Concept
Prior Statements and Hearsay
Prior statements by witness
A Witness's Prior Statements
Prior Statements and Hearsay
Most witnesses have talked about the case before they take the stand, whether to an investigator, an insurance adjuster, or a neighbor. When a lawyer offers those earlier words as proof, the hearsay rule applies even though the speaker sits in the courtroom. Rule 801(d) relaxes that result for a short list of statements by declaring that each “is not hearsay,” a label that tells you the statements fit the ordinary definition and would be excluded without it.1
Rule 801(d)(1) governs a witness's own earlier words. It requires that the declarant “testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement,” and it then asks whether the statement falls into one of three categories: an inconsistent statement, a consistent statement, or a statement identifying a person the declarant perceived earlier.2 A witness is ordinarily “subject to cross-examination” when placed on the stand, under oath, and responding willingly to questions, and the cross-examination need only concern the statement.3 Each category adds conditions of its own, and courts do not always read them alike. Courts that ask whether a statement predates the declarant's motive to fabricate, for example, divide over a witness who was under investigation or under arrest when the statement was made. Some treat the motive as already present and exclude the statement; others hold that investigation and arrest do not automatically produce a motive to lie and leave the trial court to decide on the facts when the motive began.4
Before those categories make sense, two foundations need to be in place: the baseline that makes a witness's earlier statement hearsay in the first place, and the line between using such a statement to challenge the witness and using it to prove what it asserts.
The Hearsay Baseline
A witness's earlier statement is hearsay because it satisfies both conditions of Rule 801(c). The declarant must not have made the statement “while testifying at the current trial or hearing,” and a party must offer it “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”5 The first condition looks to the occasion on which the words were spoken. Words spoken from the witness stand at the current trial fall outside the definition on that ground, and the same words spoken anywhere else do not.
Wendy's presence in the courtroom does not change the analysis. The definition turns on when the statement was made, not on whether the declarant is available or testifying now.6 Nor does it matter who repeats the words to the jury. Under both the common law and the general federal definition, a witness's own out-of-court words are hearsay even when the witness quotes them at trial, so long as their relevance depends on the truth of what they assert.7
Courts applied that definition to a witness's own words for the usual reasons. California v. Green describes the orthodox view, adopted in most jurisdictions: the earlier statement may not have been made under oath, the declarant may not have been cross-examined when he made it, and the jury could not observe his demeanor at the time. On that view the statement cannot prove the matters it asserts, though it may be introduced under a limiting instruction to impeach a witness who has changed his story at trial.8 Timing gives the view its strongest support. Cross-examination works best when it is immediate: “Its strokes fall while the iron is hot,” whereas false testimony tends to harden against the truth as the witness gains time for reconsideration and for the suggestions of others.9 A practical worry points the same way. If a witness's earlier words were generally usable as proof, well-organized parties would record interviews with prospective witnesses, with no cross-examination at the time, and offer the records at trial, when the witness might be less willing to change or criticize a recollection than if challenged when first expressed.10
Critics have attacked the hearsay label as applied to a witness's own statements. Earlier statements are often made before the pressures of litigation and closer to the event, so they may be more reliable than trial testimony and less exposed to memory loss. The cross-examiner can question the witness about both the trial testimony and the earlier account, and the jury can watch the witness answer for each, so the usual hearsay problems of inability to cross-examine and inability to see demeanor are absent when the declarant is the witness.11 A minority of jurisdictions, supported by most commentators, would therefore admit prior inconsistent statements for their truth.12 The immediacy argument also fits inconsistent statements poorly, because a witness who has changed an account has not hardened. The story has yielded to something that happened after the statement, and the circumstances most often suggest that the something was an improper influence.13
The Federal Rules landed between the two positions. Lawyers and judges disagreed with the drafters, and Congress refused to go along with them. Lawyers and judges thought that admitting prior inconsistent statements would encourage reliance on them at trial, and that deferred cross-examination, questioning the witness at trial about statements made earlier, is inferior to contemporaneous cross-examination about what the witness now says.14 Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is the compromise. It preserves the traditional view for prior inconsistent statements but exempts those made under oath, subject to the penalty of perjury, at a trial, hearing, or deposition.15
Having chosen which statements to admit, the Rules had to choose a label. Rule 801(d) defines the qualifying statements as “not hearsay” even though they fit the definition in Rule 801(a) through (c), so in substance they operate as hearsay exceptions.16 Placement explains the vocabulary: statements placed in the definitional rule, Rule 801, are called exemptions, and statements placed in separate rules, 803, 804, and 807, are called exceptions.17 The labels carry no difference in effect. An out-of-court statement within either category overcomes the hearsay objection, and the proponent may use it to prove the truth of what it asserts.18 Neither category guarantees admission, because the statement must still meet other requirements such as relevance and authenticity, and the Original Writing Rule when the contents of a document are offered.19
Impeachment Versus Substantive Use
A prior inconsistent statement can do two jobs, and the hearsay rule treats them differently. In the first, the jury notes only that the witness told another story and weighs that fact against the witness's credibility. In the second, the jury believes the earlier version and treats what it says as true.
Under the traditional view, which the Federal Rules preserve, most inconsistent statements are confined to the first job. Offered as evidence of what they assert, they are hearsay outside any exemption or exception. Offered for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness, they come in with a limiting instruction under Rule 105 telling the jury that it may consider the statement for whatever light it sheds on the witness's credibility but may not treat it as substantive evidence of the facts asserted.22 Wendy's unsworn statement to the officer fits that pattern: the defendant may use it to impeach her, but not to prove that the light was red.
The exception is Rule 801(d)(1)(A). It exempts an inconsistent statement that “was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition,” so the jury may rely on it to prove what it says.23 Most inconsistent statements lack that formality. An unsworn account to an officer, a remark to a neighbor, and a comment to an adjuster all remain impeachment material only.
Albert v. McKay & Co. states the older rule in terms that still describe statements outside the exemption. When a witness is impeached by proof of prior inconsistent statements, “the effect is merely to discredit him as a witness”; the former statements “are incompetent for any other purpose,” and they “do not constitute evidence of the truth of the facts so stated by him.”24 The Federal Rules endorse the same view. Unless the earlier statements qualify for an exemption or exception, they may be introduced to attack credibility but cannot prove the truth of what they contain, in a bench trial as in a jury trial.25
The limit has practical bite. Impeachment discredits a witness without supplying proof, so a party who carries the burden on an element cannot satisfy it with a statement usable only for impeachment. When such a statement is the only evidence on the element, the judge should grant the opponent's motion.26
The limiting instruction is easier to give than to follow. The statement usually asserts a fact that bears on the case, and a jury told to use it only for impeachment may disregard or fail to understand the instruction and treat the statement as proof.27 Jury misuse of evidence is a form of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, but that objection usually fails too, because impeachment by prior inconsistent statement is so well accepted and so important in assessing credibility.28 A statement that satisfies Rule 801(d)(1)(A) removes the difficulty, since the jury may use the earlier version for its truth and nothing needs to be disregarded.29
Rule 613 governs the mechanics of impeaching with a prior statement, and it answers a different question from the one just discussed. It sets procedural prerequisites for impeachment but says nothing about whether the statement may also be used to prove what it asserts.32 Under Rule 613(a), a lawyer who examines a witness about the witness's prior statement need not show it or disclose its contents to the witness, but must, on request, show it or disclose its contents to the adverse party's attorney.33 The first half abolishes the common-law rule of Queen Caroline's case, which required that a prior written statement be shown to the witness before questioning. The Advisory Committee called that requirement a “useless impediment” to cross-examination and noted that the rule covers oral and written statements alike.34
Rule 613(b) addresses extrinsic evidence, meaning proof from a source other than the witness's own answers, such as another witness, a document, or a recording. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party can examine the witness about it, or if justice so requires.35 The witness must ordinarily be afforded that opportunity at some point in the trial.36 The subdivision does not apply to an opposing party's statement under Rule 801(d)(2).37 Questioning the witness about the statement therefore needs no extrinsic proof, while calling another witness or offering the document does.