Concept
Coconspirator Statements
Statements attributable to party-opponent
Coconspirator Statements
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) lets a party’s opponent offer, as the party’s own, a statement that “was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”1 The party need not have been present when the coconspirator spoke.2 That sets (E) apart from the four categories before it. Under (A) through (D), the party spoke the words, adopted them, delegated the speaking, or directed the work they described. Under (E), the only link is membership in the same criminal venture, and a link that thin needs both a rationale and firm limits.
The limits come from the substantive law of conspiracy. The proponent must show that the declarant and the party belonged to the same conspiracy, that the declarant spoke while the conspiracy was operating, and that the declarant meant the statement to further its objectives; the judge decides each point by a preponderance of the evidence under Rule 104(a).3 This unit first asks why the category exists and how far it reaches. It then takes the timing and furtherance requirements in turn and closes with how the judge finds the foundation.
Reach and Rationale
Suppose A, B, and C conspire, and A’s recorded statements are offered at A’s criminal trial. They are A’s own statements, and they are also the statements of B and C, because A made them during and in furtherance of a conspiracy to which all three belonged. The usual justification is the partnership: a person who joins a partnership answers for what the other partners say while it exists and in pursuit of its goals.4 Membership also fixes how far back the attribution reaches. If X later joined the conspiracy, the statements A, B, and C made in furtherance of it before X arrived would be admissible against X, because X took the venture as he found it, with its prospects of gain and its existing risks.5
The analogy explains the rule better than it justifies it. A partner ordinarily has actual authority to speak for the partnership, which has a legal identity separate from its partners.6 The authorized-statement category shows the contrast: a claims agent’s statement to an injured person’s family binds the company because the company authorized the agent to speak, and a truck driver’s admission does not.7 A conspirator receives no comparable grant. The Advisory Committee kept the accepted limit to statements made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though the broadened view of agency in (D) might have suggested wider admissibility, and it called the agency theory of conspiracy “at best a fiction.”8
A second rationale is necessity. A conspiracy is clandestine, and neither a conspirator’s courtroom testimony nor the conspirators’ observable activities adequately reveals what the conspiracy was. The Supreme Court has remarked on that difficulty and, in United States v. Inadi, declined to condition the exemption on the declarant’s unavailability.9 Need alone cannot justify a hearsay exception, so the rule leans on its foundation as well: the requirements for conspiratorial liability give at least some assurance that the statement is fairly attributed to the party.10 Trustworthiness is not the premise. The Advisory Committee observed that conspirators’ declarations are good evidence that a conspiracy exists but less trustworthy about its aims and membership, because a conspirator may want the listener to believe the conspiracy stronger and larger than it is.11 That is why fights over these statements usually turn on the foundation facts and not on what the statement says.
Within those limits, the category is broad. Either side may use it, in a civil or a criminal case.12 The conspiracy need not be charged; the Advisory Committee understood the rule to carry forward the doctrine that a joint venturer counts as a coconspirator even though no conspiracy has been charged.13 The declarant need not be a party, so a cooperating witness or an uncharged conspirator can be the speaker.14 The statement need not be against the declarant’s interest, since a statement is “against” a party only in the sense that it is offered against the party’s case now.15 Nor does Rule 801(d)(2) confine admissions to statements made to third parties.16 Membership sets the outer boundary: a statement that comes in against the conspirators who are parties does not come in against a coparty who was never part of the conspiracy.17
The category is needed only when the statement is offered for its truth. Suppose A, B, and C agree to extort protection money from local shop owners, and A tells one owner that the owner’s son will have an unfortunate accident unless weekly payments are made. Making the threat is itself an offense, so the words have legal significance whether or not they are true. They come in as a verbal act, not as hearsay, and whether B and C share responsibility for the threat is a question of substantive conspiracy law.18 A statement that does need the exemption may still carry a second layer: a witness who repeats what one conspirator told another adds a layer, and each layer needs its own basis under Rule 805, a point the later section on layered hearsay develops.19 An exam answer should therefore ask first whether the words matter apart from their truth, and next whether any layer remains.
During the Conspiracy
The word during in Rule 801(d)(2)(E) sets a time limit: the declarant must have spoken while the conspiracy was operating.22 A statement outside that window stays out however damaging it is, so fixing the window is the first job on a coconspirator problem. If the words came too early or too late, the furtherance and foundation questions never arise.
The limit follows from the rationale. A coconspirator’s words are charged to the party because they were spoken inside an operating venture, and once the venture ends, the speaker is no longer a partner talking about shared business. The Advisory Committee accordingly called the restriction to statements made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy the accepted pattern, and it cited Krulewitch v. United States for the rule that statements made after the conspiracy’s objectives have failed or been achieved do not qualify.23 The agency category carries the same limit: a statement qualifies under (D) only if the agent made it before the relationship ended.24
The window opens when the conspirators agree. A person who joins later takes the conspiracy as it already stands, so statements the other members made earlier, during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, are admissible against the newcomer.25 A remark made before any agreement exists has no conspiracy to be made during.
The window closes when the conspiracy’s objectives have been achieved or have failed, or when the person against whom the statement is offered has withdrawn.26
The hardest timing dispute arises after the crime, when the participants try to avoid detection. Prosecutors sometimes argue that every conspirator impliedly agrees to conceal the crime, so the conspiracy lasts as long as the cover-up does. That argument proves too much, because it would keep every conspiracy alive until trial and leave the timing limit with nothing to exclude, and it has not carried the day.27 Concealment counts when it serves the main criminal objective. The line, drawn in cases such as Grunewald v. United States, admits statements made during a concealment phase if they further the main objectives, as with kidnappers hiding while they wait for ransom or the repainting of a stolen car in a plot to steal it, and excludes statements made after the objectives have been achieved or have failed.28
Withdrawal closes the window for the member who withdraws, and the next problem shows how that works alongside the furtherance requirement.
The timing ground and the furtherance ground reinforce each other here, and the furtherance ground would suffice alone, because confessions to police are the standard example of statements designed to defeat a conspiracy.29 The judge, not the jury, resolves these timing disputes. When the parties disagree about when the conspiracy began or ended, or whether a member withdrew, the judge decides under Rule 104(a), by a preponderance of the evidence.30
In Furtherance
The second half of the phrase asks what the statement was for. A remark made squarely inside the conspiracy’s life still falls outside Rule 801(d)(2)(E) unless the speaker intended it to further the conspiracy’s objectives.32 The test looks to the speaker’s purpose; the audience, the actual effect, and whether the remark names the party do not control.
The requirement ties the statement to the venture’s business, much as the scope-of-employment requirement ties an agent’s statement to the employer’s.33 A conspirator who recruits, reassures, or coordinates speaks as a participant. One who brags, reminisces, or confesses to police speaks as an observer or a defector, and the partnership logic does not carry those words to the other members.
Statements that qualify do something for the venture. They induce enlistment or further participation, prompt action, reassure members or allay their fears, keep conspirators abreast of ongoing activities, help avoid detection, or identify the names and roles of members.34 Statements that engage in planning, allocate responsibility, or discuss payment qualify too.35 Courts take a generous view of what advances the conspiracy.36 What these statements share is a present effect on the enterprise: each adds a participant, holds the participants together, or coordinates what they do next. The statement need not name the party or be made in the party’s presence. A’s instruction to B to steal a car for a bank job may be admissible against C, who was neither present nor involved in stealing the car.37
Idle chatter, bragging, and personal reminiscence fall outside the requirement, and so do simple narratives of past events.38 A bank-robbery conspirator who says, “I wish [defendant] hadn’t shot the bank teller,” comments on what has already happened and moves the plan nowhere.39 Recounting the past is not disqualifying in itself, because purpose controls. Telling a partner how the first job went wrong so that the group can plan the next serves the venture; telling the same story for amusement or credit does not.
Statements designed to defeat the conspiracy are not made in furtherance of it, and confessions to police officers are the obvious example.40 Against the confessor himself, a confession is a party’s own statement under (A), subject to the constitutional bar on involuntary confessions, which applies only where a state agent plays some active role.41
On an exam, lead with the strict test and sort the statement by the speaker’s purpose. Recruiting, reassuring, informing, planning, and coordinating fall inside the requirement; bragging, reminiscence, and confessions to police fall outside it. Then acknowledge that courts read the requirement generously at the margin. Like the other foundation facts, furtherance must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, and the judge decides it under Rule 104(a).42
Judge Decides the Foundation
Each requirement is a fact, and each can be disputed. Who decides, and by what standard? In Bourjaily v. United States, the parties agreed that the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant’s involvement in it are preliminary questions of fact that the court must resolve under Rule 104.44 The Court held that when the preliminary facts relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are disputed, the offering party must prove them by a preponderance of the evidence.45
The foundation facts go to admissibility, so Rule 104(a) places them with the judge. They do not raise conditional relevance under Rule 104(b): a coconspirator’s statement would bear on the defendant’s participation in the crime even if no conspiracy existed, so what turns on the conspiracy is the statement’s escape from the hearsay rule, not its relevance.46 The same allocation governs all five party-opponent categories. When a party objects to a statement attributed to the party, the judge finds the preliminary fact by a preponderance, and if the judge believes the statement was invented, the jury never hears it.47 The agency category follows the same pattern: the court decides a disputed agency under Rule 104(a) and may consider the declarant’s statement in doing so, but it may not rest on that statement alone.48 A few states still treat the coconspirator facts as conditional relevance for the jury under a rule like 104(b).49
The preponderance standard fits what the inquiry measures. The judge asks whether it is more likely than not that the technical issues and policy concerns behind the evidence rules have been given due consideration before the jury hears the statement.50 The proponent, usually the government, carries that burden, and a proponent who fails to carry it loses the statement.51 Because the judge decides admissibility at a preponderance and the jury decides conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, the two findings can diverge: a jury may acquit of conspiracy even though the judge found a conspiracy and the defendant’s membership in it.52 There is nothing anomalous about a court deciding, at a different standard, a fact the jury will later decide.53 In United States v. Xheka, the court applied the exemption although the defendant had been acquitted of conspiracy.54
The judge may weigh the offered statement itself. In Bourjaily, the government’s proof included Lonardo’s telephone statements and the events in a hotel parking lot, where FBI agents arrested Lonardo and Bourjaily right after Lonardo put a kilogram of cocaine into Bourjaily’s car and found more than $20,000 in cash in it.55 The district court considered the telephone statements together with those events and found by a preponderance that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and Bourjaily existed and that Lonardo’s statements were made in the course of and in furtherance of it.56 Rule 801(d)(2) later codified that approach but added a ceiling: the statement must be considered, but it does not by itself establish the conspiracy or the party’s participation in it.57 The next section takes up what independent support the rule requires.
The procedure can look circular, since the statement comes in only if a conspiracy exists and is itself part of the proof that one does. The judge contains the circle by weighing. A statement that may come from an unreliable declarant can receive little weight, but a statement supported by independent evidence receives considerable weight, and a statement that looks unreliable in isolation can be corroborated by other evidence of conspiracy.58
Bourjaily explained how the judge decides but not when. The Court expressly declined to prescribe an order of proof for an ongoing trial.59 Trial courts therefore use three approaches:
- A separate hearing, commonly called a James hearing, at which the court examines whether a conspiracy existed, whether the declarant and the defendant belonged to it, and whether the statement furthered it.60
- Proof first, ruling second: the proponent offers independent evidence of the conspiracy and the defendant’s connection to it, and the court then admits the statement. Decisions before Bourjaily stressed this order whenever it was reasonably practical.61
- Conditional admission: the court admits the statement subject to later connection and, at the close of the evidence, rules on motion whether all the evidence, including the defense’s, establishes the foundation.62
The choice trades time against risk. Conditional admission saves time, but the jury may hear a damaging statement that is later excluded for want of a foundation. Bourjaily narrowed that risk, because the statement counts toward its own foundation and the proponent can often satisfy the court with modest additional proof; the old concern about exposing the jury to a statement that then fails to qualify has largely faded.63
The jury never learns that the judge made a finding, and it never learns that a coconspirator exemption exists. It hears the statement as it hears any other evidence and decides whether to believe it and what weight to give it.64 Telling the jury of the finding would be an improper comment on the evidence and would risk unduly prejudicing the defendant.65 The defense keeps its full opportunity to argue that no conspiracy existed, and the jury remains free to acquit.66