Concept
Agents and Employees
Statements attributable to party-opponent
Agents and Employees
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) attributes to the opposing party a statement “made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.”1 A statement that fits that text and is offered against the party is defined as not hearsay, as in every other category of the rule. The category reaches the words of the people through whom a business or an individual gets things done: drivers, inspectors, clerks, caretakers.
Two limits in the text do the work, and either can defeat an otherwise damaging statement. The statement must concern a matter within the scope of the speaker’s relationship with the party, and the speaker must have made it while that relationship lasted. The text asks nothing about whether the party let the speaker speak. That silence sets (D) apart from the authorized-spokesperson category in (C), which turns on whether the party “authorized” the speaker “to make a statement on the subject.”2
The subsections below take the missing authority requirement first, then the scope limit, then the timing limit. The proponent must also prove that the relationship existed, a burden that a later section develops with the bootstrapping limit.
Beyond Speaking Authority
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) never asks whether the employer allowed the employee to speak, and that omission is the category’s sharpest break with the common law.3 The break is easiest to see against the test the rule displaced.
Before the Rules, courts asked a plain agency question about an employee’s statement: had the principal authorized this particular statement?4 The question sorted employees into those hired to talk and those hired to do. A company’s claims agent could bind the company by telling an injured person’s family that the driver had been going too fast. The driver who said the same thing could not, because a driver is hired to drive and holds no express or implied authority to speak about the driving.5 Courts excluded statements by electricians, masons, and ushers on the same theory: the principal hired them to perform physical tasks, not to speak for it, and least of all to speak against its interests.6 Damaging statements were generally held outside the scope of authority even for relatively high-level employees.7
Judges came to see the result as unfair. A company hires a driver to operate the truck, not to speak for it, so notions of relevancy and substantive agency would not carry the driver’s words against the company, and for years the common law excluded them.8 Yet an employer legally liable for the driver’s tort could remain evidentially immune from the driver’s own account of it. In Martin v. Savage Truck Line, the court railed against the “legally untenable fiction” that lets a truck owner hire another to drive but not to describe the accident to the police. It was as if the driver could make a usable admission only if he were an officer or director, but “trucks are not operated that way.”9 The exclusion also preferred weak evidence to strong, because the employee could testify on the stand while the same employee’s post-accident statement was rejected.10
The modern rule rests on a practical picture of employment. Employees are ordinarily well informed about acts in the course of the business, their statements are typically offered against the employer’s interest, and while the employment continues an employee is unlikely to make such a statement unless it is true.11 The adversary system supplies a second reason: a party that assigns people to work answers for what they say about that work, as it answers for what they do.12 These are reasons for the category, not elements the proponent must prove. As with every opposing-party statement, the statement need not admit anything against the speaker’s interest, because what matters is the identity of the declarant and of the party against whom it is offered.13
In place of authority, (D) requires a connection between the statement and the job. Under the common-law test, the thing that had to be authorized was the making of the statement; under (D), what must belong to the job is the matter the statement describes.14 Put another way, the statement qualifies if either its making or what it tells was part of the employee’s job.15 Authority to speak is no longer of concern. The proponent need show only that the statement concerned a matter within the scope of the agency or employment and that the speaker was still employed when speaking.16
The driver’s statement about the driving therefore comes in against the company, because driving is part of the job even though describing it is not. The claims agent’s statement still comes in too, because the rule continued the admissibility of the traditional authorized statement.17 A janitor’s remark admitting that he failed to clean the floor reaches his employer in a slip-and-fall suit by the same route, although the common-law test would have kept it out, since he had no express or implied authority to speak or write about the matter.18 Mahlandt shows the pattern: an employee’s statements about an animal in his custody were attributed to the center that employed him because they concerned a matter within his agency and were made while the relationship existed.19 Some jurisdictions still apply the narrower approach and would treat the driver’s words as hearsay in a suit against the company, reasoning that the driver’s job is driving, not making statements about driving.20 An exam that specifies the Federal Rules calls for the broader test.
A stem that mentions a handbook or other employer instruction invites the common-law question whether the employer authorized the statement, and (D) does not ask it. A policy against talking might defeat category (C), which asks whether the party delegated the speaking, but it leaves (D) untouched, because (D) asks only about subject matter and timing.
Without a speaking-authority requirement, two other conditions that employers have urged also disappear. One federal court rejected an employer’s argument that (D) requires the statement to have been communicated outside the company and the declarant to hold managerial responsibility, because neither requirement appears in the rule’s language or in the Advisory Committee’s notes.21 A statement made to the employer qualifies as readily as one made to a stranger.22 Rank is equally irrelevant. In Aliotta v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., the declarant was an investigator with no decisionmaking authority, and the Seventh Circuit asked only whether “the subject matter of the admission match[es] the subject matter of the employee’s job description.”23
One caveat applies when the party against whom the statement is offered is the government. In a criminal prosecution, government employees are apparently not treated as agents or employees of a party-opponent under the admissions rules, and the point remains unsettled.24 Traditionally, public employees’ statements have not been admissible against the government, because public employees lack the personal stake in the outcome that private employees have and because agents cannot bind the sovereign. Courts have refused to admit an informant’s statement against the government in United States v. Yildiz, and a CIA agent’s statements against the government in an espionage prosecution in United States v. Kampiles.25 A stem that offers a government employee’s statement against the prosecution therefore does not follow the truck-driver pattern automatically, and the answer should flag the doubt before relying on (D).
Within the Scope
The first limit in Rule 801(d)(2)(D) concerns the statement’s subject, which must be “a matter within the scope of that relationship.”28 With speaking authority out of the analysis, scope becomes the link between the words and the job: the subject of what the employee said must match the subject of what the employee was hired to do.29 The employer’s permission to speak plays no part in that comparison, and neither does the employee’s rank.30
The limit follows from why the category exists. An employee is ordinarily well informed about acts in the course of the business, and a remark about that work is the kind an employer can fairly be made to answer for.31 A remark on a matter the job never touched lacks that connection, and the employer answers for it no more than for a stranger’s.
The Draper Chemical illustration shows the limit at work. Alex maintained the plant, and his duties included inspecting certain toxic-chemical pipelines every day. After a leak injured night-shift employees, he told health and safety authorities that he had skipped the inspection of the pipe in question. The subject was a task assigned to him, and he spoke while still employed, so the statement is admissible against Draper in an injured employee’s suit.32 Skipping the inspection did not take the subject out of his job, because the skipped inspection was the very failure he described. A janitor’s admission that he failed to clean a floor stands on the same footing.33
Matching the subject of the statement to the subject of the job is narrower than asking whether the statement is about the workplace. In Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., employees’ statements that they were being discriminated against did not qualify against the company, because a statement does not concern the scope of a person’s duties merely because it describes working conditions.34 Those employees described the setting in which work happens, while the investigator in Aliotta described the very subject of his job, which was investigating accidents.35 The employee in Mahlandt fits the Aliotta side of the line, because custody of the animal was his assignment.36
The two remarks share their words, and the fact that moved the result is the speaker’s job. Scope is measured against the declarant’s own duties, not the company’s business as a whole, so one subject can fall inside one employee’s job and outside another’s. Statements about matters in which the employee was not involved fall outside the category.37 A stem that names the speaker’s position supplies one half of the comparison, and the topic of the statement supplies the other.
The judge, not the jury, decides whether a statement concerns a matter within the scope of the relationship. The question controls whether the statement is admissible at all, so it is a preliminary question for the court under Rule 104(a).38 The rule makes no conditional-relevance question of it, and requirements of this kind are determined by the court.39 The party offering the statement must prove the relationship and its scope, and it may do so through the asserted agent’s testimony, through anyone else who knows, or through circumstantial evidence.40
The declarant’s own words may help establish scope but cannot do the whole job. The last sentence of Rule 801(d)(2) says that the statement “must be considered but does not by itself establish . . . the existence or scope of the relationship under (D).”41 If the statement alone could settle the matter, a declarant’s claim that a subject belonged to his job would prove its own admissibility, and anyone could vouch an assertion in by announcing a title. Courts once refused even to look at the declarant’s assertions of agency; the federal rule lets the judge consider them but requires something more.42
While the Relationship Existed
The second limit appears in the rule’s closing words: the statement must be made “while it existed,” meaning while the agency or employment relationship was still in place.44 The scope limit compares a statement’s subject with the declarant’s duties; this limit compares dates. A former employee who describes in detail a task that was squarely part of the old job falls outside the category if the relationship had already ended. One federal court read the rule’s timing language to require that the statement relate to a matter within the scope of employment at the time it was made, so it excluded statements made after the employment ended, along with statements about matters in which the employee was not, or was no longer, involved.45
The relationship draws the line, not the workday. The exception does not reach only statements made while the speaker is at work, so an off-duty remark qualifies if it concerned a matter within the job and the relationship still existed.46
The date line rests on the same reasoning that justified the category, seen from the other side. While the employment continues, an employee is unlikely to make a statement unless it is true.47 After the relationship ends, that assurance fades. The limit protects the principal from damaging statements by terminated agents who may bear ill will against their former employer.48
Return to Alex. On Wednesday he resigned, effective immediately. On Friday he told Perrozzi, one of the injured employees, in the hospital that the pipe was old and corroded and that he had twice told his supervisor it should be replaced.49 The remark concerns the same pipe, a matter that had been within his job, but he made it after his employment ended. It is therefore not Draper’s statement under (D) and is inadmissible against Draper under this category.50 The remark also blames the company and spares Alex, which is the kind of statement the limit guards against. If Alex were joined as a defendant, his earlier statement about the skipped inspection would also be admissible against him as an individual party-opponent statement.51
The delivery-driver problem draws the same line without any hint of a grudge. Napton ran over O’Brien while delivering for Ace Building Supplies, lost his job a month later for reasons unrelated to the accident, and made his remarks about speeding and failed brakes six months after that.52 His remarks come in against him as his own statements but not against Ace under (D), because he no longer worked for Ace when he spoke. Nothing suggests bitterness, yet the statements stay outside the category, because the limit marks the end of the relationship and does not ask whether this particular former employee was biased. A book written after its author retired from the company fails for the same reason.53 In Mahlandt, by contrast, the court found that the employee spoke during the existence of the relationship.54
The date itself can be contested. In a product-liability problem, the plaintiffs offer a bicycle manufacturer’s spokesperson’s statement that the design of a particular bike had proven defective. The company says it fired the spokesperson hours before she spoke, and the plaintiffs say she was dismissed shortly afterward. Whether the relationship existed when the words were spoken is a preliminary question for the judge under Rule 104(a), because the answer decides whether the statement can be heard at all, and the party offering the statement must prove the relationship.55 A judge who finds that the evidence slightly favors the company’s account has not found that the relationship more likely than not existed at that moment, so the foundation fails and the jury does not hear the statement. The spokesperson’s own words may be considered in making that finding, but they cannot by themselves establish the relationship.56
Two points keep this limit straight on an exam. The comparison is between the date of the statement and the date the relationship ended, so the date of the underlying events does not rescue a statement made after termination. The exclusion also reaches only the out-of-court words, since a former employee remains a competent witness who can be called to testify at trial.57 A stem that supplies both a firing or resignation date and a statement date is therefore testing a one-step comparison, and the answer follows the order of the dates.