Concept
Other Rules Still Apply
Statements attributable to party-opponent
Other Rules Still Apply
Rule 801(d)(2) answers one question: does the hearsay rule bar a statement that is offered against an opposing party and fits one of the rule's categories?1 When the statement fits, the hearsay objection fails, and the rule has done all it does. A party's statement then stands where every statement stands after it clears a hearsay exception: it remains open to exclusion on other grounds.2
The rule cannot do more because of what it examines. It looks at who spoke and against whom the words are offered, never at what the words say, so a statement qualifies even if it admits nothing contrary to the speaker's interest.3 The only requirement about how damaging the words are is that they be offered against the party's case in some relevant way.4 The hearsay rule protects a party from unreliable statements by declarants who cannot be cross-examined and who stand outside the opponent's control, and that rationale does not reach statements by a party or by those affiliated with a party.5 Other rules guard other interests. Some prevent undue prejudice, and some serve an overriding policy such as the exclusion of character evidence.6 Still others avoid discouraging socially desirable behavior that could otherwise be used as evidence against the person who engaged in it.7 A statement can pass the hearsay screen and fail one of these.
The earlier sections of this chapter worked on the second step. The two subsections that follow take up the third and fourth.
The Other Screens a Party's Statement Must Pass
Rule 403 is the general backstop. A party-opponent's statement may be excluded under it even though no hearsay objection remains.9 The objection seldom succeeds. A factor that weakens an admission usually goes to weight, and only in an extreme case does it support exclusion under Rule 403 or a similar rule or common-law concept. Winning exclusion, or a significant reduction in weight, for an admission is a very uphill battle.10
The objection succeeds when the statement is dangerous for a reason other than what it proves about the case. Suppose a defendant on trial for bank robbery admitted to an undercover agent that on another occasion he had sold drugs. The statement is his own and is exempt from the hearsay rule, yet it would almost certainly be excluded at the robbery trial under Rules 403 and 404(b).11 The drug sale is a collateral offense, and the rules against unfair prejudice and character evidence apply to the defendant's words just as they would to anyone else's. A statement aimed at the fact in dispute stands differently. Deuce's statement increased the likelihood that the drugs in question were his, so it was relevant under Rule 401, and whether he testified had no bearing on its admissibility against him under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).12
Authenticity is a second prerequisite that the exemption assumes. Suppose the government in a criminal case offers an email that it claims the defendant sent and that contains incriminating admissions. If another person wrote the email, it is irrelevant and inadmissible, because proffered evidence is relevant only if it is what the proponent says it is.13 The exemption applies only to a statement the party actually made.
A third group of rules excludes conduct and statements for reasons of policy. Rules 407, 408, and 409 cover remedial, safety, or corrective measures, settlement and compromise, and payment of medical expenses.14 In these settings the concern is that people will be discouraged from desirable behavior if it can be evidence against them, a concern akin to the policies behind many privileges. The hearsay problem is usually easy to overcome, either through the party-admission exemption or because the conduct is not an intended statement, so the policy rule is the real barrier.15 Statements a party makes during compromise negotiations or plea bargaining are not usually admissible against that party.16 Two examples show the pattern. Harry offers evidence that the seller changed its delivery guarantee, and he offers it in his case in chief to show liability, so it is inadmissible as a subsequent remedial measure under Rule 407. Madonna makes a statement about Guy's assistance during a negotiation over spousal support, and that statement is inadmissible under Rule 408 to prove the amount of the disputed claim.17 In neither case was hearsay the problem.
Constitutional limits sit outside the hearsay analysis altogether. The Fifth Amendment bars involuntary confessions, but only where a state agent plays some active role.18 The Confrontation Clause matters most with codefendants. If a custodial admission or confession names or implicates someone else as well as the maker, the Clause normally prohibits using it against the person implicated when the maker cannot be cross-examined, which is the Bruton problem treated earlier.19
Layered Hearsay
Rule 801(d)(2) clears the hearsay rule only at the level where the party, or someone tied to the party, is speaking. When that statement repeats what another person said, the combined statement contains hearsay within hearsay, and Rule 805 admits it only if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.21 Rule 805 speaks of exceptions, while Rule 801(d)(2) defines party statements as not hearsay at all, but that difference does not control. One court put it this way: a nonhearsay statement under Rule 801(d) should be treated, in analyzing a multiple hearsay statement, as the equivalent of a level that conforms with an exception.22 An exempt level therefore satisfies its own layer. It does not excuse the other layers from the Rule 805 requirement, and a statement admissible under Rule 801(d) can be admitted inside another hearsay statement when that other statement qualifies under an exception.23
The method is to ask who said what to whom, and then to find a route for each speaker. Suppose that, in a suit against Digby, Arlo testifies to what Bob said, offering it to prove that Digby was reducing its production staff. Bob's statement tends to prove what Catherine said, and Catherine's statement tends to prove Digby's intention or actions. That makes two layers.24 If Catherine and Bob are both Digby's employees speaking on matters within their jobs, Rule 801(d)(2)(D) may well reach both what Catherine said to Bob and what Bob said to Arlo, so Arlo could testify and a hearsay objection would not succeed.25 Statements passed along inside the organization do not lose the exemption for being internal. In one case a defendant argued that Rule 801(d)(2) allows only admissions made to third parties and not 'in house' statements. The court noted that the Advisory Committee had discussed 'in house' admissions in connection with subdivision (C). It found that this was not a (C) situation, because no one had authorized or directed the speaker to make a statement on the matter, but it held that the committee's rationale applied to the (D) situation before it.26
Change one fact and the chain breaks. Suppose Bob is a stranger to Digby who happened to repeat what Catherine said. Catherine's statement can still qualify, but Bob's statement to Arlo cannot, because the exemption depends on who spoke and not on what was said.27 That layer needs its own route, such as another part of Rule 801(d)(2), adoption by the party being one example, or some other exception, and without one the whole chain fails.