Concept
Proving the Foundation
Present sense impression
Proving the Foundation
A present sense impression has to clear a threshold before the jury hears it, and the proponent carries the burden of clearing it. Rule 803(1) admits a statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it, and each part of that wording is a fact the proponent must establish.1 The judge decides whether those facts exist. Under Rule 104(a), the court determines whether the requirements of a Rule 803 exception have been satisfied, and a statement that qualifies must still satisfy the other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence before it comes in.2 The cases in this unit turn mostly on perception, and the burden of establishing it rests with the proponent, who must persuade the judge by a preponderance of the evidence.3
Perception is hard to prove because the statement itself is often the only evidence of it. A speaker who describes an event as it unfolds may reveal a vantage point in the same breath, and when the speaker is a bystander on a telephone line, the words and their setting may be all anyone has. That practice invites a bootstrapping objection, because the proponent seems to use the statement to prove the very condition that makes it admissible. Rule 104(a) answers the objection by freeing the judge, in deciding such questions, from the rules of evidence, so the court may treat the statement as some proof of perception, although additional proof is usually available to aid the decision.4
Freeing the judge from the rules of evidence does not relax the standard of proof. The judge must still make the findings that support admissibility, so a remark with nothing in it or around it pointing to firsthand observation does not lift itself into evidence.5 The ruling is also a discretionary one, and an appellate court reviews a foundation ruling for abuse of discretion.6
Two questions about proof recur. The first is whether the proponent must also produce someone else who perceived the event. The second arises when no one can say who the speaker was, so that the statement and its setting are the only evidence of what the speaker saw. Both questions ask how much proof it takes to persuade a judge that the declarant perceived what the words describe.
Corroboration Not Required
Rule 803(1) asks three things of a statement: that it describe or explain an event or condition, that the declarant have perceived what it describes, and that it be made while or immediately after that perception.7 A second witness to the event appears nowhere on that list, and the cases that have considered the point mostly decline to add one.8 Corroboration here means independent confirmation of the foundation facts, ordinarily from another person who saw what the declarant described. In practice the witness who relays the statement usually saw the event and can supply that confirmation, and some states, most notably New York, make corroboration a requirement.9 The federal approach differs. The proof that the declarant spoke while perceiving the event may consist solely of the statement itself, read in light of its surrounding circumstances, and corroboration is not required.10
The Advisory Committee did demand corroboration elsewhere, and the contrast explains the choice. When it expanded Rule 804(b)(3) to admit statements that exculpate another person, it attached a corroboration requirement to make the change from the earlier position more acceptable.11 The present sense impression exception presents no such general need. Its theory is that the contemporaneity of event and statement negates the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation, and that theory supplies sufficient assurance of reliability without a second witness.12 The Federal Rule and most courts have not required corroboration.13
The usual setting nonetheless supplies something close to corroboration. Because the exception is limited in time and subject matter, the witness who reports the statement will typically have perceived the event or at least observed circumstances strongly suggesting it. That adds assurance of accuracy, but a general justification for admission is not the same as a requirement.14
Dispensing with corroboration has a cost. Without a witness who can corroborate what the speaker says, it may be hard to know whether the speaker actually perceived what he describes, and the court faces the same bootstrapping question that arises with admissions and coconspirator statements, whose contents often assert the facts on which admissibility depends.15
A rule that does not require corroboration still lets it count. One court reasoned that, although corroboration is not required under Rule 803(1), the probability that the declarant observed the event, or was in a position to do so, is one of the reasons present sense impressions are considered trustworthy.16 Evidence that fills in the declarant's position therefore strengthens the foundation, and its absence leaves the judge with less to weigh. A recording does different work. It does not show what the speaker saw, but a court relying on Blakey noted that “the need for such witnesses is somewhat reduced where, due to tape recording, there is no uncertainty as to the content of the declarant’s statement.”17 A recording settles what was said, while independent evidence of the speaker's position helps settle whether the speaker saw it.
New channels of communication press the same issue. Witnesses now tweet, text, post to Instagram, or call 911 to describe crimes as they unfold or just afterwards.18 In United States v. Boyce, the Seventh Circuit upheld admission under Rule 803(1) of a 911 call from the mother of the defendant's children, who reported that he had just hit her and was “going crazy for no reason,” and who answered “yes” when asked whether he had a weapon, adding that he had “a gun.”19 The caller's words reported what had just happened to her, which put her perception on the face of the statement. Calls like these often raise problems under Crawford because the operators who receive them are connected with law enforcement, although some calls are admitted under the emergency doctrine, as in United States v. Thomas, where a 911 caller reported a shooting.20 A later section takes up that confrontation question.
Unidentified Declarants
A known speaker can be asked where she stood, and an opponent can test the answer. An unidentified speaker removes both tools. When the bystanders are unknown, their capacities to observe can be neither substantiated nor attacked, and the judge is left with the words and whatever surrounds them.22 The task is to decide from that record whether the speaker saw the event or merely assumed or repeated something.
The Advisory Committee's Note records that the cases show hesitancy in admitting a bystander's statement without more when the bystander's identity is unknown.23 That hesitancy has not hardened into a requirement of identification or corroboration, because the proof that the declarant spoke while perceiving the event may consist solely of the statement, read in light of its surroundings.24 Each extreme position fails on its own terms. If the statement alone always sufficed, any anonymous assertion would prove its own admissibility, since the speaker's claim to have seen something is the very thing in doubt. If the judge always demanded proof from outside the statement, the exception would be lost for the reports it fits best, because a motorist who phones in a crash from the roadside is often gone before anyone asks a name. Rule 104(a) resolves the tension by letting the judge consider the statement, while the proponent keeps the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that perception is more likely than not.25
Miller v. Keating shows what happens when the record adds nothing. Witnesses there reported hearing a declarant say that the other driver, with an insult attached, had tried to “cut in.”26 The Third Circuit found the record empty of any circumstance from which the trial court could have inferred, by a preponderance, that the declarant saw the maneuver. The disputed words did not proclaim perception, and the trial judge, who acknowledged as much, had reasoned only that the declarant would have spoken only if positioned to observe the collision. The court held that the statements reported, standing alone, do not show it more likely than not that the declarant saw the event.27
The same opinion marks what would have changed the result. Some statements contain words that reveal perception, and a remark such as “I saw that blue truck run down the lady on the corner” might stand alone to show perception if the judge, from the particular circumstances, is satisfied by a preponderance that the declarant spoke from personal perception.28 Words that announce a sense give the judge something to weigh. A bare accusation gives nothing beyond the fact that it was spoken.
Keating arose under the excited utterance exception, but its demand that perception be shown by a preponderance carries over to Rule 803(1). A later appellate ruling that upheld the exclusion of a statement for want of foundation spoke of the two exceptions together, asking whether the proponent had shown that the statement qualified as a present sense impression or an excited utterance.29 That same case shows that foundation rulings run statement by statement, because the court held that the other statements in the case fell within Rule 803(1) and also within the residual exception, then numbered Rule 803(24), in First State Bank of Denton v. Maryland Casualty Co.30
In Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., by contrast, the record carried the finding. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that a 911 caller actually perceived the event, and part of that finding rested on a detail of the call: there is no mile marker 99 because of the I-16 and I-95 interchange, the next posted marker reads 98, and the caller would have had no reason to look for markers until the incident startled her.31 The call was also tape recorded, so there was no uncertainty about the content of the caller's statement, which heightened its reliability.32 Neither feature proves by itself that the caller watched the event, but the marker error fits a driver startled at the scene, and the recording removes doubt about the words. Both Keating and Crown rested on the words and the circumstances. Keating's record held a bare accusation with nothing around it, while Crown's held details that fit perception.
Ramrattan v. Burger King Corp. sits between those poles. Three unidentified bystanders approached Bender and told him what had happened, and that approach was the only evidence that they actually saw the accident.33 The court inferred that people who chose to tell Bender what happened probably saw it, but it voiced concern about the lack of independent evidence of their abilities to perceive, and it noted that courts have hesitated to uphold such a statement alone as sufficient evidence of the declarant's opportunity to observe.34 Hesitancy of that kind works as a demand for more proof, which the proponent can sometimes supply, and not as an automatic bar.35
A robbery case supplies the fallback. In United States v. Medico, the Second Circuit noted the Advisory Committee's remark about the hesitancy to admit an unknown bystander's statement without more, and observed that this may well be the reason the district judge relied on the residual exception, then Rule 804(b)(5), instead of Rule 803(1).36 It then explained why the report was reliable. The information passed from the eyewitness to a bank customer and from the customer to Carmody within a very short time after the getaway, which made inaccuracy unlikely and reduced the chance that speculation or fabrication had undercut the truth, and Carmody wrote it on his checkbook as he heard it.37 The later section on near misses and Rule 807 takes up that fallback.
Navarette v. California shows the same tension from the other side. The dispute there concerned the reliability of an unidentified 911 caller's report that a truck had run her off the road, and the dissent denied that the report had the immediacy on which present sense impressions depend. It is the immediacy that gives such a statement credibility, the dissent argued, because the declarant has not had time to dissemble or embellish, yet this caller had time to observe a license number, bring her car to a halt, copy the number down, and dial the police, which left plenty of time to dissemble or embellish.38 It added that, according to the very Advisory Committee Notes the Court quoted, cases on an unidentified declarant's present sense impression indicate hesitancy in upholding the statement alone as sufficient proof of the reported event.39
The cases above rely on a small set of circumstances, and a proponent building this foundation should look for each of them:
- Words that claim a sense, such as seeing or noticing, which reveal on their face that the speaker perceived the event.
- Timing close to the event, so that little room remains for speculation or fabrication.
- Details of the setting that fit observation, such as a location error that suits a startled driver.
- A recording or a contemporaneous written note that fixes exactly what the speaker said.
- Independent evidence that the speaker was in a position to observe.
Two shortcuts mislead on this issue. One treats anonymity as disqualifying, but the text of Rule 803(1) contains no identification requirement, and the Advisory Committee's remark records hesitancy and not a bar.40 The other treats the act of speaking as proof of watching, which is the inference the Keating trial judge drew and the court would not accept on a record that held nothing else. The sound analysis asks what in the words, or around them, makes perception more likely than not.