verified his transcription and the witness testified that he gave an accurate recollection to the recorder.60
Two-Person Records
Rule 803(5)(B) asks whether the record “was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory,” and the ordinary case answers that question with one person.62 A bystander who sees a getaway car’s license plate and promptly enters the number on a phone can take the stand and testify that the memory was fresh, that the entry accurately records what was seen, and that the number is now forgotten. One witness then supplies every condition. That witness stands behind each link, from perception to the decision to record to the accuracy of the writing. Many real records, however, come from two people. One sees an event and describes it aloud, and the other hears the description and writes it down. Neither person can satisfy the rule alone.
Each falls short for a different reason. The one who perceived never wrote the record and may never have read it, so that person neither made nor adopted it. The one who wrote it never perceived the matter and can vouch only for what was said aloud. The rule says nothing express about shared authorship, and the point is less clear than might be desired.63 The Advisory Committee Note states that multiple-person involvement in the process of observing and recording, as in Rathbun v. Brancatella, is entirely consistent with the exception.64
United States v. Booz shows how a court fills the gap. A witness named Kulp had given a number to FBI Agent Bass, who put it in a report. Kulp had not necessarily read the report, so the court could not rest on adoption alone.65 It found another basis in the way the record was made. Where a record is the joint product of one person who makes an oral statement and another who embodies it in a writing, the recollection may be admitted if both are available to testify to the accuracy with which each performed a role.66 On the facts, if Bass could verify the accuracy of his transcription and Kulp could testify that he had related an accurate recollection of the number to Bass, there were enough indications of accuracy to let the evidence go to the jury, even though Kulp may not have read the report.67
The reason for requiring both people lies in what each can know. The chain runs from perception to statement to writing. The observer is the only person who can say that the account given matched what was seen and was given while memory was fresh. The recorder is the only person who can say that the writing matches what was said. Neither can vouch for the other’s link, so each testifies to the accuracy of the function that person performed and is open to cross-examination on it. Together the two sets of answers reproduce, link by link, the protection a single witness provides. Booz added a safeguard for the jury. Because years had passed since Kulp reported to the FBI, the defendant on retrial would be entitled to an instruction that the jurors should cautiously consider how reliable the recollection deserves to be and give it no more weight than that degree dictates.68
An exam stem in which a security guard writes down a bystander’s description of a getaway car, and the bystander never takes the stand, asks what survives of the guard’s note. The guard can testify that he recorded the description accurately, and that testimony may satisfy the conditions for his own role. It vouches only for the hearing and the writing. The guard saw the car only through the bystander’s words, so he cannot say whether the plate number or any other detail was true, and the proponent offers the note to prove exactly that. The note therefore contains two out-of-court statements, one nested inside the other: the guard’s writing and, inside it, the bystander’s account. With the observer absent, the first link in the chain that Booz required is unvouched, and no one on the stand can be cross-examined about what the bystander perceived. The recorded-recollection exception cannot carry that inner layer, so the bystander’s statement needs a route of its own.
Two other exceptions often supply that route. A present sense impression is a statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.69 An excited utterance is a statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.70 Both turn on the circumstances in which the bystander spoke, not on whether the bystander testifies. Other exemptions can reach particular declarants too, such as the coconspirator exemption, whose traditional justification is the analogy between a business partnership and a conspiracy.71 If the bystander’s words qualify under one of these, the guard may testify to what he heard. If he cannot fully recall the words but testifies that he wrote them down accurately, his writing becomes his own recorded recollection of that statement.
The comparison with Booz turns on one fact: whether the observer is on the stand. Kulp could testify that the number he gave was accurate, so his statement needed no exception of its own, and the court built its rule on both people being available to testify to the accuracy with which each performed a role.72 A missing observer removes that testimony, and the only route left is an independent exception for the observer’s words. How a recorder who cannot recall the particular entry can still vouch for accuracy, by pointing to a settled routine of recording correctly, belongs to the discussion of proving accuracy that follows.