Concept
Medical Records and Layered Hearsay
Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment
Medical Records and Layered Hearsay
A patient's account of how an injury happened often reaches the jury inside a hospital chart, and the chart doubles the hearsay problem. The entry is one out-of-court statement, written by someone at the hospital. The patient's account, which the writer copied down, is a second. Each is offered for its truth, so each needs its own basis.
Rule 803(6) is the ordinary route for the first layer, because it reaches a record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis when its conditions are met.1 The version of the rule quoted in Petrocelli v. Gallison describes a record made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge. The record must be kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity that regularly makes such records, as shown by a custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.2 The question the rule puts to any entry is therefore who knew what the entry says.
A patient's statement inside the chart does not ride on that foundation. The Petrocelli court stated that Rule 803(6) does not provide a basis for admitting patient statements regarding medical history or prior treatment.3 Rule 803(4) is the exception built for that layer. It admits patient or family statements describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause of a condition, provided they are reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.4 In the rule's own terms, the statement must be made for, and be reasonably pertinent to, medical diagnosis or treatment.5 A footnote in the opinion states the combination directly: a hospital record that recites patient history must be qualified under Rule 803(6) for the record and Rule 803(4) for the history, and the footnote cites Rule 805 for putting the two together.6
The two exceptions answer different questions. Rule 803(6) asks whether the hospital kept its record in the regular course and whether the person behind the entry had knowledge. Rule 803(4) asks why the patient spoke and whether the statement mattered to treatment. A flawless foundation for the chart says nothing on the second question, which is why one exception cannot do both jobs.
Petrocelli shows what happens when an entry hides its source. The plaintiffs offered notations in hospital records saying that a nerve had been cut, and argued that the entries were the opinions or diagnoses of the physicians who wrote them. A surgical clinic report of October 28, a month after the earlier notation, was “even more cryptic.” It said only that Petrocelli was “still worried about pain from transected ilio femoral nerve,” and it did not indicate that the writer had investigated and agreed with the apparent assumption that the nerve had been transected.7 Without more conclusive contextual corroboration or qualifying testimony by the doctors themselves, the court said, it was “simply impossible to tell” whether the notations were the opinions or diagnoses of the reporting physicians. The district judge therefore acted within his discretion in refusing to admit them as business records reflecting medical opinions or diagnoses. The court stressed how narrow the holding was: the record was so cryptic that pure guesswork and speculation were needed to divine the source of the information.8
Two features of the case explain that deference. Admission under Rule 803(6) would have put the notations before the jury for their truth with no chance to cross-examine the physicians who made them. And the plaintiffs had tools to avoid the problem, since pretrial discovery let them depose the physicians or otherwise seek clarification, yet they offered no corroborating evidence or testimony that the notations were professional opinions.9
The trustworthiness condition points the same way. Under the rule's current phrasing, a record qualifies only if the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.10 The court observed in a footnote, without deciding the point, that the patent ambiguity about the true source of the information might supply that separate ground for exclusion. It added that a trial judge could also exclude such an entry under Rule 403. A jury handed an item so ambiguous as to its source has no clue how to weigh it beyond the fact that it sits in an official record, and admitting it “for what it was worth” would invite speculation about the weight of crucial statements.11
The court also identified a second route to the notations and did not take it. If Petrocelli or his spouse was the source of the cut-nerve information, Rule 803(4) offered a basis for admission, because it covers patient or family statements describing medical history, or the inception or general character of the cause of a condition, when they are reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.12 The plaintiffs had presented that theory neither to the district court nor to the appellate court, perhaps for strategic reasons. The court held that even had they sought admission under Rule 803(4), an exclusionary ruling on these facts would have been harmless error.13 Because no one raised the theory, the court did not decide whether the statements met the pertinence requirement.
The court also said what fairness would have required had the notations come in under Rule 803(4). On request, the judge should instruct the jury that the statements were admitted for their truth solely as matters related by the patient or a member of his family, not as professional opinion. Without that instruction, the jury could mistake the notations for the medical judgments of the two Massachusetts General Hospital doctors who wrote the entries, or of the hospital itself.14 The instruction matches the weight to the basis: the statement comes in as the patient's account, and no clinician has vouched for it.
The entries differ in one respect: whether they reveal their source. A reader knows which exception to test for the nurse's entry, and the physician's entry is plainly the physician's own judgment. The third line could be either, so neither exception can be matched to it.
Bar questions build this issue by handing over a hospital chart and asking whether it comes in. Calling it a business record answers only one layer, and the common error is to stop there when the entry repeats what a patient or relative said. The opposite error is to invoke Rule 803(4) for a patient's statement and forget that the chart holding it needs its own foundation. A third trap is an entry whose source is unclear, which the record's official label cannot save.
Step one does the work on which every later choice depends, because the source of the information decides which exception applies. A proponent who sees the problem coming can resolve it before trial by deposing the author or calling the physician, the clarification the Petrocelli plaintiffs never sought.