Concept
Adopted Statements
Statements attributable to party-opponent
Adopted Statements
Rule 801(d)(2)(B) makes a statement the party’s own when it is one “the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.”1 The categories before this one attribute words to a party because the party spoke them. This one attributes words that someone else spoke, because the party took them on. The speaker may be a stranger to the lawsuit, and the statement still comes in against the party who adopted it. The proponent therefore has to show how the party made another person’s words its own.
Attribution of this kind is common sense. Suppose Freda tells Ed, “I think your brakes are squeaking,” and Ed replies, “Yes, I think you’re right.” Ed has agreed that his brakes are squeaking. A doctrine that admitted his reply against him but excluded the remark that drew it out would make no sense, because the meaning of Freda’s remark is absorbed into Ed’s answer. Ed conveyed the combined message of both statements, and under the Rule a party who “manifests his adoption or belief in the truth” of what another says becomes the declarant, so that the other person’s statement becomes his own.2
The party-opponent exemptions turn on who the declarant is and against whom the statement is offered. They do not turn on whether the statement admits anything contrary to the declarant’s interest, so an adopted statement need not be damaging on its face.3 Take a suit over a dog that bit a postman. Someone says to the man who later becomes the defendant, “It’s too bad your dog bit the postman.” The remark is an adoptive admission that his dog bit the postman if he agreed with it, expressly or impliedly, and something in the record points to that agreement.4 The outsider’s remark reaches the jury only through the defendant’s agreement.
The manifestation can take three forms. Words and conduct come first, because in both the party does something a court can read as endorsement. Silence follows, because there the court has only a gap to read.
Adoption by Words or Conduct
A party adopts another person’s statement affirmatively in two ways: by words that endorse it, and by conduct that treats it as the party’s own. Words of agreement are the plainest case. Someone tells driver B right after a collision, “You didn’t stop for the red light,” and B answers, “I’m sorry I didn’t.” B’s answer, together with the accusation, is an opposing party statement, or an adoptive admission.5
Conduct works the same way when a party puts someone else’s words to use. The party then manifests that it adopted or believed the statement, which puts the statement on the same footing as the party’s own.6 The standard illustrations show the range. A patient uses a physical therapist’s written opinion to make an insurance claim. A businessman gives customers and investors a newspaper article describing his company as financially sound and increasingly profitable. A minister hands his congregation a pamphlet in which a doctor calls the morning-after pill the equivalent of murder.7 In each case the party chose to rely on or circulate another person’s words, and the opponent may offer them as the party’s own.
The same logic reaches documents used to obtain a benefit. A husband asks his employer to write a letter describing his job responsibilities and salary, then uses the letter to get an auto loan. In family court his wife can offer the letter as evidence of his income, arguing that he adopted its contents. A person’s tax return, likewise, can be an adoptive admission or a personal admission.8 A party who offers a deposition or an affidavit to prove the matters stated in it knows or should know the contents and presumably wants all of them considered, since only the portion desired could be offered. The writing may therefore be used against that party as an adoptive admission in another suit.9
Electronic republication raises the same question. Forwarding an email with a “see below” annotation, or retweeting a tweet, could count as an adoptive admission, because the party endorses the statement as if it were the party’s own.10 Courts have found adoption where a forwarding employee’s own prefatory comment endorsed the original message, as in Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Lozen International, LLC. Before adoption even arises, the proponent must show that the party actually sent or forwarded the item. Authenticity is a question of conditional relevance, so an email the government claims the defendant sent is relevant only if the defendant sent it.11 One commentator has gone further and argued that a Facebook “like” is an adoptive admission, because a like manifests belief in an existing statement and does not make an independent one.12
Insurance claims show how much the circumstances matter. The picture grows more complicated, and admission should not follow, where the beneficiary expressly disavows the accompanying statement or the document is contrary to those presented in the exhibits. The argument for exclusion is strongest when the policy itself requires the accompanying statement, such as a certificate of the attending physician.13 A beneficiary who attaches what the contract demands has complied with its terms and has said little about whether she believes the certificate. Attaching a third party’s document therefore supports adoption when the party chose to submit it, and supports little when the party was compelled to include it or disavowed it.
Adoption by conduct can also avoid agency questions. A statement by an agent or employee comes in under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) only if it concerned a matter within the scope of the agency and was made during the relationship.14 Adoption supplies a route when that showing cannot be made, because a party that adopts a report makes it its own whoever wrote it.15 In Murrey, the court held that action by the Veterans Administration adopted recommendations by auditors, so their statements were admissible against the government. In Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, an airline set up a committee after a crash to investigate and recommend changes, and implemented the changes, so the recommendations were the airline’s admissions in the survivor’s suit.16
Conduct can be read more than one way, so the proponent bears the burden of showing that the party intended to adopt the statement. Whether a party manifested assent to another person’s statement is a question of conditional relevancy under Rule 104(b), and a mere statement that another person had made a particular statement is insufficient.17 A party’s report that someone else made a statement is likewise not enough by itself, and the court must look at the surrounding circumstances to see whether they indicated approval.18 When a party objects to a statement that a witness attributes to the party, the judge acts as factfinder under Rule 104(a) and must find by a preponderance that the party actually made it.19
A company president’s note shows how the party’s own words decide the question. Suppose the president writes that an attached scientific article means the company is “in serious trouble.” The judge accepts or rejects adoption depending on what the parties persuade the judge the president meant. If the president meant to agree with the article, the note and the article are admissible together under the adoptive-statement rationale.20 Without such words, the claim fails. A company does not indicate agreement with an unsolicited letter just by filing it,21 and mere possession of a document, standing alone, does not manifest adoption or belief in its truth.22
Adoption by Silence
Silence can manifest adoption when the party fails to respond at a moment when responding would have been natural.24 Words and conduct give a court something the party did. Silence gives it only a gap, and the question becomes what the party would have done had the statement been false. Silence is not itself a statement under Rule 801(a), and silence or a failure to respond is usually insufficient to adopt another’s statement unless some duty to respond exists. Courts often find such a duty when someone is directly accused of criminal activity in circumstances that would reasonably call for a denial.25
The theory is a claim about ordinary behavior. People contradict damaging claims they know to be false, so a failure to contradict one is some evidence that the person believed it. In the standard civil example, someone tells driver B, “Everyone saw that the light was against you,” and B fails to reject the assertion. The silence is treated as an admission because most people would contradict the assertion if it were untrue.26 The inference is only as strong as the setting behind it, so the same silence can support adoption in one room and prove nothing in another.
The bank-robbery prosecution in United States v. Hoosier answers all four questions for the proponent. A witness named Rogers testified that he had been with the defendant before and after the robbery, that the defendant had told him beforehand that he was going to rob a bank, and that three weeks afterward he saw the defendant with money and wearing what looked like diamond rings. In the defendant’s presence, the defendant’s girlfriend said, “That ain’t nothing, you should have seen the money we had in the hotel room,” and spoke of “sacks of money.” The defendant had earlier trusted Rogers enough to tell him the robbery plan, so the court saw little likelihood that his silence came from advice of counsel or fear that his words would be used against him. Under the total circumstances, the court said, probable human behavior would have been for him promptly to deny her statement if it had not been true, particularly since it was said to a person to whom he had related the plan. The court agreed that more than mere presence and silence was needed and found that this record contained more. Both the defendant and the girlfriend disputed the facts, but resolving that dispute was for the jury.30 Courts apply the same circumstantial test in other criminal cases, for example United States v. Fortes.
The proponent must introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding under Rule 104(b) that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a statement was made, the defendant heard and understood it, had an opportunity to deny or object, and by silence acquiesced. Mere possession of a document does not substitute for that showing.31 Once the proponent makes that showing, the statement is an opposing party statement. The exemption then looks to who the declarant is and against whom the statement is offered, and does not ask whether the statement admits anything contrary to the declarant’s interest.32
Silence offered against a criminal defendant draws added caution. The inference is inherently ambiguous, because silence may be motivated by prior experience or by the advice of counsel. Treating silence as an admission also affords unusual opportunity to manufacture evidence. And the accused is effectively compelled to speak, either at the time or at trial in explaining why he stayed silent, which crowds the privilege against self-incrimination uncomfortably.33 Miranda warnings settle the matter. Once they have been given, the defendant’s failure to speak may no longer be considered an admission, and the silence may not be used to impeach either. Silence after arrest but before the warnings has been held admissible to impeach.34
The civil rule rests on the same expectation. If an oral or written statement containing assertions of fact is communicated to a party, and the party would under all the circumstances naturally be expected to deny it if untrue, the party’s failure to speak is receivable as an adoptive admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(B). Letters follow the same pattern: although the general rule is often stated to be that failure to answer a letter is not an admission, McCormick asserts that the more acceptable view admits the failure to reply to a letter containing statements one would expect the receiver to deny if felt untrue.35