Concept
Offered Against the Party
Statements attributable to party-opponent
Offered Against the Party
Each category in Rule 801(d)(2) shares one opening condition: the statement must be offered against an opposing party.1 That condition fixes the direction in which the exemption runs, and two limits follow from it. A party can never use the exemption to bring in its own words. An opponent can use a qualifying statement only against the party responsible for it, not against everyone on the other side of the case. Both limits grow out of the rationale for the exemption. In an adversary system, what a party said is fair game for the party's opponent. The statement comes in for its truth, though it is never conclusive, because the party may offer evidence that explains it away.2 The hearsay rule shields a litigant from unreliable statements by declarants who cannot be cross-examined and stand outside the litigant's control. That rationale does not apply to statements by the party or by those affiliated with the party.3
A One-Way Street
The exemption lets an opponent use a party's statement against that party, and it never lets a party offer its own favorable statement.4 Because the exemption rests on the adversary system, it protects only the speaker's adversary. A litigant who offers its own earlier words holds no one to anything. It asks the jury to accept an untested out-of-court assertion, and the exemption supplies nothing to replace the missing test.
Dale's two remarks differ in only one respect: who offers them. A party who wants its own earlier words before the jury must find another route around the hearsay rule. So when a question stem dangles a damaging-sounding statement, ask first who is offering it and against whom.
Only the Responsible Party
When several parties share a side, a qualifying statement is admissible only against the party responsible for it. A co-plaintiff or co-defendant who is merely aligned with the speaker is not responsible.8 Suppose Jack sues Jane and Jill for personal injury after each drove through an intersection at the same time and hit him. If Jane blurts out, "It was my fault," her words come in against Jane under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) simply because she is an opposing party who made them. They do not come in against Jill.9 What lets the statement in is that Jane said it. Jill did not make it, and nothing ties Jane's words to her.
The rule has an edge, because a few relationships do make one person answer for another's words. If the parties are so closely associated that one can be deemed the other's principal or accomplice, the statement is admissible against both. A coconspirator's statement made to advance the conspiracy comes in against the other coconspirators, and an agent's statement on a matter within the scope of the agency comes in against the agent and against a principal who is a party.10 Each result depends on the particular relationship, which later sections take up. Being aligned as co-defendants supplies none of them.
A delivery-driver problem shows how much turns on the relationship. Napton drives for Ace Building Supplies, runs over O'Brien, and is later fired for unrelated reasons. After he is fired, Napton tells O'Brien that the truck's brakes had failed and that he had been speeding. O'Brien sues both Napton and Ace. The remarks are admissible against Napton under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), but they do not reach Ace. The agency category covers only a statement made on a matter within the scope of the relationship and while it existed, and Napton was no longer Ace's employee when he spoke.11 Had he said the same things while still driving for Ace, on a matter within his job, the statement would have been attributed to Ace as well.12 The words are the same in both versions, and only the speaker's tie to the party against whom they are offered changes the result.
Limiting Instructions and Bruton
When evidence is admissible against one party but not another, the common practice is to admit it against the responsible party and instruct the jury accordingly. That practice holds where the risk of prejudice is not as severe as it was in Bruton.14 Rule 403 adds a check. The court must weigh the harm that could follow from the jury's considering evidence against fewer than all parties in light of how effective a limiting instruction is likely to be. If, after that weighing, probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, the evidence is not admitted.15 In the Napton problem, Ace would ask the court to tell the jurors to use the remarks against Napton alone, and Rule 403 would govern whether that instruction can contain the risk.
A criminal case with several defendants raises the same problem in a form where an instruction may not be enough. In Bruton v. United States, the Court held that when a nontestifying codefendant's out-of-court statement implicates the accused, the substantial risk that the jury will use it against the accused despite instructions makes its introduction improper.16 The Confrontation Clause is the source of the concern. A confession by one person that names another normally cannot be admitted against the person named when the maker cannot be cross-examined.17
The options in a joint trial are therefore severance or redaction. Redaction has to do real work. Simply deleting the codefendant's name is likely not enough, though a statement may still be circumstantially linked to the codefendant through other evidence.19 A confession that is redacted to remove not only the codefendant's name but any reference to her existence, and that is admitted with a proper limiting instruction, does not violate the Confrontation Clause.20
Bruton is a constitutional limit layered on top of the hearsay analysis, and it is not the only one. Qualifying as a party's statement answers only the hearsay question, and such a statement may still be excluded under other rules.21 Even against its own maker, for instance, a confession offered in a criminal trial is barred if involuntary under the Fifth Amendment, though that bar applies only where a state agent plays some active role.22