Concept
The Judge's Role and Review
Excited utterance
The Judge's Role and Review
A judge, not a jury, decides whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance. Rule 104(a) provides that "[t]he court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible," and that in deciding, "the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege."1 Rule 803(2) supplies the questions: whether a startling event or condition occurred, whether the statement relates to it, and whether the statement was "made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused."2 Each is a preliminary question of admissibility, so each belongs to the judge.
The ordinary rules of evidence step aside when the judge finds these facts. Those rules exist largely because of the lay jury, and they are not strictly enforced in trials to the bench. A judge presumably understands the possible deficiencies in "inadmissible" evidence and can account for those weaknesses when she finds preliminary facts.3 Only the rules of privilege survive, because they are designed to prevent any coerced disclosure of the protected information.4
The sections below follow the case in order: what the judge decides and on whose proof, and then how an appellate court reviews the decision.
Standard, Burden, and Hearing
The judge applies a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to every preliminary question of admissibility.5 Suppose a proponent offers an airplane passenger's hearsay statement as an excited utterance. The judge will not admit it unless the proponent proves to her satisfaction that it is more likely than not that the passenger was still under the influence of the startling event when he spoke.6 Evidence that leaves the question evenly balanced does not make excitement more likely than not, so the statement stays out.
The judge is not always this demanding. Authenticity is a question of conditional relevancy, and the court resolves it under the low standard of whether there is sufficient evidence for a juror to find the item genuine. A judge who has doubts still admits the item over an authenticity objection if a reasonable person could find it genuine.7 The excited-utterance foundation works differently: the judge must be persuaded herself, and her doubts count against the proponent.
The proponent carries the burden because the foundation facts supply the reliability on which the exception rests. Excited utterances are trustworthy, one court explains, because they are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and those circumstances make cross-examination superfluous.8 A party who wants the statement admitted without cross-examination must therefore show the circumstances that supply that assurance. The burden also covers doubts raised by the proponent's own evidence. In one case the Rule 104(a) inquiry showed that the officer on whose testimony the proponent relied was considerably skeptical about whether the declarant was genuinely excited, and the court took that skepticism into consideration.9
The proof is usually testimony about the declarant's condition, and Rule 104(a) lets the judge weigh it without first asking whether that testimony would itself be admissible at trial. A teacher's testimony that two boys were "very excited" when they spoke was enough of a predicate for the trial court, within its discretion, to admit their statement.10 In another record, the men who reported a man two blocks away waving a gun and threatening to "shoot somebody" were described as "very excited very nervous, like they were hopping around."11
The proponent then ties that evidence to the three requirements of the rule. In a car-accident illustration the argument takes three short sentences: a car accident is a startling event, Mr. Cronan was obviously excited, his statement relates to the event, and so it should be received.12
Review and Harmless Error
An appellate court reviews the foundation ruling under either a "clear error" or an "abuse-of-discretion" standard, and in this setting the two coalesce. The reviewing court defers to the trial judge's conclusions about whether the requirements are satisfied and reverses only if it strongly disagrees, so persuading it that the judge erred at all can be an uphill battle.14 The deference exists because the trial judge sits inside the trial. Discretion gives her a limited right to reach a result the appellate court would not itself have reached on the cold record, and the ruling stands unless it is manifestly erroneous, a clear error of judgment.15
The decisions show that deference at work on each requirement. A New Hampshire-style timing challenge failed in the Brett case: the timing of a statement is only a factor, strict contemporaneity is not required, the witness arrived within minutes, and Brett was trembling, which showed he was still upset.16 The court also rejected the argument that a response to a question cannot be spontaneous, because Brett answered a question about his condition by explaining who was driving the cart, and the trial court acted within its discretion.17 The relation-to-the-event requirement is reviewed the same way. Boyce argued that the gun Portis mentioned in her 911 call referred to an earlier time, not to the domestic battery she was reporting. The court found no abuse of discretion, because during her call for help she told the operator that Boyce had a gun, answered "Yes!" several times when asked whether she had seen it, and said she was "positive."18 On continuing stress, an appellate court looked to the surprise and shocking nature of an assault and the age of the declarant. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lucy was still under the stress of the attack, stating that each of these cases must be decided on its own circumstances.19
Trial courts do not all describe the time requirement alike. One district court, defending its ruling, reasoned that an excited utterance must be made under the "stress of excitement," and that "any amount of time that passes between the exciting event and the statement will remove the declarant from the stress of the situation."20 That formulation pulls against the statement that timing is only a factor, because if any elapsed time removed the declarant from stress, timing could never be merely one consideration. Appellate decisions that admitted a "visibly distraught" declarant's statement made fifteen to twenty minutes after the event, in United States v. Phelps, and one made about fifteen minutes after it, in United States v. Golden, fit the second framing.21
A lawyer attacking such a ruling must therefore show that the record cannot support the finding, since showing that another judge might have ruled differently is not enough.
Even when the appellate court concludes that the ruling was wrong, reversal depends on whether the error mattered. Rule 103(a) requires that the admission or exclusion affect a substantial right of a party, meaning that the error had a "material affect" upon or "substantially swayed" the jury's deliberations. Error that does not is often called harmless. Where the accused is concerned, courts in practice also ask whether the evidence of guilt, viewed in the setting of the whole trial and with the error taken into account, is overwhelming.22
The Lucy appeal shows the first inquiry at work. The officer who repeated Lucy's statement followed Dr. Hopkins, Pam Lunderman, and Lucy herself to the stand, and his testimony was substantially a restatement of facts those three had already supplied. Even if his account of the statement were inadmissible hearsay under Rule 803(2), the court concluded, it was at most cumulative and therefore harmless error, because it did not influence the jury or had a very slight effect.23 A statement that repeats what the jury has already heard from others adds little to the verdict, while one that substantially sways the jury affects a substantial right.