Concept
Related Exceptions Compared
Excited utterance
Related Exceptions Compared
Rule 803(2) makes three demands of a proponent: a startling event or condition, words that relate to it, and a declarant still under the stress of excitement that the event caused.1 A statement that fails any one of them is out under Rule 803(2), but it may still come in. There are more than thirty exceptions to the rule against hearsay, and the excited utterance exception rests on one theory among them: statements made under significant stress are likely to be true.2 The neighboring exceptions rest on other theories, such as closeness in time to perception, a patient’s motive to be accurate, or the declarant’s present state of mind, and a statement with no shock behind it can satisfy one of those instead.
The neighbors matter because the facts of a problem rarely say which exception governs. A text sent from a stalled car or a remark to a nurse can often be offered under two or three rules, and a proponent who stops at the first failed foundation abandons an argument that was available. Admissibility rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and a reviewing court that finds the excited utterance ruling within that discretion need not reach the other theories offered.3 A proponent who offers every sound theory therefore gives the ruling more than one support.
Offering an alternative never loosens the exception chosen: each rule has its own foundation, and the proponent must meet it on its own terms. The comparison begins with the present sense impression, the exception most easily confused with Rule 803(2), and then turns to the medical, state-of-mind, dying-declaration, and residual rules.
Present Sense Impression Compared
The first two exceptions in Rule 803 overlap, and they differ in the source of the guarantee. Rule 803(1) admits a statement “describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it,” while Rule 803(2) admits a statement “relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”4 Immediacy is the key to the first, and excitement is the key to the second.5 Both grew out of the common-law notion of res gestae, the idea that an event can be so close to a statement that it impels the words out of the declarant, who has no time to lie or forget and whose attention is fixed on what she describes. The present sense impression is the newer exception, derived from the excited utterance.6
Three differences follow, and each can decide a problem. The first is whether a startling event is required. No exciting event or condition is needed for a present sense impression, while an excited utterance cannot exist without one.7 The absence of delay reduces fabrication and forgetfulness, but without a startling event the assumption of spontaneity is hard to maintain unless the statement directly pertains to what the declarant perceived.8 Bray shows the exception at work in chilling circumstances. In that murder trial, a Kentucky court admitted the victim’s phone call to her sister, in which she said that the eventual assailant was “sitting at the bottom of the hill,” had been there “quite a while,” and that she feared for her life.9
The second difference is scope. Rule 803(1) admits only words “describing or explaining” the event or condition perceived, and the match between observation and statement must be tight.10 Rule 803(2) asks only that the statement “relate to” the startling event. That phrase was meant to reach beyond description or explanation, and courts apply it liberally.11 It therefore includes statements that mention the cause of the event rather than simply describing what happened, and if the declarant was excited when speaking, the whole statement comes in.12
The third difference is the length of the window. An excited utterance is timed by the duration of the stress that the event caused, but a present sense impression must come while, or “immediately after,” the declarant perceived the event.13 The shorter period fits the weaker guarantee. Exact simultaneity is not required, because some time is needed to turn observation into speech, and the working question is whether enough time passed to permit reflective thought.14 A tweet sent immediately after a car runs a red light and hits a pedestrian qualifies; the same words posted on Facebook an hour later do not, because too much time has passed.15
The excited utterance exception tolerates longer gaps, because the time that may lapse between the event and the statement can exceed what the present sense impression rule allows.16 The Eighth Circuit in Phelps admitted the statement of a “visibly distraught” declarant made fifteen to twenty minutes after the startling event, and the Tenth Circuit in Golden admitted a statement made about fifteen minutes after the event.17 An appellate court affirming an excited utterance finding in an accident case rejected the argument that too much time had passed, because timing is only a factor and strict contemporaneity is not required; Brett was trembling, which showed that he was still upset, when Murphy arrived within minutes of the accident.18 The court was equally unmoved by the claim that Brett’s statement could not have been spontaneous because it answered Murphy’s question.19
Because the two inquiries measure time differently, a single statement can pass one rule and fail the other. A federal court explaining why its ruling was consistent with both rules stressed that an excited utterance must be made under the “stress of excitement,” and that time passing between the event and the statement removes the declarant from the stress of the situation.20 That inquiry examines the declarant’s condition, while Rule 803(1) examines the interval since perception and asks whether it was short enough to rule out reflective thought.21 A message written minutes after a stressful call, once the declarant has calmed, may thus qualify under Rule 803(1) alone, and a statement made while the stress lingers, but too long after the event to count as immediate, may qualify under Rule 803(2) alone. Because each rule fails where the other can succeed, a proponent commonly offers both. They share one requirement: the declarant must have had firsthand knowledge, which the statement itself can sometimes prove.22
The first step decides whether a Rule 803(2) contest is worth having, and the third decides how much of a mixed statement Rule 803(1) can save. When the declarant was calm and the statement runs past description, Rule 803(1) may rescue only the descriptive core.
Medical, Mental, and Residual Rules
A statement that fails Rule 803(2) because the declarant was calm may still qualify under Rule 803(4). That rule admits a statement that is made for, and reasonably pertinent to, medical diagnosis or treatment, and that describes medical history, past or present symptoms or sensations, their inception, or their general cause.24 The rule has no excitement element. Its guarantee comes from the patient’s motive, and courts apply a two-part test: the declarant’s motive must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment, and the content must be the kind a physician reasonably relies on in treatment or diagnosis.25
Child abuse cases show the test applied. One court concluded that a young victim would have a motive consistent with treatment and that her statement to a physician during an examination that the abuser is a member of her immediate household is reasonably pertinent to treatment.26 In Jeffers, the trial court admitted Penny’s statement to Nurse Ramirez under the medical diagnosis exception, and the defendant maintained that the admission was error, so the foundation was contested.27
Questions can shape any statement they draw out. Reliability may be influenced by the type of question asked: suggestive questions raise the possibility that the questioner influenced the statement, though such questions are sometimes necessary to elicit information, particularly when the subject is embarrassing.28 A challenge to a statement made in an examination room may therefore turn on how the clinician asked.
The difference between the two speakers lies in purpose. The first spoke to someone who could treat him and supplied the history and general cause that treatment calls for. The second spoke to a friend with no treatment in view, and her words recount a past event instead of reporting a present sensation. The residual exception remains a possibility for the second statement, but only after the specific rules fail and only on a showing of trustworthiness.
Rule 803(3) covers another kind of calm statement: the declarant’s then-existing state of mind, such as motive, intent, or plan, or emotional, sensory, or physical condition, such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health. It excludes a statement of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered or believed, except where the statement relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will.29 The carve-out confines the rule to what the declarant feels or intends at the moment of speaking. A declarant who says “I’m scared of him” reports a present emotional condition, and Rule 803(3) admits it. A declarant who says “he hit me last week,” offered to prove the blow, reports a memory, and Rule 803(3) does not reach it. When one sentence carries both, the fear comes in under this rule and the blow does not. If the declarant was still under the stress of a startling event, Rule 803(2) may carry the account of the event itself, because it reaches statements relating to that event.30
The dying-declaration exception asks more of a proponent than Rule 803(2) does. It belongs to Rule 804, and every Rule 804 exception requires that the declarant be unavailable, a showing that is always satisfied in a homicide prosecution, where the victim is dead.31 A victim who survives is generally available as a witness, so the showing is not automatic in other prosecutions. The Rule 803 exceptions, by contrast, apply whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.32 A victim who tells a bystander, in terror and minutes after an attack, who stabbed her and why may therefore satisfy Rule 803(2) without any need to invoke the dying-declaration exception.
When no specific exception fits, Rule 807 is the last resort for trustworthy hearsay, and a statement that narrowly misses Rule 803(1) or 803(2) is a candidate. Suppose a declarant reports that lightning struck very close to an electrical generator on a nearby mountainside. Five minutes have passed, probably too long for a present sense impression, which requires the declarant to speak as he perceives the event or “immediately thereafter,” and the declarant was taken aback but not fully under the stress of excitement, so Rule 803(2) fails as well.33 Some courts held that such a near miss could not enter through Rule 807, because Rules 803(1) and 803(2) specifically address the statement. Most courts rejected that view, and the 2019 amendment to Rule 807 makes clear that near misses can be admitted so long as they are trustworthy.34 A proponent argues Rule 807 after the narrower rules have failed, and explains why the statement is trustworthy despite the miss.
The first step matters most with child declarants and injured adults, whose first listener is often a provider. The fourth step comes last because a court reaches the residual exception only after the specific rules have been tried and found short.