Concept
The Bootstrapping Limit
Statements attributable to party-opponent
The Bootstrapping Limit
Three of the Rule 801(d)(2) categories hold a party to someone else's words because of a relationship, and the relationship is often a fact that the words themselves assert. An employee who tells a friend that he skipped an inspection implies that he has a job. A declarant who says that his brother will collect a shipment implies that the two work together. The rule's last sentence confronts that circularity: the statement “must be considered but does not by itself establish” the declarant's authority under (C), “the existence or scope of the relationship” under (D), or “the existence of the conspiracy or participation in it” under (E).1 Using an offered statement to prove the facts that make it admissible is called bootstrapping, and the sentence permits it only in part.
The two halves of the sentence answer two opposite dangers. If a court could count a statement toward its own foundation without limit, any speaker could vouch his words in by describing a relationship, and the requirement that the declarant be tied to the party would mean nothing. If a court could not look at the statement at all, it would throw away evidence that, once supported, may carry considerable weight.2 The first danger is sharpest for conspiracy. Conspirators' declarations “are good to prove that some conspiracy exists and less trustworthy to show its aims and membership,” because the conspirator's interest “is likely to lie in misleading the listener into believing the conspiracy stronger with more members (and different members) and other aims than it in fact has.”3
The limit took shape in stages. Glasser v. United States admitted a conspirator's declarations against an alleged coconspirator who was not present when they were made only if there was “proof aliunde,” proof from another source, that the absent coconspirator was connected with the conspiracy. Otherwise, the Court said, “hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence.”4 Glasser and United States v. Nixon both predate the Federal Rules, so the question in Bourjaily v. United States was how that older demand for outside proof fit with the Rules.5
In Bourjaily, the district court considered both the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's telephone statements and found by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and the petitioner existed and that the statements were made in the course of and in furtherance of it.6 The Supreme Court held that when the preliminary facts relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are disputed, the offering party must prove them by a preponderance of the evidence.7 The trial court could consider the statements themselves, but Bourjaily did not address whether they could carry the foundation alone.8
An amendment then wrote the answer into the rule. The trial court must consider the statement as part of the proof of conspiracy, but the statement “does not by itself” establish the foundation requirement that the defendant and the declarant belong to the same conspiracy.9 The same sentence reaches (C) and (D).10 For agents it displaced older law. Courts traditionally held that the purported agent's past declarations asserting the agency could not be considered at all, whereas the federal rule lets the judge use them but states explicitly that, standing alone, they are insufficient.11
Each half of the sentence has its own work to do. Because the statement must be considered, the judge may give a doubtful statement little weight when it may come from an unreliable declarant, and considerable weight when independent evidence supports it.12 Because the statement cannot suffice alone, no speaker can create the foundation for his own admissibility. A court cannot tell whether a remark about the relationship deserves any weight until something outside the remark points the same way, and the relationship is the only reason the party answers for the words.
Under (C), the foundation is that the party authorized the speaker to make a statement on the subject.13 The statement counts toward that showing but cannot complete it.14 A speaker who announces “I speak for the company on safety” has made a claim about authority. The claim persuades only when something outside it, such as the company's own practice of letting that person handle the subject, points the same way.
Under (D), two relationship facts are at stake: that the declarant was the party's agent or employee, and that the statement concerned a matter within the scope of that relationship and was made while it existed.15 The judge decides these facts under Rule 104(a).16 The proponent must first prove that the declarant is the adverse party's agent and the scope of the agency, directly through the asserted agent's testimony, through anyone who knows, or through circumstantial evidence.17 The judge may consider any helpful portion of the statement itself, but the agent's statement, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish the scope of his duties.18 The court must therefore exclude the statement when the only evidence that it satisfies the rule is its own contents.19 The tempting shortcut is to treat a speaker's own description of his job as enough, since people generally know where they work, and the sentence rejects that shortcut.
What separates the two remarks is not their specificity or their damage but whether anything besides the speaker's own words supports the relationship.
Under (E), the statement bears on two foundation facts: that a conspiracy existed, and that the declarant and the party both took part in it.20 Suppose a declarant says, “My brother Bill is going to South America next week to pick up some great stuff.” The statement is admissible against Bill if the government proves to the judge by a preponderance that Bill and the declarant belong to the same conspiracy. In deciding that question, the judge weighs independent evidence, such as joint bank accounts and meetings between the declarant and Bill, together with the very statement the government is offering.21 The foundation fails when the support is missing. In one case the evidence did not establish the speaker's identity, the time and place of the assertions, or any other circumstances supporting a conspiracy between the unknown declarant and Dullard, and the court found the showing insufficient.22
The limit reaches only (C), (D), and (E). A party's own statement comes in under (A) because the party made it, so no relationship foundation is needed.23 Even within (E), the sentence names the existence of the conspiracy and participation in it. It does not name the separate question whether the statement was made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, which the court also decides under Rule 104(a) by the more-probable-than-not standard, and on which it may consider the content of the statement itself.24
Some state rules write the independence requirement into their text. The Ohio rule quoted in Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co. admits a coconspirator's statement only “upon independent proof of the conspiracy,” and it states no such requirement for the authorized-speaker or agent categories.25 The federal sentence differs in both respects. It covers all three categories, and it forbids reliance on the statement alone without requiring the court to set the statement aside.
An exam stem tests this sentence through the source of the foundation. When the only proof of a job, a delegation, or a partnership is the declarant's own account, such as a speaker who says she is the company's head of safety, the statement is considered and falls short. When the stem adds a payroll record, a company directory, a clerk who issued the declarant's paychecks, or conduct by the other conspirators that matches what the declarant described, the independent support is present and the statement comes in. Under the Federal Rules the court weighs the statement, so an answer saying the court may not look at it is as wrong as one treating it as self-proving.