Concept
The Memory and Belief Limit
Statements of mental, emotional, or physical condition
The Memory and Belief Limit
Rule 803(3) ends by taking back part of what it grants. It admits a statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind or emotional, sensory, or physical condition, but it excludes “a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed,” with one carve-out for a statement that relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will.1 Words that describe the speaker’s mind may prove that mind. They may not also prove the event the speaker remembers or the fact the speaker believes.
Simple examples show the line. “I hate him” and “I think she’s an undercover cop” describe what the speaker feels or believes, and a party may offer them to prove that feeling or belief.2 The same words may not prove that the hated man did something to earn the hatred, or that the woman really was an undercover cop. Any account of a past event can be restated as a present belief that the event happened, so a rule that let the belief prove the event would admit every narrative. Treating memory as proof of the past in that way would, in the treatise’s words, accomplish “the effective destruction of the hearsay rule, which generally excludes narratives of past events,” and it is rejected because of the hearsay risks and the lack of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.3
The limit is the counterweight to the Hillmon doctrine. Declarations of intention, “casting light upon the future,” are sharply distinguished from declarations of memory, “pointing backwards to the past.”4 A plan exists while the declarant speaks, and the jury is asked only to infer that the declarant carried it out. A memory reports an event that ended before the declarant spoke, and the jury is asked to take the declarant’s word that it happened.
The practical difficulty is that one sentence often does both jobs. Offered to show what the declarant felt or planned, the words fit the grant; offered to show the event behind the feeling or the fact a plan mentions, the same words meet the limit. Every problem in this section therefore starts with one question: which job does the proponent need the statement to do? Shepard supplies the pattern, and statements of fear, plans that mention past facts, and statements about a will apply it.
Shepard and the Backward Look
Shepard v. United States draws the line on facts that make the forbidden inference feel natural. The defendant offered Mrs. Shepard’s declarations to her friends that she was weary of life and ready to end it, testimony that lent plausibility to a theory of suicide.5 The Government answered with an accusatory declaration of hers, and it used the words as evidence that she was dying of poison given by her husband.6
The Court accepted half of the Government’s position. By proving declarations that showed an unhappy state of mind, the defendant opened the door to declarations showing a different one, consistent with a persisting will to live, and he would have had no grievance had the rebuttal stayed on that point.7 The Government did not stay there. It did not use the declarations “to prove her present thoughts and feelings, or even her thoughts and feelings in times past”; it used them as proof of an act committed by someone else. That fact, if it was a fact, the Government was free to prove, “but not by hearsay declarations.”8
The Court also refused to assume that a jury could split the words. It called the needed discrimination “a feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds” and observed that the accusation’s “reverberating clang” would “drown all weaker sounds.”9 It added that, even had the Government disclosed a limited purpose at trial, the accusation had to be rejected as evidence of a state of mind.10
The Court set that result beside Hillmon, whose ruling, it said, “marks the high water line beyond which courts have been unwilling to go.”11 It then drew the distinction the last clause of the Rule now carries. The accusation “faced backward and not forward.” It spoke to a past act, and, “more than that, to an act by some one not the speaker.”12 Any other tendency the words had was “a filament too fine to be disentangled by a jury.”13
Those features do not carry equal weight. Courts that have asked whether a declarant’s intent is admissible as evidence of another person’s actions under the Federal Rules have opted in favor of admissibility, so the involvement of a third person does not itself bar a forward-looking statement.14 The backward look is what survives into the Rule. A plan asks the jury to trust only that the declarant meant what the declarant said. The accusation asked the jury to trust that the declarant had perceived a cause, remembered it, and reported it faithfully, and it reached the jury without an oath or cross-examination.
The limit also bites only when the proponent needs the belief to be true. A statement that explicitly describes what the speaker believed, knew, or felt, such as “I think she’s an undercover cop,” comes in under the exception when offered to prove that belief, knowledge, or feeling.15 The accusation in Shepard asked the jury to accept the fact believed, that the poisoning happened. A remark offered only to show what the declarant believed asks the jury to accept the belief itself.
The two remarks share a declarant, a listener, and a subject, and they separate on direction: the first looks to tomorrow and the second to last week. The sorting question on any such stem is whether the proponent needs the jury to find a feeling or plan the declarant held while speaking, which the exception admits, or an event the declarant remembers, which it excludes.
Statements of Fear
A statement of fear describes an emotional condition, and Rule 803(3) lists mental feeling among the conditions it covers.17 “I hate him” is the treatise’s example of a statement describing the speaker’s own state of mind, and “I am afraid of him” belongs beside it.18 The memory-and-belief clause decides most disputes over fear, because the party who offers the statement usually wants more than the feeling.
A prosecutor who calls a witness to repeat a murder victim’s remark that the victim feared the defendant generally hopes the jury will reason from the fear to something the defendant did. People fear someone because of what that person has done or threatens to do, so the inference runs backward to a past act or forward to a feared one. Either way, the statement becomes a belief about another person’s conduct offered to prove that conduct, and the last clause of Rule 803(3) removes that use from the exception.19
Shepard shows the same defect in a sharper form. Mrs. Shepard’s accusation was a charge against another person that traveled with her state of mind, and the Government used it as proof of that person’s act.20 The Court held that the Government could prove the poisoning, “but not by hearsay declarations,” and it doubted that jurors could credit the words for what they showed about her will to live while discarding the charge against her husband.21 That doubt explains why a limiting instruction is a weak remedy when a vivid accusation rides inside the feeling.
When the defense puts the victim’s own mind in issue, the same fear comes in for that purpose. The defendant in Shepard made the wife’s mental condition the contested fact with his suicide theory, and the Court held that he thereby opened the door to declarations showing a persisting will to live, so long as the rebuttal stayed on that point.22 A claim of self-defense works the same way: it puts the victim’s conduct in issue, and the victim’s fear bears on whether the victim started the fight.
The words in the two scenes are close to identical, and the result differs because the issue differs. In the first, the fear is useful only through the defendant’s conduct. In the second, it bears directly on how the victim probably behaved, and the step from a fear voiced days earlier to the same fear on the fatal night is the continuity reasoning from earlier in this chapter.
The third question does most of the work on exam stems. An offer that merely recites the victim’s fear, with no defense theory making the victim’s mind relevant, fails however strong the fear was, while the identical offer in rebuttal to suicide or self-defense passes. The usual error is to treat the fear as admissible for every purpose because it is an emotion, or as inadmissible for every purpose because it contains an accusation.
Intent Mixed With Past Facts
Plans rarely arrive alone, because people explain them, and the explanation is often a past event. Rule 803(3) admits a statement of plan and excludes a statement of memory offered to prove the fact remembered, and in one sentence the two commands collide.24 The letter in Hillmon shows the pattern. Its writer said he would “leave here to see a part of the country that I never expected to see when I left home, as I am going with a man by the name of Hillmon, who intends to start a sheep ranch, and, as he promised me more wages than I could make at anything else, I concluded to take it.”25
The letter holds a plan (to leave and go with Hillmon), a statement about another man’s intention (Hillmon intends to start a sheep ranch), and a report of another man’s past act (Hillmon promised more wages). The Court held that the two letters “were competent evidence of the intention of Walters at the time of writing them, which was a material fact bearing upon the question in controversy.”26 That ground reaches the plan. The report that Hillmon promised more wages is a statement of memory about another person’s act, and the Rule’s last clause bars it from proving that the promise was made.27
Rule 805 adds a second filter when the past fact is itself something another person said. A promise of wages is Hillmon’s statement repeated inside the writer’s statement, and hearsay within hearsay comes in only if each part of the combined statement conforms with an exception.28 A party who offered the letter to prove that the promise was made would have to satisfy the rule for each layer, while a party who offered it to prove the writer’s plan needs only the exception for the plan.
The sorting question is therefore which part of the statement carries the offer. If the offer needs the plan, the past event that explains the plan travels with the plan as its reason, and the jury may not use it for more. If the offer needs the past event, the plan does not rescue it.
The jury need not believe that D made the demand to credit the plan, because Z’s belief that D made it is enough to explain why Z meant to go. The first sentence can also be tested by itself.
The payoff words are the same in both scenes, and the only thing that moves is whether a forward-looking intent is attached to them. In the first scene the payoff supports a plan; in the second nothing remains but the memory, which is the structure of Shepard. The reverse mistake also appears on exams: a speaker who recounts a threat and adds, almost as an afterthought, a plan to stop by an office has made a plan admissible to show the visit, but the threat is still a memory offered to prove the fact remembered, and the plan beside it does not carry it in.
The second question decides most stems, because identical words pass or fail depending on the use the proponent has in mind. Errors run in two directions: striking a past reference that merely explains the plan, and treating the presence of a plan as a license to prove the past event it mentions.
Statements About a Will
Rule 803(3) makes one exception to its own exclusion: a statement of memory or belief may prove the fact remembered or believed when it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will.30 The treatise describes the covered statements as those relating to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of the will, and it rests the carve-out on necessity and expediency.31 Everywhere else in this section the clause blocks the step from belief to fact. Here the Rule lets a backward-looking statement prove what it says. Like the rest of Rule 803(3), the exception applies whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.32
The need the treatise points to appears in the older probate decisions. Where capacity, fraud, or undue influence was contested, or where a will was lost and its contents had to be proved, courts in Massachusetts and England admitted a testator’s written or oral declarations made before the date of the will to show his real intention about his property, though they divided over declarations made afterward.33 In Sugden v. St. Leonards, a lost-will case, the English Court of Appeal unanimously admitted oral as well as written declarations made before the will, and Lord Chief Justice Cockburn said that “verbal declarations of what he was about to do,” though “not conclusive evidence,” are “legally admissible as secondary evidence of the contents of a lost will.”34
Those decisions admitted declarations of what the testator was about to do, so they work under the ordinary rule for statements of intention. The will clause reaches further. A declaration made after the will exists can only look back at what the testator did, and the clause admits a statement of that kind when it relates to the validity or terms of the will. It is a separate carve-out from the memory-or-belief limit and not an application of the state-of-mind rationale.35
The two remarks share a declarant, a listener, and a backward-looking form, and they differ in what the memory is about. The clause admits memory about the will, and a testator’s recollection of an unrelated event, however sincere, stays under the general limit. The tempting argument is that the theft remark is a statement of belief, but it asks the jury to accept the thing believed, which is the use the limit forbids. The text also confines the exception to the declarant’s own will, so a statement about someone else’s will gets no help from it.36