Concept
Elements of the Exception
Present sense impression
Elements of the Exception
Rule 803(1) lifts the hearsay bar from “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.”1 Courts also quote it as reaching a statement made “while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.”2 From that sentence they draw three requirements, worded a little differently from court to court. In United States v. Ferber, the proponent had to show that the declaration was limited to describing or explaining the event, that it was made contemporaneously with the event or immediately afterward, and that the declarant actually perceived what she described, although she need not have taken part in it.3 The Seventh Circuit asks for a description of the event “without calculated narration,” by a speaker who “personally perceived” it, in words spoken “while the speaker was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.”4 Under either formulation, a statement faces three tests: what the words say, whether the declarant perceived what they describe, and how soon the declarant spoke.
The tests serve a single theory. Substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negates the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation,5 and the res gestae idea behind the exception was that the declarant had no time to lie or forget and focused her attention on what she described.6 Each test protects part of that guarantee, so strength on one cannot make up for failure on another. The content test comes first, because it fixes how much of a statement the exception can carry.
Describing or Explaining the Event
Rule 803(1) carries only the part of a statement that describes or explains the event or condition the declarant is perceiving. Courts test a statement clause by clause and insist on a tight connection between the words and the event,7 and the assurance of trustworthiness behind the exception confines the subject matter to that description or explanation.8
Two tweets mark the line. Dede watches a blue car run a red light and hit a pedestrian, and she immediately tweets, “Saw a car run a red light and hit someone.” Every word reports what she saw, and the statement comes in.9 Donny, the driver’s son, tweets within minutes of a similar accident, “Dad just ran a red light because he was late picking me up from school!” The clause about the red light describes the event. The clause beginning “because” supplies a reason, and it falls outside the exception even though it went out as promptly as the rest.10 The content test and the timing test therefore operate separately. If Donny was excited when he posted, the whole tweet may come in as an excited utterance, because the “because” clause refers to the cause of the accident, and that doctrine allows a longer interval between event and statement.11
The limit follows the rationale. A report of what lies before the speaker’s eyes comes from attention fixed on the event, while a cause, a motive, or a judgment of blame draws on knowledge from outside the scene and leaves room for the reflection the exception assumes away.12
The word “explaining” stretches the limit past bare description, because a remark that makes sense of what the speaker is watching qualifies. In State v. Salgado, two witnesses saw a man walk toward Harold, who appeared to greet him with his hand extended. One heard Harold say, “Hey, Timo, what’s up?”; the other heard, “Hey, Primo.” The man then shot Harold repeatedly.13 The court found no error in admitting the greeting, because the words explained the event: Harold was greeting the shooter while extending his hand toward him.14 His later words, “Timo shot me,” came in on a different footing, as an excited utterance relating to the startling event of being shot and made under the stress it caused.15
Courts can also divide over what counts as the event. In United States v. Medico, a young man who watched robbers escape from a bank gave a bank customer the license number and a description of their vehicle. The majority concluded that the testimony met all the specific requirements of Rule 803(1).16 The dissent doubted that a license number and a vehicle description describe or explain the event within the ordinary meaning of the rule.17 The rule reaches a condition as well as an event, which supports the majority, but the dissent previews the argument an opponent can press whenever a detail identifies a thing instead of depicting an action.
A statement about something that happened earlier fails for a plainer reason. In United States v. Phelps, a defendant who was in the courtroom but not testifying offered his own out-of-court statement about a gym bag in a trunk. The statement could not be a present sense impression, because its subject was not what the defendant was perceiving when he spoke but something that had occurred at a remote earlier time, whenever the bag was placed in the trunk.18 He could not call his words an admission either, because a party’s statement qualifies as an admission only when offered against that party.19 Compare Harold’s greeting, which accompanied an approach he was watching as he spoke.
A statement must also report the event and not compose an account of it, which is why the Seventh Circuit requires a description “without calculated narration.”20 The test turns on incentive. A remark made as the event unfolds carries no motive to shape the story, while a statement made with time to form a purpose carries the same temptation as testimony. In Commonwealth v. Dugan, the court held that a drawing was not a present sense impression, because the exception requires that the declarant see the event, make an observation about it to another person at the scene, and do so at the time or so soon afterward that the declarant is unlikely to have had the opportunity to form the purpose of misstating it.21
Questioning by a listener can bear on that inquiry. A 911 caller in United States v. Boyce said the defendant had just hit her and that she had just run to a neighbor’s house. The Seventh Circuit observed that answering questions, as opposed to giving a spontaneous narration, could increase the chances of calculated narration, and that the caller had run to another residence between the battery and the call.22 The court left open whether those concerns defeated the exception, because the statements were admissible as excited utterances in any event.23 A question put to the speaker is thus a circumstance the court weighs, not an automatic bar.
That fallback works because the two exceptions measure content differently. An excited utterance may “relat[e] to” a startling event, while a present sense impression is limited to “describing or explaining” it, so Rule 803(2) allows a broader scope of subject matter.24 A statement that reaches cause, blame, or detail can fail Rule 803(1) and still qualify under Rule 803(2) if the declarant spoke under the stress of the event, a comparison taken up later in this chapter.
Personal Perception
The timing clause in Rule 803(1) runs from the moment the declarant perceived the event, so a speaker who perceived nothing gives the clock no starting point.26 Courts accordingly treat perception as a requirement of its own: the declarant must have been describing something she actually perceived herself, though she need not have taken part in it.27 The requirement is the familiar rule that a witness may testify only from personal knowledge, and it applies with equal force to the declarant of a hearsay statement.28
The contemporaneity guarantee protects only a speaker who reports what her own senses delivered, because only her attention was fixed on the event and only her memory had no time to fade.29 A declarant who repeats what someone else said adds a second source whose attention and honesty no one has tested, and the speed of the repetition reveals nothing about that source. Perception covers hearing as well as sight: the notes in Ferber recorded what Eisenberg told Carey, and the court treated those words as something Carey herself perceived.30
In Bemis v. Edwards, the trial judge found a lack of foundation because the 911 tape indicated that the caller was not observing the events he described but was merely reporting what others in the house were seeing and describing to him at the time.31 The caller’s own words defeated the foundation, and promptness could not supply a perception he did not have.
A recorded 911 caller in Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc. met the requirement on a thinner record. She said she “noticed” a truck as it “sideswiped” a car parked on the road, and the court relied on her words and the surrounding circumstances in concluding that she had observed the incident.32 Because the call was taped, no uncertainty existed about what she said, which heightened reliability.33 Her remark that this was her first opportunity to reach a phone would be accurate if she had travelled I-95 to Highway 204, where no phones or buildings stand before the interchange. Her mistaken mile marker fit the same route: no marker 99 exists, and she would have had no reason to watch the markers until the incident startled her.34 The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the caller actually perceived the event.35
A Third Circuit decision, Miller v. Keating, shows what doubt looks like. Witnesses repeated what an unidentified speaker had said at the scene of an auto accident, “the bastard tried to cut in.” The court listed what the words left open: the speaker might have been drawing a conclusion from what he saw while approaching the scene, hypothesizing, repeating what someone else had said, or talking about a different driver who had cut in front of him, and he might have been a participant with a natural bias.36 A self-serving exclamation by a participant, the court added, is hardly likely to qualify as trustworthy.37 Older decisions excluded statements for the same reason when nothing showed that the speaker had perceived what he described. See State v. Davis; Moe v. State.
The proponent must prove perception, and the court decides the question as it decides other preliminary facts. The proponent carries the burden, the judge finds the fact by a preponderance of the evidence, and the judge is not confined to legally admissible evidence.38 The statement itself counts as some proof, although other proof is usually available.39 A remark such as “I saw that blue truck run down the lady on the corner” can stand alone if the circumstances satisfy the judge that the declarant spoke from personal perception.40 Corroboration is not required, though courts hesitate to rely on the words alone when the declarant is unidentified, and the Advisory Committee’s note records the same hesitancy when a bystander’s identity is unknown.41
Two people need knowledge in a present sense impression problem, and each needs a different piece of it. The declarant must have perceived the event. The in-court witness needs personal knowledge only of the making of the statement, as Rule 602 requires, and nothing in Rule 803(1) demands that the witness also have seen the event.42 A store manager investigating an injury cannot say how a shopper behaved, because he did not see it, but he can testify that a bystander told him the shopper was running around like crazy. The bystander’s words are hearsay if offered to show that behavior, and the present sense impression exception is the likely answer, subject to the timing question raised by the bystander speaking about ten minutes after the accident.43
Chains of statements follow the same logic one link at a time. In Ferber, Carey wrote notes of what Eisenberg told her about a conversation between Eisenberg and Ferber. Ferber objected that Carey did not participate in, and so did not perceive, that conversation. The court answered that the notes were a present sense impression not of what Ferber said to Eisenberg but of what Eisenberg said to Carey, with a separate and independent basis for admitting each link under Rule 805.44 Requiring each exception to reach back to the original speaker would nearly eliminate admissible hearsay within hearsay.45 The dissent in Medico took the narrower view that Rule 803(1) could cover only the first stage of the double hearsay there, the young man’s statement to the bank customer, because only the young man was perceiving the getaway he described.46
The second step decides most disputes, because the words usually announce a basis in the speaker’s senses or reveal its absence.
Immediacy of the Statement
The rule’s own words set the timing test: the statement must come “while or immediately after the declarant perceived” the event or condition.48 The primary guaranty of trustworthiness is the “substantial contemporaneity” of event and statement, and the exception is limited to statements made while an event or condition is perceived or immediately afterward.49
The rule does not demand exact simultaneity. The Advisory Committee observed that “in many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity is not possible,” and that “a slight lapse is allowable.”50 Some allowance must be made for the time needed to translate observation into speech, so the working question is whether sufficient time elapsed to have permitted reflective thought.51 Reflection matters because it gives back what the exception assumes away, the time to lie or forget.52 The window is also narrower than the one for excited utterances, which lasts as long as the stress of the startling event, while a present sense impression may be made only while or “immediately after” perception. The shorter period matches the weaker guarantee of trustworthiness.53
At the near end of the range, results are predictable. The Boyce caller said the defendant had “just” hit her and that she had “just” run upstairs to a neighbor’s house, which satisfied the Seventh Circuit that she called almost immediately; that timing fit decisions from other circuits, including one that treated thirty seconds and five minutes alike.54 In United States v. Obayagbona, an officer’s recorded statement described an event that he and an informer had both observed minutes earlier. The court found an added guarantee of trustworthiness in the informer’s presence: he stood beside the officer and could have contradicted him within the hearing of the other officers, which made fabrication unlikely.55 See also United States v. Parker (statement made after an extremely short interval).
Around ten minutes, courts divide. A bystander who describes a shopper’s conduct to a store manager about ten minutes after an injury presents the question squarely, and some courts would call that lapse too long under the words “while or immediately after.”56 Other courts have accepted 23 minutes in United States v. Blakey, 16 minutes in United States v. Mejia-Velez, and 10 minutes in State v. Odom.57 Still others have rejected intervals in the same range; see United States v. Penney (about ten minutes) and Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co. (fifteen minutes or more). One critic asks why intervals that long should count as immediate at all, a question taken up with the other criticisms of the exception.58
An opponent’s objection usually takes this shape: too much time had passed, the declarant had an opportunity to deliberate before speaking, and that undermines reliability.59 Because the question is whether enough time passed for reflection, trial judges have room to rule either way. One court upheld the exclusion of accident reports filed two days after the claimed accident, finding that the declarant had time to “consciously manipulate the truth” and that excluding the reports was not an abuse of discretion.60
Intervals of an hour or more fall outside the exception. Dede’s tweet, posted instead on Facebook an hour later, would be inadmissible because too much time would have passed.61 See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. (collecting decisions that treat intervals of hours as long enough for reflection).
Phones have changed what a first opportunity looks like. “Immediately after” may now be measured by roughly the time it takes to locate a cell phone and text a friend or make an entry on Facebook.62 Witnesses tweet, text, post, and call 911 to describe crimes as they unfold or just afterward,63 and a written record is as eligible as a spoken one: a present sense impression is admissible so long as it explains an event immediately after it happens, and a short passage of time does not preclude it.64 In Ferber, the court admitted an internal email recounting a conversation with Ferber under Rule 803(1) “for much the same reasons” as it had admitted the notes.65
What fills an interval counts as much as its length. Acts requiring thought between the event and the statement weigh against admission, because they supply the reflection the exception assumes away. The Boyce caller ran to a neighbor’s house before calling and then answered the operator’s questions, and the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that both facts could raise the chance of calculated narration.66 A delay spent only in reaching a phone leaves the guarantee intact, which is why immediacy is now measured by the time needed to find a phone and send a message.67
The third step decides most disputed cases, since identical intervals come out differently depending on whether they were spent in transit or in planning. The fourth step is the legal conclusion, and the figures from decided cases serve only as reference points for it.