Concept
The Confrontation Clause Overlay
Excited utterance
The Confrontation Clause Overlay
Rule 803(2) answers one question only: whether the hearsay rule excludes a statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.1 When the prosecution offers such a statement against an accused, a second and independent question arises under the Confrontation Clause, which reaches out-of-court statements that serve as a substitute for live testimony.2 Everything earlier in this chapter bears on the first question. This section bridges to the second and states the working rule: in a criminal case, satisfying Rule 803(2) is necessary but not always sufficient.
The two questions once moved together. Before Crawford v. Washington, courts treated the excited utterance as a firmly established exception that escaped independent Confrontation Clause analysis.3 Reliability carried the argument. As Idaho v. Wright framed it, such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, so cross-examination would be superfluous.4 Under that approach, a statement reliable enough for the hearsay exception was reliable enough for the Constitution.
Crawford moved the inquiry from reliability to the question whether a statement is testimonial. Davis v. Washington was the Court's first chance after Crawford to explore that testimonial approach, and it held that statements made for the primary purpose of dealing with an ongoing emergency are admissible after all.5 The Court found that the 911 call fit the emergency exception because the danger was ongoing, and that the statements to officers on the scene did not, because the emergency was past.6 The assailant's location explains the difference. The Court presumably treated the call as emergency-driven because the assailant was at large, and it treated the second case differently because Herschel Hammon was in custody.7 Both Michelle McCottry and Amy Hammon described past events, so past tense alone cannot decide the question. The primary purpose of the statement does.8
This is why excited utterances so often land on the safe side of the line. A person calling for help is not testifying, because "[n]o witness . . . goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help."9 The absence of reflection that makes an excited utterance trustworthy under Rule 803(2), an utterance made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses before self-interest could be brought to bear,10 also makes a blurted plea for protection look unlike testimony. The overlap is not complete, though.
Take one victim and two statements. She calls 911 from the street while the man who threatened her is still nearby. Later, after officers have taken him into custody, she tells them what he did. Either statement may qualify as an excited utterance, but only the call fits the emergency exception. The account given after the emergency ended falls on the testimonial side of the line.11
The prosecution of Arnold shows the safe side in operation. Gordon fled a gun-wielding assailant who remained at large and who, in the present tense, was "fixing to shoot" her. The court treated her 911 call as a close analogy to the call in Davis, assuming for argument that the operator's inquiries were acts of the police and still finding that Gordon sought protection from an ongoing emergency.12 Her exclamation to officers when Arnold suddenly returned, "that's him, that's the guy that pulled the gun on me," was prompted not by ex parte questioning but by his reappearance, and it bears even less resemblance to testimony.13 The excited utterance label played no part in either result. What mattered was whether the danger continued and whether the statement was made to meet it.
A private listener moves a statement toward the safe side, but does not settle the matter. Davis treated the 911 operator as an agent of the police for purposes of its decision, without deciding whether and when a statement to a non-agent could be testimonial, so the Court seems to leave open that some statements to non-agents could be testimonial.14 In People v. Vigil, a seven-year-old at home told his father and the father's friend about his pain and what had happened. The court asked how an objectively reasonable child in his position would see the exchange. It concluded that such a child would speak to seek comfort and help, and would see the adults as trying to learn what happened, find out whether he was hurt, and comfort him.15 The same case also involved the child's videotaped police interview. The court treated those statements as testimonial, and their admission raised a constitutional error whose harmlessness the court had to review.16 The listener and the occasion split one declarant's statements into two categories.
Emergency is also not the only nontestimonial purpose. Michigan v. Bryant stressed that an ongoing emergency is but one primary purpose that puts a statement outside the testimonial category. There may be other circumstances where the primary purpose was not to create a substitute for testimony, and the Court did not identify them. One might speculate that obtaining medical care counts, or guarding against risks to public health or safety.17 Bryant also reasoned that statements dealing with emergencies are less prone to fabrication, and it cited Rule 803(2) as an example of a hearsay exception built on similar logic. That reasoning links the constitutional question back to the hearsay exception.18
Once a statement is nontestimonial, the federal Confrontation Clause appears to regulate it no further. Bryant acknowledged in a footnote, however, that the Due Process Clause may bar unreliable hearsay. States remain free to give accused persons more protection under their own confrontation clauses, and some still apply a reliability-style analysis to nontestimonial statements.19 A nontestimonial outcry must still satisfy every element of Rule 803(2) on its own.
The common error is to stop after step one and treat an excited utterance ruling as the end of a criminal-case analysis. Step three does the real work. The same victim can speak nontestimonially to an operator while the danger lasts and testimonially to an officer once it has passed.