Concept
The Confrontation Clause Overlay
Multiple hearsay
The Confrontation Clause Overlay
A chain of hearsay can satisfy the Rules of Evidence at every level and still fail in a criminal case. Rule 805 admits hearsay within hearsay when each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception, and that command belongs to the law of evidence.1 The Sixth Amendment adds a requirement of its own: any testimonial evidence the State offers against a defendant is subject to the defendant's confrontation rights.2 Rule 805 is therefore the first gate a prosecutor's chain must pass, and the Confrontation Clause may be the second. The clause has its own full treatment elsewhere; this unit shows only how the two gates fit together.
The two gates ask different questions. Rule 805 asks whether every level of the chain has a hearsay exception. The clause asks whether the State is using a testimonial statement against an accused who had no chance to cross-examine the person who made it. A chain can answer the first question yes and leave the second wide open, because finding that a statement fits an exception does not show that this accused ever had an opportunity to confront this declarant. The protection also runs in one direction. It belongs to the accused and restrains the State, so it has nothing to say when the accused offers the chain.
One opinion shows both sides of that point. Nicole Brown had no first-hand knowledge of the shooting; she repeated to Detective Spell what Flowers had told her. At trial she testified that Flowers never told her he saw Demby do the shooting, but the court explained that this testimony did not change the hearsay nature of her earlier statement to Spell about what Flowers said.3 Her statement was hearsay within hearsay, with Flowers's words inside Brown's, and Rule 805 would demand an exception for each level. In the same passage, the court recited the rule that any testimonial evidence the State offers against a defendant is subject to the confrontation rights the Sixth Amendment guarantees.
The same opinion also contained a chain the clause never touched. The defendant offered the Lehman videotape, which contained Flonnory's statement against penal interest. Each level had its own exception: the videotape qualified under D.R.E. 803(24), and Flonnory's statement under D.R.E. 804(b)(3).4 The Confrontation Clause was not implicated, because the defendant, not the State, was presenting the videotape and the statement.5
The contrast teaches the point that matters here: the clause turns on who offers the evidence. When the State offers testimonial evidence against a defendant, his confrontation rights apply. When the defendant offers it, they do not.
A hearsay error and a constitutional claim can also attach to the same inner statement. In one federal prosecution, the government's evidence included Inspector Anderson's report, which repeated a statement by Macias-Limon. The defendant argued that the statement was inadmissible hearsay and that its admission violated the Confrontation Clause. The court of appeals held that the district court erred in admitting Macias-Limon's statement within the inspector's report, assumed without deciding that the error also violated the clause, and concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.6 By assuming the violation and still finding the error harmless, the court avoided deciding the constitutional question.
Not every inner statement draws the constitutional objection. A commentary on the Rules imagines a criminal case in which a declarant named Hilda is unavailable and cannot be cross-examined by Morris. Her declarations about Morris would raise a question under the clause, but the particular statement probably would not violate it, because it is not testimonial.7