Concept
The Two-Part Test
Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment
The Two-Part Test
Rule 803(4)(A) admits a statement that “is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment.”1 The phrase reads like a single requirement, but courts treat it as two questions. In United States v. Iron Shell, the court began from the reasons the exception exists and drew a two-part test from them. First, is the declarant’s motive consistent with the purpose of the rule? Second, is it reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment?2 The case involved a young assault victim, Lucy, whose answers to her examining doctor were offered at trial, and the same two questions recur in the later decisions this section draws on.
The test has two parts because the court found two independent rationales behind the rule. One focuses on the patient. Diagnosis and treatment depend in part on what the patient says, so the patient has a strong motive to tell the truth, and that motive is thought to guarantee trustworthiness well enough to justify an exception to the hearsay rule.3 The other focuses on the information. The court quoted Weinstein and Berger: “a fact reliable enough to serve as the basis for a diagnosis is also reliable enough to escape hearsay proscription,” because physicians make life-and-death decisions in reliance on such facts. The court added that this rationale closely parallels the one behind Rule 703 and suggests a similar inquiry: whether the fact is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions.4
Because the rationales are independent, a statement can fail on either one. A patient who wants treatment and volunteers a detail no clinician would use in deciding what to do has the right motive but a detail a physician would not rely on. A statement that would be perfectly useful to a physician fails the other way if the declarant spoke for some reason other than getting care. The first subsection below takes up motive, and the second takes up the content of the statement.
Motive to Promote Treatment
The words “made for” medical diagnosis or treatment make the declarant’s purpose in speaking a condition of admission.5 Iron Shell treated that purpose as the first question: is the declarant’s motive consistent with the purpose of the rule? The purpose of the rule is the patient’s strong reason to tell the truth, since diagnosis or treatment will depend in part on what the patient says.6 That guarantee has a limit built into it. A speaker who was not trying to get care has no special stake in accuracy, and the reason for trusting the statement disappears. This prong therefore asks only why the declarant spoke. Whether a physician could use what was said is a separate question, taken up in the next subsection.
The declarant’s state of mind is something courts ordinarily infer rather than prove. One court put the standard in two steps: the declarant must subjectively believe the statement is being made to obtain diagnosis or treatment, and with most declarants that is a simple matter, because where a patient consults a physician the desire to seek and receive treatment may be inferred from the circumstances.7 The consultation itself is therefore the evidence, and the proponent need not call anyone to describe the patient’s thoughts each time an adult reports symptoms in an examining room. The Iron Shell court checked the record for facts pointing the other way and found none. Child declarants raise their own questions about motive, and a later section takes them up.
Iron Shell shows the inference at work. The examining doctor first asked Lucy what happened, and she did not answer. When he asked whether she was in pain, she pointed to the place that hurt. When he asked again what happened, she said she had been dragged into the bushes, and she then confirmed that the man had taken her clothes off.8 The defense argued that the question about her clothing came from an investigator rather than a doctor, and that the physician had been employed to qualify as an expert witness.9 The doctor himself testified that his purpose was two-fold: to treat Lucy and to preserve any evidence that was available.10 The court still found no facts suggesting that Lucy’s motive was other than that of a patient seeking treatment, and nothing in the content of her statements suggested she answered for any other reason. The court also noted that her statements concerned what happened rather than who assaulted her.11 The doctor’s second purpose changed nothing because this prong looks at the declarant. Lucy was answering a doctor’s questions about what happened and where it hurt, which is what a patient does, and the examiner’s added interest in preserving evidence does not alter why she spoke.
The objection fails on the motive prong. Rosa spoke to get care, and her interest in an accurate diagnosis operates whether or not the statement also helps her lawsuit. Statements made for diagnosis or treatment are admissible even if made after the action was filed.12 The orthopedist’s expectation that he may testify changes nothing, for the same reason the doctor’s evidence-preserving purpose changed nothing for Lucy: the prong asks why the declarant spoke. The exam trap is the label self-serving. A statement that favors the declarant still qualifies when it was made to obtain care, and only facts showing that the declarant was not seeking care would defeat the prong. Whether the orthopedist could rely on the content of her statement is the second question, which the next subsection addresses.
Reasonable Pertinence to Treatment
The second prong turns from the speaker to the words spoken. Rule 803(4)(A) admits a statement only if it is made for diagnosis or treatment and is “reasonably pertinent to” it,14 so a sincere wish for care does not settle the matter. It is not enough that the declarant intended to facilitate diagnosis or treatment; the statement must in fact be reasonably pertinent to it.15 Courts applying the Renville test phrase this step as whether the content of the statement is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis.16
This prong draws on the second rationale for the rule. Physicians make serious decisions in reliance on what patients tell them, and a fact that is reliable enough to support a diagnosis is reliable enough to escape the hearsay bar.17 A detail the physician has no use for gets no benefit from that reasoning, which is why pertinence marks the outer edge of the exception.
The defense in Iron Shell attacked pertinence from two directions. It argued that the question whether the man had taken Lucy’s clothes off was an investigator’s question rather than a doctor’s, and that the examination would have been the same whether or not the doctor received that information.18 The court’s answer began with the doctor’s testimony, given at length outside the jury’s presence. Dr. Hopkins explained that a discussion of the cause of the injury gave him guidelines for the examination, because it pinpointed areas of the body to examine more closely and let him narrow the examination by eliminating other areas.19 The question was a physician’s question because he had shown what it did for the examination.
The argument that the examination would have been identical failed on the doctor’s testimony too. He said the examination would have been basically the same but more lengthy without a description of the general cause. The court held that this did not make the discussion impertinent, because it is enough that the information eliminated potential physical problems. In the court’s words, “Discovering what is not injured is equally as pertinent to treatment and diagnosis as finding what is injured.”20 Information can therefore serve a physician’s work in two ways: by pointing toward an injury or by ruling one out. The defense’s remaining argument, that a doctor employed to testify deserves suspicion, is answered by the rule’s treatment of examining physicians, which a later section covers.21
Pertinence can still fail for a patient who plainly wants care. If a patient says he hit his head diving into a swimming pool that had no warning signs about which end was shallow, the opponent has a strong argument that the information about warnings is not closely enough related to the providing of medical care to fall within the policies behind the exception.22 The speaker’s motive was good, but one detail has no use to a clinician.
Both statements pass the motive prong, since the cyclist spoke to get care. Only the first passes the second prong, because the physician has explained what the information let her do. The second statement cannot be tied to the care and draws the objection. The two prongs therefore operate at different levels: motive attaches to the speaker, while pertinence is assessed statement by statement. A proponent also cannot rest on the physician’s having asked a question. The court in Iron Shell declined to hold that a doctor’s taking of information is prima facie evidence of pertinence, and it required a close examination of the facts and circumstances in each case.23
State cases applying counterpart rules show what a foundation looks like. In People v. Vigil, the Colorado court affirmed admission under CRE 803(4) on these facts: the child’s mother and a police officer took the child to the doctor for a diagnosis of whether the child had been sexually assaulted; the history of where the child was hurt was reasonably pertinent to diagnosing the cause of the bruising and redness; and the doctor relied on the statements in forming his opinion that the child had been hurt by a penis.24 A rape-kit case applying the Renville test supplied the same kind of support through the physician’s testimony. She explained that she takes a history so that she can properly collect specimens and provide appropriate care, and that she relied on the victim’s account, including the abuser’s identity, to decide how to treat.25 The role of identity in that testimony is a separate subject for a later section. What carries over from both cases is the method: the physician explained what the information let her do, and the court tied the statement to the care.
Step four does the work students most often skip. A physician’s testimony that history-taking mattered in general will not carry a detail the physician cannot tie to the care. A frequent error is to treat the medical setting as proof of pertinence: the cyclist’s account of how she landed and her remark about the bike lane were made in the same examining room, but only the first was connected to treatment.